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ABSTRACT

‘Indirect expropriation’ is not an uncommon concept in international law. It
generally concerns situations in which State regulations impact upon the use of
private property in a manner tantamount to direct expropriation. However, the
conduct and the extent in which State regulation can constitute an indirect
expropriation subject to compensation obligations under international investment
treaties are still unclear in international law, and the problems of legal indeterminacy
in the area of indirect expropriation have resulted in inconsistent and incoherent legal
interpretations in a series of investment arbitrations.
In order to develop a more coherent approach with the potential to reduce the
indeterminacy of indirect expropriation provisions, this thesis argues that,
considering the public law nature of international investment treaties, vague indirect
expropriation terms contained within those treaties should be interpreted in light of
legal doctrines drawn from public law principles under both domestic and
international law. In international law, relevant rules applicable between the parties
comprise the context for treaty interpretation, as set out in article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. These are ‘general principles of law’
recognized as sources of international law under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. To identify the relevant public law principles, the
thesis focuses on resource materials, doctrinal analysis and case studies drawn from
domestic public laws and national jurisprudence developed by the US Supreme
Court, the European Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional and Administrative
Court of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Supreme Court of Mexico. The diversity
of selected jurisdictions is to ensure the comprehensiveness and generalizability of
the compared principles.
Analysis of the findings shows that the courts in selected jurisdictions affirm the
powers of governments to regulate private properties for public interests. However,
as societies evolve economically, the State’s rights to interfere with private property
become more limited, and governments can exercise their powers only within a
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limited bound of permissible legislative and bureaucratic discretion. Courts in the
selected jurisdictions generally affirm the emergence of the ‘proportionality
doctrine’ as a tool to assess the regulatory interference measure imposed. Indirect
expropriation is then typically subject to compensation obligation, first, when a
regulation deprives the property owner of all property rights or all economicallyviable uses; and second, when the regulatory interference falls short of full
deprivation of property rights, but fails to meet the ‘proportionality test’ and imposes
an ‘excessive burden’ borne by the property owner. In the latter case, the amount of
compensation is not subject to full market price, but rather varied according to the
nature of measure and circumstances in each case.
Current national jurisprudence demonstrates that the ‘principle of proportionality’
can provide a coherent framework for legal analysis of expropriation, and enable an
adjudicator to scrutinize all kinds of regulatory interferences that expropriate private
property, without impeding democratic processes on public policy processes within a
country. It can provide important guidance for treaty drafters searching for a less
indeterminate model clause on indirect expropriation. The ‘proportionality doctrine’
enables a State to interfere with private property for public policy purposes,
providing that the measure is necessary, suitable to the goals pursued and nondiscriminatory and not an excessive burden on the property owner.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A. Background Information
The lack of clarity within the definitions of “Indirect expropriation” provisions under
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other investment treaties (e.g. NAFTA
Chapter 11) has long been discussed. The type of government conduct that is
considered to be an indirect expropriation is surrounded by controversy. While direct
expropriation normally concerns a forced transfer of property from an individual to
the State, indirect expropriation is not easily determined and can be varied in nature.
Whilst it generally refers to government intervention having an equivalent effect to
the outright taking of private property, exactly which governmental interferences
designed to serve public interests qualify as indirect expropriation is often uncertain.
As a result of unclearly defined legal doctrine as well as the vagueness of Bilateral
Investment Treaties’ texts (BITs) regarding the phrase ’indirect expropriation’, a
series of international tribunals have applied different conceptual frameworks to
distinguish between normal public policies, on the one hand, and indirect
expropriation qualifying for compensation under investment treaties, on the other.1
Inconsistencies in applying this term have consequently hindered the development of
jurisprudence in this area of law.2
In addition to the problem of making the meaning of this abstract language unclear,
the current standards for investment protection have also been blamed for not clearly
integrating other international obligations; such as international human rights and
environmental protection obligations by which a country is bound.3 This problem

1

There were cases which ended up with opposing outcomes even though a different group of
arbitrators faced the same set of facts CME v Czech Republic (Partial Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral
Tribunal, 13 September 2001) and Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb, Final Award, 160–
165, 204, 235 (Sept. 3, 2001).
2
Peter D Isakoff, 'Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for International Investments' (2013)
3(2) Global Business Law Review 189, 196-200.
3
Luke Eric Peterson, 'Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Mapping the Role of Human
Rights Law withi Investor-State Arbitration' (Rights & Democracy, 2009).
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further adds to the inconsistency within investment treaty jurisprudence pertaining to
the rights of host State governments to take necessary measures. While some
arbitrators pay no attention to State intent or motivation to regulate for public
interests, and focus merely on effects-based issues,4 other arbitrators interpret
expropriation clauses as endorsing the public welfare purposes of State actions.5 This
exacerbates conflicting interpretations of legal texts between the investment treaties
and other branches of international law that the disputing parties have to respect.
Furthermore, the legal standards used by arbitral tribunals are arguably more
expansive than the legal requirements stipulated under the domestic laws of some
countries.6 As Been and Beauvais stated, some arbitral tribunals interpret
compensation requirements under expropriation clauses in a manner that far exceed
the substantive scope of the US takings standard.7 This arguably imposes extra
obligations on a State to compensate whenever it implements regulations that
interfere with investor’s benefits, or the investment’s value, even though the
contentious regulations were implemented for public interests and were not
discriminatory under domestic law. The ambiguity and uncertainty of the term
‘indirect expropriation’ under international law is, therefore, problematic. As
Peterson claims, the broadly defined term of ‘indirect expropriation’ allows an
arbitral tribunal at its own discretion to ‘draw the line between legitimate
regulations… and those actions or measures which amount to an expropriation of an
investment.’8
In contrast to international law, the concept of indirect expropriation is not a totally
new thing within the context of domestic public law. It largely concerns a situation
in which a State’s regulations restrict the use of private property to the extent that
4

Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB
(AF)/97/1, 30 August 2000); Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v
Argentine Republic (Award) (2007) ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3); Sempra Energy v The Argentine
Republic (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB/02/16, 28 September 2007).
5
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v The United Mexican States (Award) (ICSID Arbitral
Tribunal, Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003); EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador
(Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, Case No UN 3481, 3 February 2006); Methanex
Corporation v United States (Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 3 August 2005).
6
Vicki Been and Joel C Beauvais, 'The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protections
and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine' (2003) 78(1) NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 30, 59-78.
7
Ibid, 37.
8
Peterson, above n 3, 14.
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they produce an impact tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation, without
officially depriving the title of ownership over property. The power of government
to limit rights over property has long been recognized in the history of many
countries. In essence, the State right to control property was understood as an
exercise of the ‘police power’ to promote legitimate purposes in the society.
However, as societies evolve, property rights protections become increasingly
predominant in many countries in order to safeguard property owners from abusive
use of state power. As a result, protection against illegitimate regulatory interference
has been included in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and various other forms of
legal instruments. Nevertheless, since property rights are not absolute those protected
rights are also subject to reasonable limitations. State authorities can, therefore,
exercise their powers in accordance with permissible legislative or bureaucratic
discretion, beyond which legal remedies are provided to redress the harm suffered by
property owners as a result of regulatory interference.
However, State interference has increased in response to contemporary social
problems in a wide range of areas. This leads to heated demands by property owners
and diverse interest groups for compensation for regulatory interventions that
undermine the use and value of their properties.9 Domestic courts in both developed
and developing countries have tried to overcome these tensions by articulating legal
principles that distinguish compensable indirect expropriation from

non-

compensable regulation. By drawing from experiences under domestic laws (in the
United States, Thailand and Mexico) and regional law under the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), this research aim to illuminate insights into
the concept of indirect expropriation and to suggest more appropriate and effective
interpretative guidance for arbitral decision makers to enable them to reach more
consistent and coherent legal interpretations and doctrinal frameworks. This research
outcome could be useful in the future development of international rules, assisting in
formulation of the scope and content of indirect expropriation clauses in order to
clarify vague standards of investment protection and to ensure consistency in the
interpretation and application of such clauses for all investment treaties.
9

Steven J Eagle, 'The Birth of the Property Rights Movement' (Policy Analysis No 558, CATO
Institute, 15 December 2005) <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/birth-propertyrights-movement-0>, 3.
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In contrast to some commentators who favor dynamism and diversity and claim that
inconsistency is normal (given that different sets of laws are suitable to different
jurisdictions),10 I argue for harmonization. Arbitral decision-makers should utilize
the same common basic principles in a range of legally analogous situations across
judicial bodies across nations and various international legal bodies.11 Making use of
recognizable ‘general principles of law’ would potentially strengthen harmonized
interpretation, which ultimately leads to greater certainty and clearer expectations
among governments, individuals and arbitrators themselves concerning the baselines
for appropriate government interventions and the maximum limits of protection that
foreign investors should be able to enjoy.

B. Research Objectives
Based on the aforementioned concerns, there are six broad research objectives that
will be addressed in my thesis:
(1) To articulate the phenomenon and legal theory in the area of indirect
expropriation law.
(2) To investigate the evolving concepts, and the current state of, the doctrines of
‘indirect expropriation’ and the ‘standard of compensation’ under international law.
(3) To analyze the influence of social, economic and political factors on the
formulation of the legal interpretations on the protection against indirect
expropriation.
(4) To articulate the legal doctrines that determine when an indirect expropriation
occurs and to identify the ‘general principles of law’ on indirect expropriation and
the standard of compensation generally accepted not only by developed, but also
developing countries.
10

Steven R. Ratner, 'Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented
International Law' (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 475.
11
Markus Perkams, The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law—Searching
for Light in the Dark, International Investment Agreement and Comparative Public Law (Oxford
University Press, 2009), 111-12; A. Roberts, 'Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the
Investment Treaty System' (2013) 107(1) American Journal of International Law 45, 92.
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(5) To develop and devise a more coherent methodology to be used by international
commercial arbitrators to distinguish the use of normal regulatory powers from
compensable indirect expropriation.
(6) To provide recommendations for redrafting new model laws that can clarify the
term indirect expropriation and which conform to judicial practices under domestic
laws.

C. Research Questions
Based on the above set of research objectives, the key research questions that will be
explored within this thesis are as follows:
(1) What theoretical approaches best address and solve the problems of legal
indeterminacy?
(2) How do broadly defined treaty texts and the current practices of investment
arbitrations contribute to the problems of legal ambiguity and unpredictability in
investment treaties?
(3) Should international arbitral tribunals defer to national public policies/public
laws in indirect expropriation enquiries? Can the concepts of ‘comparative public
law approach’ and the ‘general principle of law’ be used as interpretative guidance to
strike a balance between private and public interests?
(4) What are the legal concepts/thresholds adopted by national courts, in certain
selected developed and developing country jurisdictions to identify the existence of
indirect expropriation, and to calculate compensation? And what are the common
general tendencies within their respective national jurisprudence regarding indirect
expropriation?
(5) What are the ‘general principles of law’ on indirect expropriation most
commonly accepted by nations from both developed and developing countries, in
light of their different legal institutions and socioeconomic backgrounds?

5

(6) What would be an appropriate model law on indirect expropriation to improve
textual clarity and comply with the judicial standards adopted by the courts in
developed and developing countries?

D. Research Methodology
The research undertaken in this thesis is an historical and comparative study, with a
primary goal to clarify the vague concept of compensable indirect expropriation
under international investment laws. To answer the research questions mentioned
above, this thesis will use a legal research methodology which focuses on resource
materials, doctrinal analysis, and case studies. To achieve the proposed research
goals, the thesis will be approached in five logical steps.
1. Establishing a Theoretical Framework
In this first stage, the thesis will develop a theoretical framework to understand and
to resolve the problems of legal indeterminacy. Based on the existing legal concepts
developed by legal thinkers from three distinct schools of thought, namely, Legal
Positivism, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and Legal Pragmatism, an attempt is made
to discover core principles surrounding notions of legal indeterminacy, as discussed
in each philosophical construct. Some general key ideas will be distilled in regard to
how the problem of legal indeterminacy can be resolved. Fundamentally, to respond
to this problem, it will be argued that an adjudicator should not only rely on the
written law as a decisive source of interpretation, but should contextualize normative
interests, facts and societal values embodied in a legal community. This interpretive
approach would allow an adjudicator to extract the real legal meaning of the vague
text from a number of possible semantic possibilities, and decide which one
constitutes the most proper meaning of the text.
2. Identifying the Problems of Legal Indeterminacy in the Context of Indirect
Expropriation in International Investment Laws
In the second stage, the study will focus on the problem of legal indeterminacy in the
area of indirect expropriation as evidenced in international investment laws.
6

Although State rights to regulate private property have long been recognized in
customary international law, it is less clear when the State can constrain or limit the
right to use private property without incurring international responsibility. Due to the
lack of definitional clarity, the problem of legal indeterminacy is manifested in the
context of international investment treaties where the clauses are typically drafted in
short and vague language. The textual imprecision creates significant concerns
regarding inconsistent arbitral interpretations and unfair interference in private
property. The problem of legal indeterminacy is thus not uncommon in international
laws.
To analyze this issue, the study will focus primarily on treaty texts as well as
relevant decisions by arbitral tribunals, collected from both primary and secondary
sources. The analysis will place emphasis on foreign investment protection laws that
are contained in four different types of international legal instruments, namely, the
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), North America Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Iran-United States Criminal Tribunal Declaration (IRUSCT) and the
recently concluded Tran-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). In order to conduct a
fruitful doctrinal analysis, a variety of case law databases will be used, including the
electronic resources operated by the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID),12 United Nations Commissions on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL),13 italaw,14 and the Iran-United State Claims Tribunal.15
3. Exploring the General Principles of Law of Indirect Expropriation through the
Comparative Public Law Method
Since an ‘indirect expropriation’ can occur through various forms of state
interference for the benefits of the public in general, this type of expropriation occurs
in the context of ‘public law’, which develops out of the commitment to political and
social norms in the community. Using the conceptual frameworks articulated by

12

ICSID, Cases <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx>.
UNCITRAL, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html>.
14
University of Victoria, <www.italaw.com>. This is a comprehensive and free database on
investment treaties and investor-state arbitration, operated by Professor Andrew Newcombe of the
Faculty of Law, University of Victoria, Canada.
15
Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Tribunal Awards & Decisions <http://www.iusct.net>.
13
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some legal scholars regarding the role of public law in investment arbitration,16 this
thesis argues that, instead of relying on general commercial law frameworks, legal
interpreters should employ public law thinking as a guiding tool to overcome the
problems of legal indeterminacy in international investment treaties. To engage
comparative public law with the interpretation of investment treaties, this thesis will
suggest that adjudicators should interpret vague provisions in light of ‘general
principles of law’ as prescribed by Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties (VCLT).
To identify general principles of law, the exploration of commonly accepted
principles of indirect expropriation will be carried out through a ‘comparative public
law study’, which involves the comparison of indirect expropriation jurisprudence
developed by courts across selected jurisdictions. Based on the courts’ jurisprudence
and the context of national economic developmental circumstances, the commonly
accepted principles that reflect ‘general principles of law’ can be identified to
provide a good source of interpretive guidance for investment arbitral tribunals. The
shared concepts will not only promote a more coherent and consistent interpretative
framework, but also improve the harmonization of legal doctrines at international
levels.
To build a common platform for comparison, the scope of the study will be limited
to the courts’ jurisprudence on damage attributed to two main types of state
regulatory powers: (i) the enactment of legislation to protect public interests (such as
the enactment of environmental and zoning laws); and (ii) State’s administrative acts
(such as a State revocation of granting permit of any harmful activities). The
research will, however, exclude court decisions on ‘tortious damage’ caused by the
State. In other words, the study will be limited to the loss incurred in the course of

16

Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007);
Stephan W. Schill, 'Enhancing international investment law's legitimacy: conceptual and
methodological foundations of a new public law approach' (2011) 52(1) Virginia Journal of
International Law 57; Stephan W Schill, 'Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: ReConceptualize the Standard of Review Through Comparative Public Law' (Paper presented at the
Third Biennial Global Conference, National University of Singapore, NUS Faculty of Law, Center for
International Law, 30 June 2012) <http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-2012-SingaporeConference.html>; William Burke-White and Andreas Von Staden, 'The Need for Public Law
Standards of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations' in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment
Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 690.
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exercising authoritative powers that are empowered by specific laws, rather than the
general infringement on private property under tort laws.
To ensure the comprehensiveness and generalizability of the compared principles,
the surveyed jurisdictions cover the United States, Thailand, Mexico and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). These jurisdictions were selected on the
basis of their diverse backgrounds in terms of the levels of economic development,
legal traditions, different litigation experiences and language diversity.
(a) The Level of Economic Development
In order to ensure diversity in the levels of economic development, the study consists
of sample jurisdictions from both developed and developing countries. While the
United States is considered by the World Bank as a developed country, 17 Thailand
and Mexico are selected as an indicative sample of developing countries falling
within a group of middle upper income nations.18 Unlike the United States, Thailand
and Mexico, the ECtHR, which is an international organization body with its main
function being to oversee the protection of human rights in the European Union
(EU), is composed of 47 Member States with different levels of economic
development.19 The ECtHR thus represents a key supra-national body that promotes
common values and standards of human rights protections across Member States
with multicultural diversity and diverse levels of economic development. To some
extent, the progress of economic development in certain jurisdiction might reflect a
direct relationship between welfare improvement, on the one hand, and a higher level
of individual freedom and property right protection, on the other.
(b) Legal Systems
In addition to the aforementioned factors, the type of legal system is another
important element that affects the way in which the law is interpreted and applied.
To ensure comprehensiveness of the analysis, the thesis compares countries from
two key legal traditions – common law and civil law. While the judgments of the
17

The World Bank, United States The World Bank <http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states>.
The World Bank, Thailand The World Bank <http://data.worldbank.org/country/thailand>.
19
Council of Europe, Migration and Human rights: European Court of Human Rights (2014)
<http://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/bodies/echr_en.asp>.
18
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U.S. courts are influenced by the common-law tradition, whereby the law is
generally developed from court judgments, the Thai legal system is greatly
influenced by the civil-law system, which was adopted from French and German
civil law cultures, where core principles are codified by law-making bodies. The
Thai legal system is similar to Mexico which is largely based on a civil law system,20
and Mexican codes, like most Latin American countries, borrowed from European
codes of the late 19th century.21 However, the ECtHR, which is a supra-national court
with a jurisdiction to hear complaints from its Member States with diverse domestic
legal systems, applies a single standard of human rights protections to all disputes
regardless of the diversity of legal systems operating within each of its Member
States.22
(c) Litigation Experiences
This comparative research is also concerned with contrasting differing litigation
experiences. With solid litigation traditions and experiences, the ECtHR 23 and the
US courts24 are appropriate examples of jurisdictions that have heard a large number
of cases relating to the issue of indirect expropriation. As a result, the courts in both
20

Dennis John Peyton, The Mexican Legal System (2009) Law Mexico Publishing
<http://www.lawmexico.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Mexican-Legal-System-ForForeigners.pdf> 1.
21
Franciso A Avalos, Mexican Legal System (16 December 2014) Daniel F Cracchiolo Law Library,
the University of Arizona <http://lawlibrary.arizona.edu/research/mexican-legal-system>.
22
Monika Ambrus, 'Comparative Law Method in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights in the Light of the Rule of Law' (2009) 2(3) Erasmus Law Review 353, 356; Nina-Louisa
Arold, The Legal Culture of the European Court of Human Rights, The Raoul Wallenberg Institute
human rights library V 29 (Martinus Nihoff Publishers, 2007) 6; Alec Stone Sweet, On the
Constitutionalisation of the Convention: The European Court of Human Rights as a Constitutional
Court <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/71>.
23
See Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden (European Court of Human Rights, Court (Plenary), Application
nos 7151/75; 7152/75, 23 September 1982) ('Sporrong'); Mellacher and Others v Austria (European
Court of Human Rights, Court (Plenary), Application Nos 10522/83; 11011/84; 11070/84, 19
December 1989) ('Mellacher'); Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece (European
Court of Human Rights, Court (Chamber), Application No 13427/87, 9 December 1994) ('Stran
Greek Refineries').; Presso Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v Belgium (European Court of Human
Rights, Court (Chamber), Application No 17849/91, 20 November 1995) ('Presso Compania');
Beyeler v Italy (European Court of Human Rights, Court (Grand Chamber), Application No
33202/96, 5 January 2000) ('Beyeler').
24
See Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922); Armstrong v United States, 364 US 40
(1960); Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104 (1978); Andrus v Allard, 444
US 51 (1979); Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255 (1980); Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan, 458
US 419 (1982); Nollan v California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825 (1987); Dolan v City of Tigard,
512 US 374 (1994); Palazzola v Rhode Island, 533 US 606 (2001); Tahoe Sierra Preservation
Council Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302 (2002); Kelo v City of New London, 545
US 469 (2005); Koontz v St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S Ct 2586 (2013).
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jurisdictions have long developed legal criteria with which to solve this type of
conflict. This is contrary to the position in Thailand, where the relevant specialized
courts were established as recently as 1999. Thus the administrative courts25 and the
Constitutional Court of Thailand26 have decided a significantly smaller number of
cases as compared to developed countries. As such, the courts in Thailand are at the
early stage of developing a coherent legal analytical framework to handle this
complex issue of indirect expropriation.27 This is similar to Mexico, where the
application of the Mexican Constitution against State regulatory interference with
private properties is quite limited due to a strict interpretation of the Federal
Constitution, which holds that compensation is given only when the property is
seized by formal decrees.28
(d) Language Diversity
Besides legal factors, the selection of sample jurisdictions is limited by knowledge of
language. Basically, this research focuses on the jurisdictions that use English as the
official language. This includes the United States and the ECtHR. The information to
be compared can be obtained from both primary and secondary sources. 29 However,
to make the research findings more scientifically sound and generalizable, this thesis

See e.g. ศาลปกครองสูงสุด [Thai Supreme Administrative Court], For 17/2545 (2002); ศาลปกครอง
สูงสุด [Thai Supreme Administrative Court], Red Case No. Aor 180/2554, 8 June 2554; ศาลปกครอง
สูงสุด [Thai Supreme Administrative Court] Red Case No Oor 35/2547 (2004); ศาลปกครองสูงสุด
[Thai Supreme Administrative Court] Red Case No Oor 75/2550 (2007).
26
See e.g. ศาลรัฐธรรมนูญ [Constitutional Court of Thailand], No 14/2544, 26 April 2001 reported in
the National Gazette, Vol 119, No 18 Kor 1; ศาลรัฐธรรมนูญ [Constitutional Court of Thailand], No
26-34/2545, 4 June 2002 reported in the National Gazette, Vol 120, No 11 Kor, 1; ศาลรัฐธรรมนูญ
[Constitutional Court of Thailand], No 40-41/2546, 16 October 2003 reported in the National Gazette,
Vol 121, No 45 Kor, 1; ศาลรัฐธรรมนูญ [Constitutional Court of Thailand], No 30/2548, 1 February
2005 reported in the National Gazette, Vol 122, No 96 Kor, 1; ศาลรัฐธรรมนูญ [Constitutional Court
of Thailand], No 24-25/2551, 26 December 2008 reported in the National Gazette, Vol 126, No 30
Kor, 55; ศาลรัฐธรรมนูญ [Constitutional Court of Thailand], No 13/2556, 2 October 2013 reported in
the National Gazette, Vol 131, No 2 Kor, 1.
27
Charnchai Sawangsakdi, คาอธิบายกฎหมายเกี่ยวกับความรับผิดทางละเมิดของเจ้าหน้าที่และความ
รับผิดชอบของรัฐโดยปราศจากความผิด [The Explanation to the Law in relation to Torts Liability and
State Liability without Faults] (Winyuchon Publishing, 2012) 391.
28
Gregory M. Starner, 'Taking a Constitutional Look: NAFTA Chapter 11 as an Extension of
Member States' Constitutional Protection of Property' (2002) 33(2) (Winter2002) Law & Policy in
International Business 405, 414.
29
In addition to scholarly publications written, the case studies can be obtained from other online
sources. For the US courts’ decisions, the information is mainly from LexisNexis,
<http://www.lexisnexis.com.au> For the ECtHR, the information is from HUDOC database operating
by the European Court of Human Rights, Judgements and Decisions <http://www.echr.coe.int>.
25
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also includes samples from other non-English countries, namely Thailand and
Mexico. In relation to Thailand, all information largely appears in Thai, the author’s
native language, so this allows the researcher to gain access to local information
available in both primary and secondary sources.30 However, due to limited English
language publications in the area of indirect expropriation law in Mexico, the
researcher heavily relies on translated works in English which are available in some
English language literature and reliable online materials.
4. Analysis of the Utility of the Proportionality Doctrine
After the comparative analysis of similarities and differences between the legal
doctrines adopted by the surveyed jurisdictions, the thesis offers an in-depth analysis
of key elements and the context in which the ‘proportionality doctrine’ has been
applied in the area of indirect expropriation law. Due to the widespread application
of this doctrine, at both national and international levels, this thesis suggests the
identification of the ‘proportionality doctrine’ as a general principle of law that can
be adopted to resolve tensions between public and private interests in the context of
indirect expropriation law under international investment treaties. Some advantages
and drawbacks of this doctrine will also be analyzed.
5. Proposing a New Model Treaty Clause for Indirect Expropriation
In the final part of this thesis, the study will provide some suggestions concerning
how to enhance the predictability, consistent interpretation and coherence of a legal
framework for the issue of indirect expropriation. To make the suggested legal
framework more immediate and practical, a new model clause on indirect
expropriation to be articulated in investment treaties will be proposed. By
incorporating the proportionality doctrine in the proposed clause, the model law is
intended not only to improve textual clarity and precision, but also to reflect the
current practices recognized by national jurisprudence (namely within the United
States, Thailand, and Mexico) and international jurisprudence (namely by the
30

Besides the scholarly publications in both Thai and English, the decisions and judgements by local
courts in the Kingdom of Thailand can be obtained from the websites operated by The Constitutional
Court of the Kingdom of Thailand, Court's Judgements <http://library.constitutionalcourt.or.th/> and
The Administrative Court of the Kingdom of Thailand, Interesting Cases Classified by the Nature of
Dispute <http://www.admincourt.go.th/admincourt/site/05SearchCategory.html>.
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ECtHR) utilized to distinguish normal regulations from compensable regulatory
interference.

E. Chapter Structure and Brief Contents

Chapter

Objectives

1

Introduction

2

This Chapter examines the concepts of legal indeterminacy proposed by
various legal theories. The applicability of the doctrine and its relevance
to international investment agreements will be analyzed. Some proposed
legal remedies to the problem of legal indeterminacy will be addressed,
and will be used as an analytical framework for the remainder of the
thesis.

3

This Chapter reviews the concepts and the applications of expropriation
regimes under customary international law and of the international
minimum standard of treatment. The discussion will reflect upon the
ideological conflicts between exporting and importing countries in the
early period of expropriation of foreign investment.

4

This study focuses on the legal concept of expropriation under
contemporary international investment treaties. It also examines current
developments in arbitral jurisprudence on indirect expropriation under
international law on foreign investment protection. It gives an overview
of past jurisprudence regarding the manner in which private arbitrators
distinguish

compensatory

expropriations

from

legitimate

State

regulations. The study also reviews the concepts of dispute settlement
and the interpretative approaches undertaken by private arbitrations
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Chapter

Objectives
under various legal regimes, such as NAFTA, BITs and the Iran-US
Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP). Based on this past jurisprudence, working under the framework
of ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitral rules, the analysis reveals how an
unclearly defined term of indirect expropriation and the current systems
of investment dispute settlement contribute to the problem of legal
ambiguity and legal unpredictability.

5

This Chapter outlines the role of domestic public law as a means of
providing interpretative guidance for investment arbitrations. Rather
than conferring upon the private arbitrator full discretionary power to
interpret vague substantive rights contained in investment treaties, this
Chapter argues that treaty interpretation should be based on standards
and concepts embodied in each domestic legal order.
The study will analyze the limitation of conventional approaches to
treaty interpretation in effectively resolving the problems of legal
indeterminacy in investment treaties. Based on new legal concepts
developed by a number of legal scholars, the study suggests that
deference should be paid specifically to the ‘public law approach’ in
order to resolve problems of legal indeterminacy in international
investment treaties.
To clarify the ambiguous standards of indirect expropriation law, the
study adopts the ‘general principles of law’ framework pursuant to
Article 31(3)(c) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
as a means to clarify vague legal principles of indirect expropriation and
standards of compensation. An examination of the role of domestic
public law will be carried out through both a theoretical discussion and a
survey of practical outcomes of past jurisprudence. Despite not being
applied in a uniform manner across sample jurisdictions, the thesis will

14

Chapter

Objectives
argue in Chapter Nine that the ‘proportionality doctrine’ is widely
regarded as a commonly acceptable principle that is used in all
comparing jurisdictions.

6-8

The surveys of judicial standards concerning indirect expropriation at
both domestic and international levels are carried out in four different
jurisdictions. In Chapter Six, the study focuses on the historical
development, internal judicial review system, objectives and decisions
made by the US Supreme Court. In Chapter Seven, the research focuses
on the position within the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
and in Chapter Eight, the position within Thailand and Mexico is
examined respectively.

9

A comparative analysis of these four legal systems, their standards of
review and the concepts of indirect expropriation as well as the
associated compensation regimes employed by the ECtHR, the United
States, Thailand and Mexico is undertaken in Chapter 9.
From the experiences in these four different jurisdictions, this Chapter
distills a comparative overview of institutional backgrounds, core legal
doctrines and State practices on the jurisprudence of review in relation
to indirect expropriation. It will argue that common ‘general principles
of law’ can be recognized as inherent in those selected jurisdictions. The
identified

proportionality

doctrine

could

provide

a

coherent

interpretative framework that investment arbitrators can follow when
they encounter hard cases in the future.

10

This Chapter provides an overview of the major thesis findings. In
addition, it provides policy recommendations in support of developing a
new model clause on indirect expropriation in investment treaties. To

15

Chapter

Objectives
resolve the tensions arising out of an unclearly defined conceptual
framework regarding indirect expropriation provisions, an attempt is
made to present a potential model clause by making use of the
proportionality doctrine that has been developed by ECtHR and
domestic courts in the United States, Thailand and Mexico when dealing
with the regulatory interference. It is argued that the proposed model
clause would not only improve textual clarity, but also reaffirm an
appropriate balance between the right to regulate by state governments
and the rights to be protected from regulatory interference, which
conforms to both national and international practices.

F. Significance of Study
This thesis is significant for three reasons. Firstly, this thesis fills a gap in academic
literature on the doctrine of indirect expropriation in international investment
treaties. It is one the first studies to examine the ‘general principles of law’ approach
to indirect expropriation from the point of view of both developed and developing
countries. Secondly, the findings of this thesis could provide interpretative guidance
for arbitral tribunals when analyzing indirect expropriation claims. The aim of such
guidance is not only to improve consistency in interpretations of vague treaty texts,
but also to ensure better interpretations, which comply with the standards adopted by
judicial practices in both developed and developing countries. Thirdly, the research
findings could provide useful insights for host and investor state governments to
revise provisions on indirect expropriation contained in international investment
laws, in order to more appropriately balance private and public interests in their
countries
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CHAPTER II
LEGAL INDETERMINACY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, SOURCES,
SOLUTIONS AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS

The concept of ‘indirect expropriation’ presents a great challenge in international
legal proceedings on investment protection law. There is still no consensus as to
when any governmental interference should be regarded as an indirect expropriation
under international law.
To promote justice and consistency in this growing and important field, this Chapter
provides an overview of existing theoretical frameworks used to analyze the issue of
legal ambiguity within international investment agreements. The study reviews the
theoretical foundations, sources and remedies for ‘legal indeterminacy’. By doing so,
this Chapter provides a thorough understanding of the key problems and provides
some insight into possible solutions. The theory of legal indeterminacy provides a
context for coherent discussion of indirect expropriation in the remaining parts of
this thesis.
The Chapter starts by examining the meaning and types of legal indeterminacy. The
second section then reviews theoretical aspects of legal indeterminacy, raised by
three different schools of thought; ranging from legal positivism to critical legal
studies, as well as law and economic pragmatism. In addition to the legal concepts
themselves, some discussion of the suggested devices proposed by each legal
approach is carried out on order to identify various ideas regarding how adjudicators
should react to problems of legal indeterminacy. In the last section, the study focuses
on the problems of legal indeterminacy in international investment agreements.
Since the treaty language is inherently ambiguous, its indeterminacy allows
arbitrators to exercise considerable discretionary power in deciding cases. Despite an
arbitrator’s impartiality, the vague standards of protection in an investment treaty
may result in inconsistency in treaty interpretation, undermining the legitimacy of
the international arbitration process. Finally, to resolve the problems of legal
17

indeterminacy in international investment arbitration, some suggested solutions are
provided.

A. The Types of Legal Indeterminacy and Associated Problems
Legal indeterminacy’, or ‘Indeterminacy Theory’, is a significant theme in current
legal debate and is advanced in a number of legal theories. In general, these theories
posit that in any given set of legal principles, there are always ‘substantial gaps,
conflicts and ambiguities’.1 If the law does not precisely prescribe the outcome of a
situation, other factors such as the personal attitude of the judge might influence the
outcome. According to Kress, if legal ambiguities are not addressed, the objectivity
and neutrality of legal decisions will always be questioned, and this would lead to
the problematic questioning of the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole.2
In order to analyze the nature of indeterminacy, commentators have identified
different types of indeterminacy that may arise in legal systems. Lorenz Kaehler, for
example, provides a broad overview of the nature of legal indeterminacy. He claims
that there are at least five different types of indeterminacy in any legal system:
formal indeterminacy, normative indeterminacy, substantial indeterminacy, factual
indeterminacy and linguistic indeterminacy.3 For Kaehler, formal indeterminacy
concerns a situation in which the law is unable to a give an accurate answer to the
legal question before an adjudicator. In the case of normative indeterminacy, the law
itself cannot determine accurately which norm should govern the case. In this case,
he argues that the personal opinion of the adjudicator can be of importance in
making a decision. Another type of indeterminacy can be described as a substantial
indeterminacy, which is concerned with the vagueness of a legal provision and a
judge’s inability to apply an accurate legal standard to the case.

1

Factual

Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Critical Legal Studies Movement
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/bridge/CriticalTheory/critical2.htm>.
2
Ken Kress, 'Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy' in Gregory Leyh (ed), Legal Hermeneutics
(University of California Press, 1992) 200; Joseph William Singer, 'The Player and the Cards:
Nihilism and Legal Theory' (1984) 94 Yale Law Journal 1, 11-12.
3
Lorenz Kaehler, Indeterminacy in the Law: Types and Problems (2014) University of Transnational
Business <http://transnationalbusinesslaw.com/indeterminacy-in-the-law--types-andproblems.html>3.
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indeterminacy can also play a role in the uncertainty of law. It concerns uncertainty
in how an adjudicator connects facts and evidence with the conduct and
consequences in question.
Similarly, Professor Sol Picciotto points out the sources of indeterminacy in the rule
of law.4 At its root, the problem originates from the indeterminacy of ‘language’.5
Since language is associated with a society, the meaning of words is not static and is
interpreted in accordance with the prevalent social context, which is changing over
time.6 In addition to vague language, the indeterminacy of law flows from the
presence of ‘liberal legality’.7 Since the legislator cannot draft the law to capture all
existing and future applications in real life, the drafter has to leave a certain degree in
flexibility of legal interpretation to the adjudicator. Legal practitioners are free to
interpret the text within the framework formulated by the legislature so as to bridge
these legal gaps. Nevertheless, this flexibility of legal interpretation might create
tensions and contradictions, resulting in the indeterminacy of law.8 In addition to
these legal factors, Professor Picciotto also notes that the interpretation of law is not
only concerned with facts and written law, but also the ‘norms’ embodied in a set of
laws.9 As a result, the different norms and values contained in a set of laws
inevitably leads to different interpretations of the meaning of the texts, which reflects
a hidden ideological power of the decision-maker.10
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the types of indeterminacy in law are
diverse and vary in scope and degree.11 Although there is no conclusive answer to
define the complete nature of indeterminacy in law, it can be said that different types
of indeterminacy in law can be linked and clustered together. Since indeterminacy in
law is a common phenomenon, it can trigger many legal problems concerning the
application of law, interpretative consistency of law and methodological approaches
to be used by adjudicators. In essence, the imprecision of the ‘open texture’ of
4

Sol Picciotto, 'Indeterminacy, Complexity, Technocracy and the Reform of International Corporate
Taxation' (2015) 24(2) Social & Legal Studies 165.
5
Ibid 169.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid 171.
10
Ibid.
11
Kaehler, above n 3.
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language can not only lead to ‘disagreement between reasonable people on the
application of that expression’,12 but also to disagreement regarding the ‘semantic’
uncertainty of how law should be applied within a specific circumstance to
determine a single legal outcome.13

B. Theoretical Responses to the Problem of Legal Indeterminacy
In order to overcome the problems caused by legal indeterminacy, legal
commentators have considered various fundamental principles to resolve them. In
the following part, three main schools of thought including Legal Positivism, Critical
Legal Studies (CLS) and Pragmatism, will be investigated and analyzed. In each
theory, some fundamental legal concepts are highlighted. In addition, some aspects
of the problem of legal indeterminacy and potential solutions embodied in each
theory will be discussed. The aim of this examination is to see how legal thinkers
respond to the existence of legal indeterminacy in order to discern the a best
interpretation.
1. Legal Positivism
(a) Basic Ideas: The Objectivity of Law
The concept of legal positivism played a critical role for nearly 200 years from the
end of 18th century until the mid of 20th century.14 Due to the Industrial Revolution in
Europe and America, the understanding of law and legal interpretation was
influenced by ‘modernism’, according to which law and judgment must be
scientifically, rationally and analytically proven.15 Generally, legal positivism does
not reject the existence of moral values, but it claims that ‘the existence of law is

12

Timothy A O Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 11-12.
LELIJA ŠOČANAĆ, 'Indeterminacy vs Precision in International Arbitration: The Arbitration
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conceptually distinct from its moral value.’16 Legal positivism, based on the absolute
ground of science and knowledge, denies moral questions.
The discussion of the concept of legal positivism dates back to ancient Greece in the
fifth century BC. However, positivism became widely regarded during the 18th-19th
century when legal theory was largely grounded on the basis of ‘command’ and
‘sovereignty’.17 Jeremy Bentham (1747-1832), a renowned legal positivist,
maintained that people are rational and respond to the system of reward and
punishment.18 Since the ultimate goal of law is to increase the total sum of social
pleasure,19 Bentham perceives law as a ‘communication of how the sovereign wants
(or commands) their subjects to behave, together with something that makes them
inclined to obey the commands’.20 John Austin (1790-1859) also perceived law as a
command of the sovereign.21 However, Austin went further by explaining that the
formation of command also incorporates other key elements, including a wish,
communication of wish, and inherent sanctions.22 Austin thus conceived law as the
generalized commands of the sovereign that are backed up by sanctions.23
To remove subjective matters from legal science, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973)
established a ‘pure theory of law’ that aims to describe the general nature of law in
any legal system.24 According to Kelsen, law is not merely a set of written laws, but
also a set of ‘norms’ that create a sense of obligation on people’s behaviors.25 A
norm is thus the expression of the idea that something ‘ought to occur’ in a given
situation.26 If a person acts in a manner contrary to the norms of the society,
sanctions might be imposed.27
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Based on Kelsen’s theory, rules of law can be seen as norms that everyone will obey
only if they are conceived as valid.28 Kelsen viewed that positive law is a system of
norms in which the higher norms validate the inferior ones in the same hierarchical
chain.29 Kelsen asserted that any given system of law starts from the ‘Basic Norm’
(Grundnorm), with which all inferior norms in the system must conform. 30 Being the
original point of the hierarchy, the Grundnorm thus plays an important role in
validating all other norms in the legal system. According to Kelsen’s theory, it is the
role of the adjudicator to understand the nature of the original legal norm and its
hierarchical relationship with all other norms that formulate a valid system of law
which fosters trust among people.
In a similar manner, HLA Hart (1907-1992) also precluded questions of morality
from impacting legal issues. Hart conceived a law as not simply a command from the
sovereign, but a means to regulate on human behaviors connected to people’s
collective attitude.31 He considers that law consists of both an ‘external’ and an
‘internal’ aspect.32 So laws not only represent a set of rules that dictate the
‘observable action’ of people, they represent standards of behavior that are internally
accepted by people and form expectations about other people’s and their own
behaviors.33 Violation of these standards thus results in either ‘social pressure’ or
‘physical sanction’.34
To make law valid and recognizable by people, the enacted law must comply with
Hart’s so-called ’secondary rule’ proposition.35 According to Hart’s theory of law,
the secondary rule consists of three distinct components, which are the rule of
change, the rule of adjudication and the rule of recognition. These components are
essential elements that determine the validity of any law, which ultimately is dictated
by people’s attitude towards the creditability of said law. 36 Instead of viewing laws
as commands issued by the sovereign, Hart considered that people would only accept
28
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commands that are handed down by accepted legal institutes and officials who have
the power to make and adjudicate the rules. In addition, the said rules must also be
accepted by officials.
Viewing laws as based on recognition by people, Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013)
similarly asserts that law is not simply a collection of written rules, but it involves a
‘network of standards’.37 Since Dworkin’s conception of law is largely based on the
principle of liberalism, the factors of legal environment, politics and social beliefs
embodied in the community are all relevant in forming the system of law. 38 For him,
moral value is not fixed and eternal; it is not something abstract but rather a subject
inherent in the community itself.39
(b) The Problem of Legal Indeterminacy and Proposed Solutions
According to the conceptual frameworks developed by legal positivist thinkers, the
law does not only consist of rules to govern individual behaviors, but it is also
something more than a set of written rules that obligates people to obey. When there
is no clear-cut rule, pursuant to which an adjudicator can determine a legal answer,
the interpretation of law becomes more complicated and necessarily involves an
examination of underlying values and norms that are significant within that place and
time.
HLA Hart, for instance, asserted that on many occasions the drafters of laws cannot
describe precisely the meaning of legal provisions.40 However, Hart considered that
language has a ‘core of certainty’, surrounded by a ‘penumbra’ of uncertainty.41
When facing the problem of ‘open texture’, judges must exercise their discretion to
find the meaning and the scope of law.42 To resolve the problem of legal
indeterminacy, Hart’s theory admitted that a judge can exercise discretion to decide
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what law applies to the case,43 or fill gaps in legal rules by weighing all competing
interests and deciding upon which side of the line the meaning lies.44
Contrary to Hart’s theory, Dworkin suggested that in every single case, there is
always a single right answer and there is no room for judicial discretion in the legal
system.45 When resolving a hard case, the interpretation of any rules of law
comprises three main steps: (i) the pre-interpretative stage; (ii) the interpretative
stage and (iii) the post-interpretative stage.46 In the pre-interpretative stage, all works
and rules are gathered to formulate an analytical framework. Then, in the
interpretative stage, the meanings of legal rules are discovered and in the postinterpretative stage, the meaning of a rule is determined so as to provide guidance for
future interpretation. Among these three stages, the ‘interpretative stage’ is arguably
the most important element as it provides an interpretative meaning that generally
fits the existing legal materials relevant to the case.47
According to Dworkin’s approach, judges have a duty to develop a ‘theory which
best explains what the law actually is in a particular situation’.48 Based on Dworkin’s
view, the discovered principle reflects the ‘political morality’ that can fill the gaps in
the law and best justify the answer to the legal question in a given case. 49 Even
though Dworkin asserted that there is always ‘one right answer’, which can be
discovered through constructive interpretation, given the quantity and complexity of
all available laws and principles, such a discovery could only be carried out by a role
model, or ‘Hercules’, judge who is capable of conceptualizing a wide range of ideas
and influences, and discerning the right balance of all relevant social factors in order
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to determine the correct answer applicable to the case at hand.50 This theoretical
extreme might prove difficult in practice, since Dworkin’s ‘Hercules’ judge could be
conceived as a purely abstract construct. Ultimately, this might imply that Dworkin’s
concept does not altogether deny or underestimate the problem of legal
indeterminacy and a degree of difficulty in dictating the right answer to a legal
question.
2. Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
(a) Basic Ideas: Law is Nothing, but a Matter of Power Relationships in the
Society
CLS is a school of thought that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s and challenged the
standard norms and practices of the existing legal system. CLS scholars uncovered
the problems of injustice embodied in laws. CLS theorists assert that ‘law is
politics’.51 According to CLS, law is neither value free, neutral, nor unaffected by
politics, society and personal points of view.52 To the contrary, influenced by these
external factors, law is indeterminate and it is hard to preclude these elements from
the process of legal reasoning and decision-making.53 As a consequence, the
decision-maker fills the gap attributed to the indeterminacy of law by freely
‘pick[ing] and choos[ing]’ doctrine to fit the personally desired legal outcome.54
(b) The Problem of Legal Indeterminacy and Proposed Solutions
One of the fundamental ideas of the CLS movement is that law is ‘radically
indeterminate’.55 Mark Tushnet, one of the key advocates of CLS, asserts that no
matter how hard one tries, or how skillful one is as a lawyer, it is very difficult to
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determine the correct answer for any legal question and, perhaps, it might end up
with a diverse set of legal answers.56
To explain the root of the problem, a prominent CLS thinker Duncan Kennedy
asserts that a set of rules is embodied by the ‘fundamental contradiction’ of norms or
values, and this holds true in every aspect of life.57 Kennedy holds that since the
fundamental contradiction is always present, individual needs might be incompatible
with community objectives.58 Due to the existence of inherent conflicting values in
any legal rule, Kennedy concludes that the interpretation of law by adjudicators
could be dominated by the personal experiences of judges; thus, legal reasoning and
the final outcomes of a case are shaped by a judge’s encounter with external and
changeable factors.59 Due to conflicting purposes and objectives embodied in a rule,
the adjudicator might find it difficult even to apply a valid and clear rule to some
hard cases, as a ‘narrow exception’ or ‘standard’ might be needed so as to achieve
the real purpose of the rule.60
In support of the CLS movement, Csaba Varga, who studies the status of law in the
judicial system, also asserts that ‘law is something more than a set of rules and it is
even more than a set of enactments’.61 These lines of analysis provide some insights
into how legal systems work in reality and how a judge’s personal preference and
other social factors, such as constructed social and political views, can influence the
judicial outcome when the law is ambiguous; making it is difficult to arrive at a
straightforward judgment. Furthermore, a well-trained lawyer can consider opposing
results to produce legal argument that subordinates other competing legal concepts,
when the legal text is unclear.62 Due to this malleability, in many cases, laws tend to
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be construed in favour of the powerful or in a manner that protects the interest of the
hegemony, rather than the subordinated.63
The conceptual framework proposed by CLS, which is deeply skeptical about the
neutrality and objectivity of law to reach a correct answer in a given case, implies
that courts should not place emphasis only on the written law to determine legal
outcomes, but also on other factors in constructing court decisions. Since law is
inherently indeterminate due to embodied conflicts of ideological controversy, this
results in the varying ‘discretionary interpretive choices affecting the determinacy of
legal outcome’.64 To deal with the problem, adjudicators should leave legal discourse
out and see how laws work in reality. This enables courts to uncover class relations
without losing the connection with social reality and historical development. This
would allow the adjudicators to improve the coherence of judicial reasoning and to
construe the law so as to reduce social divide and create a more equitable society.65
3. Legal Pragmatism
(a) Basic Ideas: Law as an Instrument for Justice and Equilibrium
Legal pragmatism is a theoretical framework that claims that law is a practice which
should incorporate ‘a more diverse set of data’ that is subject to the ‘specific context
at hand’.66 Legal pragmatist argues that conventional legal analysis, which is
grounded on the ‘use of precedent’ and ‘rigorous arguments from analogy’, is
‘naively rationalistic’ and ‘overly legalistic’.67 To mitigate the limitations present
within the conventional approach of judicial decision-making, legal pragmatists
contextualize the facts by incorporating diverse controversies and arguments in their
legal analysis, rather than relying solely on written rules to provide interpretative
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guidance.68 As Steven Platt emphasizes, ‘[t]he function of law is to ensure justice
and equilibrium. The origin of the law is not the main thing – the goal is. There can
be no wisdom in the choice of legal path unless we know where it will lead.’ 69 The
advantage of this approach has been confirmed. One of the prominent legal
pragmatists, Judge Richard Posner, asserts that ‘pragmatism is the best description of
the American judicial ethos and also the best guide to the improvement of judicial
performance and thus the best normative as well as positive theory of the judicial
role.’70
(b) The Problem of Legal Indeterminacy and Proposed Solutions
Pragmatists see law as something which is historically and culturally contingent.
Although not being associated directly with the legal indeterminacy doctrine,
pragmatists generally reject the idea of ‘one overarching value or policy
consideration’.71 In this respect, pragmatists do not believe in the concept of a ‘grand
theory’ in law that can produce a definitive answer in any legal case. 72 Pragmatists
understand that when judges try to apply the same legal doctrine to all cases, it can
produce legal absurdity73 since a mere ‘linear arrangement’ or a ‘single foundational
brick’ could hardly resolve all complex cases.74 Judge Richard Posner also asserts
that when deciding a hard case, judges struggle with the diverse range of contestable
policy choices and ethical preferences in a given society.75
Responding to this problem, some legal pragmatists suggest interpreters should rely
on ‘practical reason’ to resolve any legal issue so that the set goal could be
ultimately achieved. Richard Bernstein, for example, held that in reaching decisions
there are no determinate rules with which to distinguish between right and wrong
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reasons.76 He asserts that since the justification of legal reasoning is historically and
culturally contingent, such reason must be subject to adjustment in accordance with
changing knowledge and prevailing experiences.77 Judge Richard Posner also
suggests adjudicators use a practical method to resolve any disputes. Posner believes
that ‘law’s practical consequences are more important than any broad or narrow
definition of law itself’ because it is a process

which involves ‘a complex

interweaving of positive and natural law or…, of law and morality’.78 As such,
Posner affirms that no correct interpretation of law can be sought, only ‘the correct
ethical political solution.’79 In other words, adjudicators need to understand the
context of the issue to be able to achieve the correct answer. Based on Posner’s
philosophy, the ability to determine the right answer is subject to many factors,
including ‘anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, empathy, imputation
of motives, speaker’s authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory,
experience, intuition and induction’.80 He also claims that ‘means-end rationality’,
‘tacit knowledge’, and the ‘test of time’, are also key elements that adjudicators need
to take into account when deciding cases.81 Based on Posner’s judicial philosophy,
adjudicators have a duty to sustain ‘a legal fabric that includes considerations of
precedent, of legislative authority, of the framing of issues by counsel, of the facts of
record, and so forth.’82
4. Overall Conclusions and Suggested Solutions
Legal indeterminacy is not a new phenomenon, but has been raised by legal scholars
for many years. The above theoretical discussion demonstrates that each of the
examined theories analyzes the problem and potential solutions of legal
indeterminacy from a different perspective. Based on the idea of the proclaimed
objectivity of laws, legal positivists claim that it is impossible to include every
imaginable circumstance falling within the ambit of legal texts. To resolve the
problem of legal indeterminacy in the context of legal positivism, the relevant
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interpreters should have the discretion to find the meaning and the standard of law
that is generally accepted by the community. This generally accepted principle is not
the same as a morality; rather, it represents the norms, values and attitudes that are
objectively recognized by people in a given community. As Dworkin asserts, despite
the possibility to search for a correct answer, the task is difficult as it requires a
superhuman who can take into account a wide range of ideas and interests when
making a judicial decision in a given hard case.
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) similarly holds that law is inherently indeterminate as
every hard case contains the ‘fundamental contradictions’ of controversial norms and
values.83 Therefore, CLS emphasizes the ‘openness of the normative concepts used
by the judiciary’ to reduce the risk of adjudicators’ bias in identifying the available
choices in a legal dispute.84 The adjudicator should be given the opportunity to hear
and pay respect to the relative positions of all stakeholders involved so as to avoid
the problem of having one concept that predominates the other.85
The central concept of legal pragmatism lies within the rejection of grand theory as a
tool to resolve all disputes. Due to the open-ended nature of law, pragmatists assert
that legal knowledge is not a matter of language, but rather a situational context.86
Therefore, pragmatists perceive law as an instrument in analysing legal problems; to
achieve ultimate goals, practical reason must take into account a new set of
information that allows the adjudicator to assess any individual case in a more
realistic way.
Even though each school of thought has different philosophical paths to view and
understand the issue of legal indeterminacy, all fundamentally agree that vague
expressions of legal texts are omnipresent and persistent and this problem inevitably
leads to indeterminacies in the application of the law in many hard cases. To resolve
the problem of legal indeterminacy, they commonly suggest that a judge needs to
search for the ‘general principles of law’ that can best describe the core values and
norms that are important and mutually obeyed by people in a given community.
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However, to ensure that different views and norms are taken on board, a given
principle should also permit adjudicators to interpret the meaning of law by
incorporating the context of the situation, in such a way that all competing interests
are embraced and presented.
In addition, based on a general application of this suggested approach, judge’s
personal ideologies will not predominate the legal outcome, nor favor the hegemonic
powers. This interpretative framework could be applied in reaching the correct
answer in a particular hard case, especially in the context of international investment
laws on indirect expropriation, which typically contain vague and open-ended legal
texts that give rise to significant controversy surrounding the definition and scope of
legal application.

C. Legal Indeterminacy in the Context of the International Law on
Foreign Investment Protections: Problems, Causes and Remedies
In recent years, there has been a proliferation in the number of international
investment treaties. A study conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) reveals the continued expansion of the network of
international investment agreements. From 1999-2008, the number of concluded
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) increased significantly, from less than 2,000 in
1999, to 2,676 at the end of 200887 and 2,857 at the end of 2012.88 There has been a
considerable amount of literature exploring reasons as to why BITs have become
popular for investment promotion and protection. In essence, BITs are perceived as a
tool to give foreign investors protection against arbitrary conduct by the host state
government. BITs thus provide an advantage in attracting inward investment flow to
boost economic growth within a country.
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Consistent with the growing tendency of concluding BITs worldwide, there has been
an increase in the number of investment disputes under the Investor-State Disputes
Settlement mechanism (ISDS).89 Recourse to arbitral proceedings was introduced to
settle disputes concerning the legitimacy and legality of governmental measures
imposed by host state administrative, legislative, or judicial branches. 90 International
investment treaties thus guarantee a wide range of typical protection standards,
which the host government must respect. They include, among other things, National
Treatment, the Most-Favored-Nation clause, Fair and Equitable Treatment, Free
Transfer, and Expropriation provisions.
Subedi argues that this comprehensive set of protections is generally ambiguous and
involves legal indeterminacy risks, which ultimately contribute to the development
of multiple interpretative approaches91 and inconsistent arbitral awards.92 The next
part of this Chapter will analyze the problems and causes of indeterminacy in BITs,
and discuss some remedial approaches to resolve issues resulting from legal
indeterminacy in international investment agreements.
1. The Problem of Legal Indeterminacy in International Investment Law
The problems of legal indeterminacy in international investment law have long been
discussed. Basically, BITs are signed with the main purpose to protect and promote
foreign investment. Historically, the antecedents of what constituted BITs evolved
from customary international law. However, customary international law for
investment protection has not yet been clearly formulated despite imposing
obligations to commit to a minimum standard of treatment. Due to a failure to
achieve customary international investment law among nations, most countries
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largely adopt a similar framework of international investment agreements to reduce
the problem of legal incoherence.93
Although BITs have successfully established hard legal obligations for the host state
government to follow, a number of commentators have raised concerns over arbitral
interpretations of potentially broad and vague provisions in both bilateral and
multilateral investment treaties. In responding to the problem of unclear treaty texts,
some leading scholars have argued that arbitrators have expanded the meaning of
texts far beyond the states’ initial commitments.94 Similarly, Subedi discusses the
expansive nature of arbitral awards in a series of cases, stating that protections ‘will
be stretched to argue that the host state concerned failed in its obligation to provide
full protection and security to the foreign investor.’95 Regarding the problem of
expansive interpretation, Van Harten argues that the ambiguity of the law on
expropriation can lead to ‘a broad reading’ of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT),
in a manner that precludes some legitimate regulatory actions. 96 Given this trend, the
host state’s sovereign right to regulate is harmfully affected by a broad interpretation
of private investor rights in the existing treaty texts.97
In addition to the problems associated with an overly broad interpretation of BIT
provisions, the current regime of treaty provisions also triggers multiple
interpretative approaches and inconsistent arbitral awards. For example, when
interpreting the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) clause, the Tribunal in Impregilo SpA
v Argentina98 held that that the MFN clause is applicable to dispute resolution. In
this case, the Province of Buenos Aires privatized all water and sewage services, and
93
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an Italian company, Impregilo, through its subsidiary local company AGBA, entered
into a concession contract for a term of 30 years with the Province in 1999.99
However, in 2001, AGBA was experiencing some difficulties in collecting fees from
customers during the economic crisis in Argentina.100 AGBA made requests to the
provincial government to increase tariffs,101 however, the requests were rejected and
the Federal Government enacted a law to freeze all utility contracts. 102 In 2006, the
Ministry of Public Services concluded that AGBA had violated the Concession
Contract and it imposed fines on AGBA.103 Impregilo submitted a claim to
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) against the
Argentine Government for its failure to observe the commitments under the
Argentina-Italy BIT.
Argentina denied the claims and argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction as
Impregilo failed to observe the requirement in the BIT that the dispute be submitted
to domestic courts for 18 months before lodging the case for international
arbitration.104 However, Impregilo claimed that, under the MFN provisions, it had
the right to take up a more favorable investor-state dispute settlement term as found
in other BITs. It asserted that since the MFN clause can extend to procedural issues,
it can import a more favorable dispute resolution from the Argentina-US BIT by the
virtue of the Argentina-Italy BIT.105
The majority of the tribunal held that the MFN clause in the Argentina-Italy BIT
permitted Impregilo to adopt a more favorable dispute resolution rule from the
Argentina-US BIT. The tribunal asserted that the words ‘treatment’ and ‘all other
matters regulated by this Agreement’, under Article 3 of the Argentina-Italy BIT,
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extends to dispute settlement procedures.106 Thus the tribunal took a very broad view
in interpreting the MFN provision.
By contrast, the Tribunal in Daimler Financial Services AG v Argentina107 applied a
different concept and refused to include dispute resolution in the ambit of the
MFN.108 In this case, the claimant commenced ICSID arbitration proceedings in
relation to numerous measures that the Federal Government of Argentina adopted
during the regional economic crisis in 2001.109 Argentina argued that the tribunal
lacked jurisdiction on the basis that Daimler failed to observe the dispute settlement
requirements under Article 10 of the Argentina-Germany BIT, and that use of the
MFN clause to bypass the dispute settlement requirements was prohibited. 110 Based
on the conditions set by the law, the dispute could only be submitted to international
arbitration when the period of 18 months had elapsed from the moment when the
judicial process had been initiated in the domestic courts and no final decision had
been rendered.111
Daimler argued that it did not have to submit the dispute to the domestic court as it
could adopt more generous dispute resolution rules from other BITs.112 Daimler
referred to Article 3 of the Argentina-Chile BIT, which states that either party may
settle the dispute in a domestic court or by international arbitration, providing that
the dispute cannot be settled amicably within six months.113
In contrast to Impregilo SpA v Argentina114, the majority in the tribunal in Daimler
Financial Services AG v Argentina115 held that the claimant cannot invoke an MFN
provision in the Argentina-Germany BIT to avoid the agreed upon dispute resolution
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rules and pick up more favourable dispute settlement methods.116 The tribunal
asserted that the 18 months requirement was mandatory and both parties must
observe the sequential process that they agreed upon.117 The Tribunal held that
Daimler could not invoke the MFN clause to circumvent the agreed text.118
In addition to the MFN clause, inconsistency has also been observed in the
interpretation of the term ‘expropriation’. For example, in the context of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Tribunal in Metalclad v Mexico119
interpreted the term ‘measure tantamount to expropriation’ generously to mean that
any measure interfering with business’s legitimate expectation could amount to
compensable expropriation. However, in Feldman v Mexico120, the NAFTA tribunal
did not award in favor of foreign investors, confirming that such regulations were
justified and not subject to compensation.
Some commentators claim that when the legal texts are too broad and vague,
arbitrators can decide cases based on their differing views of the applicable laws, and
that also unavoidably affects the way the arbitrators assess factual details within
these cases.121 Analysis of past arbitral interpretations reveals that the divergent
decisions and awards are dependent on the experience, individual preference and
judgment of adjudicators.122 This problem has concerned some legal experts due to
contradictory legal rulings arising from very similar sets of questions or facts.123
As noted above, legal provisions that are unclearly defined may lead to a ‘legitimacy
crisis’ within the investment treaty arbitration system. This may result in the
adoption of inconsistent interpretations and ultimately, inconsistent decisions by the
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arbitral tribunal.124 Hueckel observes that ‘broad standards have led to inconsistent
arbitral awards that undermine both the legitimacy of the system and the sovereignty
of participating states’.125 This implies that the reviewing body must engage in a
deeper analysis of investment treaty rights and display greater transparency in their
decisions, to guarantee logical consistency in their legal reasoning.
2. Causes
The problem of legal indeterminacy is caused by both legal and non-legal factors.
They include both textual ambiguity and the institutional structure of the arbitration
system.
(a) Unclear Legal Texts
The problem of legal indeterminacy in investment treaties is largely attributed to
unclearly defined text. One of the main reasons for this is the flexibility intended by
the drafter to handle any unforeseen situations in the future. For example, in the
context of what constitutes a protected ‘investment’, nearly all investment treaties
include a non-exhaustive wide ranging list of economic activities falling within the
scope of a defined protected investment.126. This is due to the avoidance by the
drafters of a strict or specific definition of the types of assets that should be covered
under the treaty.127
Even though some treaties provide greater detail in their definition of investment to
provide guidance to tribunals engaging in legal interpretation, they similarly include
an open-ended, non-exhaustive list of assets to characterize investments protected
under investment treaties.128 Such an expansive treaty language reflects the new form
of investment protection mandated by neoliberal legal regimes. These expansive
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norms are needed to promote the flow of investment, thereby ensuring economic
progress. In other words, to accommodate new forms of protected investment
activities in the future, legal texts have been drafted in an unrestrictive manner.129 As
a consequence, arbitrators are at risk of reinterpreting phrases in treaty texts beyond
the original intention of the states. This creates rules of secure investment
protection.130 As a consequence, arbitrators are at a risk of reinterpreting phrase.
In addition, the drafters of investment treaties intentionally leave some legal
provisions vague and flexible so as to encompass subsequent more specific
agreement. Given vastly different political, economic and social factors in each
country, Hai asserts that ambiguous language is necessary as it is nearly impossible
for the States to achieve agreement on detailed international obligations.131 To reach
such general agreement, the treaties are thus normally drafted by resorting to ‘a
compromise that glosses over their differences with vague, obscure or ambiguous
wording, sacrificing clarity for the sake of obtaining consensus in treaties and
conventions’.132 Therefore, broadly drafted text is an effective means to reach
consensus on core provisions and to move negotiations forward. This approach is
effectively a compromise between the competing interests of the contracting parties.
For example, there is no consensus as to what constitutes actions breaching the
obligatory standards imposed by ‘indirect expropriation’ and ‘fair and equitable
treatment’ clauses,133 despite the fact that these concepts are fairly common within
the national laws of some countries.134 In order to find international consensus that is
acceptable to all, it is arguably necessary to leave the text as wide open as possible to
encompass the differences among countries.135
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(b) The Structure and the System of Investor-State Arbitration
Besides vague language, legal indeterminacy in investment treaties is also
attributable to the structural characteristics of investor-state arbitration. Investor-state
arbitration under international investment treaties has many unique characteristics.
Firstly, it grants an investor the right to bring a case against the host State
government directly. Secondly, the investor-state dispute is normally decided by
appointed one-off ad hoc arbitrators, and to ensure neutrality and speediness, the
award rendered by the arbitrators cannot be reviewed by the domestic court of the
country which is the seat of arbitration. Even if a local court can set aside the arbitral
award, the court can do so only on very limited grounds. Thirdly, the award rendered
has a legally binding effect on the parties to the dispute, but no precedential effect
binding upon similar cases in the future. Fourthly, confidentiality of proceedings
must be granted and no award can be disclosed unless both parties consent to do
so.136
Commentators have identified causes of interpretative problems as resulting from
this structure of the existing investment arbitration system, ie: the ad-hoc nature of
the arbitration system, the lack of binding effect of precedent, and the absence of any
reviewing body.
(i) Ad Hoc System
Professor Thomas Walde found that clarity can be obstructed by the ad hoc nature of
investment arbitration. Since the current system of arbitral proceedings is operated
by ad hoc investment arbitrators, interpretations by them are ‘predominantly an
effort by tribunals with a variety of expertise, experience, and time available to make
sense, test, compare, reformulate, select, and,… to identify agreement from the
opposing and disparate submissions by the parties.’137 Thus, personal educational
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background and socio-political beliefs can greatly influence the ‘style of reasoning’
of the chosen arbitrators.138
The influence of a personal professional background on the standards of review
applied by various appointed arbitrators has been emphasized by Stephan Schill.
According to his study, the dynamic in this complex area is pushed forward by a
small group of specialists with different professional backgrounds. While a number
of arbitrators with commercial law backgrounds granted protection rights to
investors suffering from a State’s use of regulatory powers, without focusing much
on the sensitivity of public interests, arbitrators with public law backgrounds were
more aware of the importance of State autonomy and paid more deference to a
State’s wider margin of discretion.139 As a consequence, different arbitral tribunals
applied different standards to reviews of States’ regulatory activities, despite similar
facts or investment rights.140
(ii) No Precedent Doctrine
Lack of progress in clarifying substantive rights is attributed to the absence of the
doctrine of precedent in the investment arbitration system. A considerable number of
scholarly writings indicate the problems arising from the non-binding effects of
previous arbitral awards. Christoph Schreuer and Matthew Weiniger, for example,
referring to Article 53(1) of the ICSID Rules, conclude that the provision requires
only that the award bind the parties (ICSID 53(1)),141 and the awards in previous
cases have no binding effect on subsequent cases.142 Due to the absence of legally
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binding precedents, tribunals in different cases may take different views in
interpreting the rules when making a decision.143
The problem of the lack of precedent is also highlighted by Devrim Deniz Celik.
Due to the lack of precedent in investment arbitration, tribunals can construe treaty
texts by using different legal approaches to interpret vague treaty provisions.144 In
the case of expropriation, the author identifies different legal methodologies used for
determining the meaning of indirect expropriation, as found in Metalclad v Mexico145
and Pope&Talbot v Canada.146 While the former case endorsed a liberal approach to
protect investors, the latter endorsed the state’s rights to regulate in the public
interest without compensation obligations.
(iii) No Single Reviewing Body to Unify Interpretations
Under the existing framework, ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration rules do not
provide an appellate body with power to review arbitral awards under international
investment treaties.147 Under regular ICSID rules, the arbitral decision is subject to
internal ICSID review when each party to the dispute is a member-state of the
ICSID. In such a case, the arbitral tribunal’s decision can be annulled only by an
appointed ICSID reviewing body.148 Domestic courts in the country where the
arbitration was situated are not empowered to review these cases.149
Unlike the ICSID Additional Facility rules, which are applicable where one of the
parties to the dispute is not a member of the ICSID Convention, cases may be
reviewed by the courts within the country where the arbitration is situated. 150 This is
143
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similar to the UNCITRAL rules, which permit the national court of the place in
which the arbitration is located to challenge the arbitral award.151 Nevertheless, the
national court can only undertake a review within a very limited range of issues,
which include neither legal error nor the issue of legal inconsistency.152
Within the existing framework for investment arbitration, there is no single appeal
mechanism for reviewing arbitral awards. Due to the lack of the reviewing
mechanism, Subedi argues that it is impossible for arbitral tribunals to succeed in
‘harmonizing different trends in interpreting the rules of foreign investment law and
the somewhat divergent views of various investment tribunals’.153 This makes it very
difficult to develop coherent and consistent legal interpretations of awards rendered
under international investment treaties.154
3. The Proposed Solutions
To resolve the problems of legal indeterminacy, a number of approaches have been
raised by legal scholars. Some of the proposed solutions include: textual
clarification, a new institutional framework, or a new treaty interpretative method.
(a) Improved Textual Clarity
To address the problem of textual ambiguity, there have been significant attempts to
make international investment rules as clear as possible. For example, in the
NAFTA155 context, Canada and the United States jointly issued a binding
interpretative statement through the NAFTA Fair Trade Commission (FTC) after
they were repeatedly exposed as respondents under NAFTA Chapter 11 investment
arbitrations,156 to clarify the nature and scope of the term ‘fair and equitable
151
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treatment’ (FET) in Article 1105 of NAFTA Chapter 11.157 According to the FTC’s
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, foreign investors are
entitled to fair and equitable treatments which ‘do not require treatment in addition
to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment’.
Beyond the context of NAFTA, attempts have been made to clarify BIT provisions.
The United States, for example, adopted a new Model BIT in 2004 to promote clarity
in some key provisions. In the context of expropriation provisions, the US Model
stipulates that:
(a) the determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case,
fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i)

the economic impact of the government action, although the fact

that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an
indirect expropriation has occurred;
(ii)

the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct,

reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and
(iii)

the character of the government action.

Annex B of the US model also provides a clearer guideline to distinguish a normal
use of regulatory power from indirect expropriation committing to compensatory
obligations. It says that:
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(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public
health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.

Canada similarly adopted a new model Foreign Investment Promotion and
Protection Agreement (FIPA) to be used as a guideline to clarify some key
provisions.158 Concerning what constitutes a compensable expropriation,159 the
Model FIPA requires that a non-discriminatory measure taken to protect legitimate
public welfare objectives will not constitute indirect expropriation, except in rare
circumstances.160 This provision indicates that, non-discriminatory good-faith
measures to protect public welfare objectives will be sheltered from liability and
will, therefore, not be regarded as an indirect expropriation.
Despite these attempts, vagueness and ambiguity are not totally removed from
international laws. Rohan Perera claims that explicit criteria contained in US Model
BIT could create more legal uncertainty in investment treaties. 161 He argues that
legal uncertainties surrounding the phrase ‘except in rare circumstances’ would give
rise to a new area of controversy from the point of view of the host state, since any
good faith non-discriminatory regulatory action on the part of a host State could be
interpreted at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal as a measure tantamount to an
‘indirect expropriation,… in a given situation’.162 It is therefore left to the tribunals
and the host states to interpret what form of governmental interference is deemed
expropriatory.163
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Although more strict and specific wording is desirable, some commentators argue
that the ambiguity will persist, especially when the parties cannot totally agree on the
negotiated text.164 The renowned legal philosopher Thomas Franck, for example, is
inclined to accept this proposition asserting that, in order to promote international
agreements, ambiguous terms and a certain degree of flexibility have to be
maintained in treaty provisions.165
Aaken supports this view and admits that to enable the states to reach international
consensus and carry out their sovereign powers, making the written treaty text less
specific and more flexible is advantageous.166 From the point of view of economic
contract theory,167 parties conclude a contract only when perceived benefits exceed
incurred costs.168 However, the parties may experience unforeseen situations that
undermine the anticipated joint benefit, and in addition, contracts that are too strict
and inflexible may negate the benefits for one of the parties.169 Without sufficient
BIT flexibility, state parties may react in a manner unfavorable to the BIT which
may undermine foreign direct investment protection.170
Overall, full textual clarity is almost impossible. Although there have been many
attempts to define legal text as precisely as possible, vague and ambiguous language
still persists. Due to the omnipresence of vagueness in treaty texts, textual
clarification is inherently difficult to achieve. It is therefore necessary to identify an
interpretative approach which promotes greater transparency and logical consistency
of legal reasoning, in order to strike a balance between a state’s exercise of its
sovereign power and the protection of the rights of foreign investors pursuant to
various international investment treaties.
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(b) Amending the Arbitration Rules to Promote Predictability of Legal
Interpretation
To enhance consistency and predictability across investor-state awards, the existing
body of work on institutional reform suggests that changes are needed in the system
of investor-state arbitration. These suggested initiatives include the recognition of a
doctrine of ‘precedent’, which requires subsequent cases to follow the rulings made
by previous arbitrations.171 In addition, some advocate the establishment of an
appellate mechanism for investor-state arbitrations through the ‘International
Investment Court’ with a mandate to review awards under investment treaties in
order to provide more consistent and coherent interpretations of legal orders.172 In
support of these ideas, the ICSID released a discussion paper in 2004 to propose a
reform plan for the institution’s arbitration rules.173 Among the major changes
proposed by the ICSID were recommendations concerning preliminary procedure,
publication of awards, access by third parties to the proceedings; and disclosure
requirements for arbitrators.174 Besides the procedural rules, the Secretariat of the
ICSID also recommended the creation of a single appellate body to review arbitral
awards.175 Rather than being undertaken by different mechanisms for each treaty
concerned, the Secretariat of the ICSID argued that an appellate body would help to
harmonize the decisions made by different arbitral tribunals under ICSID and nonICSID arbitration rules.176
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Whilst constructive, these ambitious ideas have made slow progress, and have not
obtained support from all state parties.177 Trinh Hai says that it is inappropriate to set
up an appellate mechanism for ad hoc arbitral tribunals under diverse investment
treaties, and that this could ‘result in the same problems of inconsistency and
possible interpretative errors when they would actually serve as the second tier of
arbitral evaluation.’178 He argues that such changes are premature and would be
difficult at this moment in time, as they demand a great deal of revision of the
existing arbitration rules and many of them may dilute the benefits of arbitration
systems, which derive from efficiency and finality.179 Some intergovernmental
organizations, such as the South Centre, disagreed with the policy initiative proposed
by the ICSID. It expressed concerns that the institutional reform is premature and
that the benefits of the creation of an appeal mechanism would be outweighed by the
costs, as poor countries will suffer from extended litigation proceedings.180 Some
legal commentators argue that the creation of the appellate mechanism is unlikely to
happen in the near future,181 and that this institutional reform would conflict with the
existing ICSID arbitral rules which exclude any form of appeal against awards made
by the appointed arbitrators.182
As can be seen from the above discussion, the implications of the proposed policy
initiative are enormous. Even though the recommended amendments could improve
the coherence and consistency of arbitral awards, a wider discussion of the possible
amendment of the existing arbitral rules must, therefore, ensure that over-burdening
cost implications are avoided and not borne by the contracting states.
177

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 'Suggested Changes to the ICSID
Rules and Regulations' (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 12 May 2005
2005)
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=Vi
ewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=22_1.pdf> 4 (Suggested Changes).
178
Trinh Hai, above n 94, 22.
179
Burke-White and Von Staden, above n 139, 56.
180
The South Centre, 'Developments on Discussions for the Improvement of the Framework for
ICSID Arbitration and the Participation of Developing Countries' (The South Centre, 2005)
<http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/AN_INV1_Improvement-of-theFramework-for-ICSID_EN.pdf> 18-19.
181
Stephan W Schill, 'International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law: Ways out of the
Legitimacy Crisis?' (Paper presented at the International Investment Forum, New York University, 11
April 2011) 8 (‘International Investment Law: Ways Out’).
182
Christoph Schreuer, 'Coherence and Consistency in International Investment Law' in E Roberto
and P Sauvé (eds), Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy (Cambridge University
Press, 2013) 391, 402.

47

(c) The Adoption of a New Interpretative Approach to Promote the Coherence of
Legal Reasoning and Greater Transparency in the Decision-Making Process
Both approaches discussed above face some difficulty. In the context of treaty
drafting, ‘too precise legal text’ might impose excessive limitations on the
adjudicator to accommodate unforeseen circumstances or changing conditions.183 As
a consequence, an arbitrator’s individual bias would likely come back and play a
critical role in tackling the contingencies, leading once more to the problem of
jurisprudential uncertainty.
Alternatively, the establishment of a single appellate mechanism could undermine
the desirable feature of a speedy investment-treaty arbitration. The creation of a
single appellate body is also contentious because the parties in the investment
dispute could suffer from higher transaction costs and longer dispute settlement
proceedings. In this way, the constitution of a single appellate body could
disadvantage poor countries using the proposed facility.
To avoid the deficiencies in both approaches, some commentators have proposed
using ‘general principles of law’ found within the public law framework under both
domestic and international law as a feasible solution to overcome the problems of
vague treaty language and alleged bias in the arbitration system. Use of the ‘public
law’ approach might overcome some interpretative difficulties, and also help
maintain the viability of the current regime of arbitration. In order to formulate
sustainable and certain arbitral jurisprudence, it is recommended that an arbitrator
should resort to the public law method of legal interpretation for investment-treaty
disputes.
Although general principles of law within the public law framework are not
completely free from ambiguity, the identified principle may provide for a coherent
account of the adjudication process by arbitral tribunals when dealing with
indeterminacy. Based on the theorists’ point of view, the role of coherence in legal
reasoning cannot be overlooked, as it enables the adjudicator to reach judicial
decisions that adhere to some extent with the settled law of an entire legal system or
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with particular areas of law. MacCormick, for example, views coherence in terms of
the unity of a principle in a legal system, contending that the coherence of a set of
legal norms adheres to either some common value or principle.184 Likewise, Raz also
views coherence in terms of the unity of the principle. On his view, the more unified
the set of principles underlying a courts’ decision, the more coherent the law is.185
When considering the role of coherence in legal reasoning, the interpretation of
investment treaties based on the public law framework encourage an adjudicator to
interpret the law in a more consistent manner, which contributes to enhanced clarity
in the adjudication of subsequent cases.
Since investment treaties are analogous to public law, permitting the individual to
seek redress for injuries caused by members of public administration, analysis of
legal norms embodied in domestic public laws is suggested by some commentators.
Van Harten, for example, asserts the critical role of public law concepts in
investment-treaty arbitration. Unlike conventional international commercial disputes,
he argues that investor-state disputes largely involve a dispute arising from the
exercise of a state’s sovereign power in the public interest. 186 This special feature of
investment-treaty arbitration requires the adjudicators to employ complex strategies
to strike an appropriate balance between public and private benefits. Thus, to resolve
investor-state disputes, Van Harten strongly advocates the use of public law concepts
to deal with the regulatory relationship between the host State government and
foreign investors.187 To advance a more coherent interpretation of laws, deference to
state judgments akin to the principle of deference in domestic administrative laws is
advisable.188 According to Van Harten, understanding the Administrative and
Constitutional laws of countries can provide arbitral tribunals with useful guidance
in dealing with matters that arise out of regulatory disputes.189
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To find a reliable and consistent basis for treaty interpretation, a considerable
amount of literature has focused on the task of refining treaty standards through the
comparative study of public law concepts. One of the most recognizable studies in
this field was undertaken in 2011 by the Working Group on General Public
International Law and International Investment Law of the Transnational National
Economic Law Centre of the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg in
Germany. This study demonstrated the benefits of the application of general
principles of domestic law and conceptualized some key substantive laws in the
international investment framework through the lens of German public law.190 The
research argues that due to deficiency in relevant aspects of international investment
law, the threshold of investment protections contained in investment treaties should
be found in the legal norms of the domestic law of the host countries.191 This
approach will potentially provide interpretative guidance for arbitrators applying
investment treaties, and will ensure that the adjudicators’ discretion is limited and
that the interpretation of vague standards of investment protection rights is made in
compliance with the standards commonly accepted in both domestic and
international law.192
Authors, such as Schill, also assert the utility of general principles of law as a source
of treaty interpretation when dealing with vague terms in investment agreements.
Schill argues that the application of general principles of law can be of help in
identifying some ‘normative’ considerations within the investment arbitral
processes.193 As Perkam asserts, arbitral decisions should not only be fair and free
from personal bias, but also reflect the core fundamental principles of the legal
system and the rights which have been legitimately relied on by both host states and
foreign investors at the time when investments were established in the country

190

Jurgen Bering et al, 'General Public International Law and International Investment Law: A
Research Sketch on Selected Issues' (Institute of Economic Law Transnational Economic Law
Research Center, School of Law, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, 2011).
191
Ibid 9-10.
192
Ibid 14.
193
Stephan W Schill, 'International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law-An Introduction' in
Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford
University Press, 2010) 3, 18. (‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law’).

50

concerned.194 Through legal rules, judicial decisions, soft laws and guidelines, some
general principles can be singled out. These can provide interpretative guidelines for
the arbitrators when encountering legal indeterminacy.195
To identify the general principles of law in the context of indirect expropriation law,
the ‘proportionality principle’ is overwhelmingly regarded as an internationally
recognizable doctrine that emerged from the domestic public laws of civilized
nations. Due to its widespread acceptance, this principle has often been adopted by
international investment arbitrators when considering claims in which a State’s
regulatory interference has affected an individual’s property rights. Since investment
arbitrators have become mindful of the state’s rights to control, some have adopted a
deferential ‘proportionality test’, by ascertaining the State’s justifications for
interference and examining whether the regulatory interference imposes an excessive
burden on the property owner.
Even though the “proportionality principle” cannot dictate fixed correct legal
answers to any legal question, and although it is not able to inform the adjudicators
on how to weigh various interests and values in any case, it does offer procedures to
govern a stable legal framework that adjudicators may use to justify their rulings. 196
Due to the multitude of analytical steps involved in the resolution of legal disputes,
the proportionality principle is a useful tool for reconciling opposed values and
interests, and to resolve conflicts between two sets of norms.197 The underlying
principle may promote coherence in legal reasoning, and greater transparency in the
decision-making process of international investment arbitrations.
Following the brief advantages of public law regime, the role of ‘general principles
of public law’ as a new source of legal interpretation will be examined later in
Chapter Five, and the widespread use of the proportionality test as a general
principle of law by domestic courts in the United States, the European Court of
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Human Rights and selected developing countries (Thailand and Mexico) will be
investigated in Chapter Six, Seven and Eight, respectively.

D. Conclusions
A vast literature has arisen pertaining to the issue of legal indeterminacy. Thinkers
from legal positivism, critical legal studies and pragmatism alike question the causes
and consequences of inconsistency and uncertainty in law. Essentially, the vagueness
of legal text, the personal bias of adjudicators and the structure of adjudicating
processes each contribute greatly to the inconsistency and uncertainty of investment
treaty textual interpretation. From a theoretical point of view, when answering hard
cases with imprecise legal text, adjudicators play a vital role in applying the rules to
facts and, on many occasions, have to decide these cases on the basis of a personal
assessment of the norms rather than on the basis of generally recognized legal
principles. This problem leads to divergence and inconsistency of legal interpretation
across different cases.
A consideration of the existing literature in the field of international law on foreign
investment protection highlights the problems of inconsistent and uncertain
interpretation by arbitral tribunals often present in investor-state arbitrations. The
erratic application of legal principles undermines the legitimacy of the arbitration
system. The literature has identified the sources of indeterminacy of treaty
interpretation. Aside from broad or vague legal provisions, the current structure,
legal framework, and practice of the investor-state arbitration system also impedes
consistency and certainty in arbitral tribunal interpretations of unclear legal texts. To
better deal with these problems, various approaches to promote clarity and uniform
interpretation of treaty text have been discussed. They include increased clarity of
the treaty’s text, amendment of the current legal framework of the investor-state
arbitration system, and the establishment of an investment appeal court.
Nevertheless, the previously advanced solutions are considered to be impractical and
not free from contention. In order to promote a practical legal solution, numerous
critics have proposed to rely on general principles of law found in public law
52

framework as an interpretative guidance to achieve more logical consistency and
greater transparency in decision-making process. Without having to replace the
current arbitration system, the general principles of law approach can be applied
directly and can be carried out in compliance with the international rules on treaty
interpretation. In order to promote coherence and transparency in the international
investment arbitrations, adjudicators cannot rely simply upon the wording of the text,
but also have to apply fundamental doctrines generally accepted in public law.
However, in spite of the advantages, this approach is not fully free from
controversies as it may be difficult to identify relevant general principles of law
directly applicable to the case. It is thus a key aim of this research to discover and
prove the existence of generally accepted principles of law relevant to the topic of
indirect

expropriation

under

international
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investment

treaties.

CHAPTER III
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON EXPROPRIATION
BEFORE THE AGE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: FROM CLASSICAL
EXPROPRIATION TO REGULATORY TAKINGS

The protection against nationalization of foreign-owned property has been widely
discussed. Literature on the topic of classic expropriation has always focused upon
an outright taking of private property by the state government, which results in the
compulsory transfer by promulgated legislation of specific assets, or the ownership
of rights over property, to the state government or a third party. 1 This form of direct
nationalization was popular and a major concern in public international law before
the First World War.2
However, since then, the issue of indirect expropriation, or regulatory takings, has
become more prevalent as an issue in international law. Instead of taking the
property directly, this new form of expropriation involves governmental regulation
that negatively affects the utilization and enjoyment of property rights, to the extent
that it has virtually the same effect as nationalization or direct confiscation.3
Although the issue of indirect expropriation has not been regulated by international
legal standards, the issue has sometimes been addressed and examined in arbitral
decisions and international agreements.
The objective of this Chapter is to articulate the evolution of international law on
foreign investment protection against expropriation prior to the Second World War.
The study conducted within this Chapter illustrates the developments in
expropriation law, as perceived by both developed and developing countries, before
the emergence of international investment treaties. The emerging concept of indirect
expropriation, or regulatory takings, which gradually developed in the early periods,
1
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will also be investigated. This Chapter demonstrates that the approaches of
developed and developing countries in regards to indirect expropriation or regulatory
expropriation conflicted with each other. The research will provide an overall
account of the divergent standards of treatment of foreign investors, and explain why
consensus in customary international law on expropriation law was unable to be
achieved in earlier times.

A. The Origin of International Law on Expropriation
before the Second World War
1. Early Development of International Law on Expropriation Proposed by
Western Nations
Back in the Middle Ages, the main approach to settling a dispute between nations
relied heavily on diplomatic protection.4 To protect the interests of its nationals in
overseas countries, capital-exporting countries generally exercised diplomatic
protection on behalf of their injured nationals.5 In order to provide extensive
protection for injured nationals, diplomatic protection could be carried out through a
variety of approaches, namely by military forces, ad hoc commissions and arbitral
tribunals,6 as well as by neutral international judicial forums like the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ).7 Central to the challenges experienced at this
time were issues relating to unlawful expropriation of aliens’ property.
During the colonial period, most non-Western countries were colonies. As Angie
indicates, colonies were not granted independence and had no recognized
sovereignty under international law.8 They were not considered to have power to
enter into international treaties with other sovereign States due to their lack of
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international legal personality; a requirement under international law.9 As a result,
the concepts of expropriation in international law were generally advanced by
Western nations.
The United States was considered one of the first nations to seek protection for its
nationals by means of international agreements. The United States negotiated and
concluded a series of treaties on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCNs),10
beginning with its first FCN agreement with France in 1778, the Netherlands in
1782, and Sweden in 1783.11
In the 19th century, investment protection was not the main focus of negotiated
agreements. Instead, a typical concern was National Treatment and Most-Favoured
Nation (MFN) status with respect to trade, mutual guarantees against discrimination,
exchange of consuls, and duties of parties with respect to neutral trade in time of
war.12
In the early formulae, no legal provision referred directly to the issue of
expropriation.13 During the 1920s and 1930s, US FCNs generally contained a
uniform protection standard, providing the nationals of each contracting party with
‘the most constant protection and security’ and the protection ‘required by
international law.’14 However, the FCN between the United States and Germany in
1920 explicitly prohibited the expropriation of foreign properties, by saying that:
The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive within the territories of the
other, upon submitting to conditions imposed upon its nationals, the most constant
protection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect
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that degree of protection that is required by international law. Their property shall not
be taken without due process of law and without payment of just compensation.15

This significant FCN called for only lawful expropriation, requiring that a property
must be treated in accordance with international law, and that expropriation can be
imposed only with the due process of law and a payment of just compensation.16 The
broad language suggests that international law plays a superior role to national
treatment standards, and the host state government could not be excused for nonfulfillment of its international obligations by relying upon its own domestic law.
Thus, international legal rules at that time played a significant role in determining the
‘nebulous concept’ of protection and compensation, to which the State needed to
adhere.17 Bonnitcha remarks that the underlying doctrine of protection announced an
‘international law standard of expropriation independent of either discrimination or
denial of justice in the treatment of foreign property’.18 In this respect, the broad
scope of expropriation liability under international law was expansive enough to
include all potential risks, not only the outright taking of physical assets, but also
other regulatory interference that deprived an owner of property or economic value.
The rule of protection against expropriation was emphasized again in the early
1920s, when the US challenged the Mexican government to take responsibility for its
unlawful expropriation behaviors. The most noteworthy incident took place in 1938
when the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, wrote a letter to the Mexican Ministry
of Foreign Affairs regarding the expropriation of American oil and agrarian
investments in Mexico.19 In the exchanged correspondence, Secretary Hull called for
full protection over expropriated property and expounded the now-famous doctrine
called the ‘Hull Formula’. According to the Hull Formula, the State is allowed to
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nationalize, but the taking of an alien’s property by a host state requires ‘prompt,
adequate and effective’ compensation.20
As Sornarajah notes, the proposed standard was considered by Western nations as
the customary international law minimum standard,21 aiming to ensure that ‘the
freedom of trade and investment across state boundaries is guaranteed.’22 Based on
the Hull Formula, whenever the state government engages in nationalizations or
other types of regulatory measures, the government of the host state has an
obligation to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation to the benefit party.
Contrary to the practices of the US, European countries initially resorted more
frequently to non-legal instruments. Sornarajah notes that the underlying protection
mechanisms used by European nations were largely driven by colonial expansion.23
Through the ‘imperial system’, some powerful European countries exerted direct
control over their colonies.24 Due to their strong influence by colonization, there was
no need to create a separate legal system or international laws to protect the benefits
of European nationals in their colony states.25 In the case of States that had never
been

colonized,

European

countries

asserted

the

legal

principle

of

‘extraterritoriality’,26 which immunized aliens against the local laws of host states
that were considered to be uncivilized and inferior to Western legal systems.27 The
principle of extraterritoriality was advanced by Western European nations to protect
the interests and commercial activities of their nationals in overseas countries.28
Outside the sphere of their colonial power, Western countries concurrently
developed a relationship with other countries based on equality. O’Connor found
that European countries started to build up external networks by signing international
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agreements among themselves and other countries outside of their colonial control.29
To protect the trade and commerce activities of their nationals in overseas countries
from unlawful expropriation, European countries concluded a number of
international agreements, which explicitly incorporated a clause that prevented
foreign-owned property from being unlawfully nationalized by the host state
government.30 Most international agreements required that, to be lawful, private
property could not be taken without compensation.31
2. Early Decisions of International Tribunals on the Concept of Indirect
Expropriation
The eminence of expropriation cases has long been discussed in international law.
The main early form of expropriation involved deprivation of a foreign investor’s
property through its confiscation and nationalization for use as a public utility. 32
Consequently, a growing body of international jurisprudence dealt with state
regulatory interference that resulted in a deprivation of foreign-owned property
rights and economic benefits.
One of the oldest decisions concerning regulatory expropriation was the controversy
between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in the 19th
century. The case was one of the very first significant cases to deal with the concept
of indirect or regulatory expropriation, where the British trader’s rights over
manufacturing and trading of sulphur were abolished by the orders of the Sicilian
government. In 1838, Great Britain argued that Sicily had granted sulphur monopoly
rights to French traders in breach of British rights to property protection under the
1816 Treaty of Commerce.33 In early times, there was no restriction on the trading of
sulphur in Sicily. Due to an increasing demand for sulphur within England and
France, there was a dramatic increase in sulphur production and, as a consequence of
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excessive production, sulphur prices decreased in the 1830s.34 To overcome this and
maintain price stability, the French agreed on fixed-price contracts for a large
quantity of Sulphur.35 The plan was greatly supported by many Sicilian mine
owners, who expected to gain higher purchase prices from their production.36 The
Sicilian government consequently granted a monopoly power to the French. This
situation alarmed British firms and the British government claimed that the
monopoly granted to the French had caused substantive economic loss to British
companies, preventing them from trading their sulphur freely.37 To resolve the
dispute, an adjudicating body was established. It held that the Sicilian granting of
monopoly power to a single French company had affected British competitors’
property rights, and this justified the an award of compensation to the British owners
of sulphur mines, the suppliers of sulphur and those that had been prevented from
trading their product.38 In this case, the Sicilian government was ordered to pay
compensation despite the fact that it had not taken any physical assets from the
aggrieved sulphur companies.39
In addition to the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies dispute, the
question of indirect expropriation was also addressed in the Norwegian Ship case.40
One of the key issues decided by the tribunal in this instance was whether
contractual rights could be subject to expropriation.41 In this case, there was a
dispute between the United States and the Norwegian ship buyer. In response to the
Norwegian claims of expropriation, the United States argued that it had expropriated
only ships, and contractual rights could not be considered as property since ‘this
property was an entity distinct from the material and other tangible things subjected
to the property’.42 To decide the case, the Tribunal applied the internal laws of the
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United States and Norway to determine what expropriatory actions had taken place.43
The Tribunal held that the Fleet Corporation, a United States government entity,
‘took over the legal rights and duties of the ship owners toward the shipbuilders’44
and that amounted to ‘de facto expropriation’.45 The Tribunal thus asserted that the
US authorities had to pay compensation not only for the requisition of tangible
property, but also for all intangible property as well.
Following the Norwegian Ship case, compensation was also awarded to American
landowners in De Sabla v Panama,46 as a result of expropriation pursuant to a land
reform policy of the government of Panama. Under a new land policy, the
government could forcefully transfer temporary cultivator’s licenses over privately
owned land to others.47 The government of Panama had made conveyances of
portions of the claimant’s lands to Panamanian citizens on the ground that all the
lands in question were public land.48 However, the government of Panama argued
that the claimant failed to oppose all adjudications and applications, and that the
claimant could not assert title over those public lands.49
After considering all the evidence, the United States-Panama General Claims
Commission (Commission) which was established under the conventions between
the United States and Panama of 28 July 1926 and 17 December 1932, held that the
Panamanian reforms were too unreasonably rigid and created hardship for the
complainant.50 The Commission also held that, since the authorities should have
afforded the owners of private property protection, they should deny applications for
grants and licenses that conflicted with the land owned by the claimant. The
Commission held that the license, despite being temporary, permanently deprived the
landowner of title and encouraged trespassers to come onto the property and destroy
all the timber and denude the soil by improper cultivation. 51 The Commission
asserted that such a license unlawfully made the land of De Sabla worthless as the
43
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government order created a ‘constructive total loss of the property because of the
breaking up of the continuity of the estate by adjudications, coupled with the damage
done to forests and soil by the licensees.’52 The Commission ultimately granted De
Sabla an indemnity in a claim for damages for violations of a foreign owner’s title to
land in Panama.53 Thus, this case reflects the notion that the host government is
liable for interference that renders property rights so useless that they are deemed to
have been expropriated.54
The issue of regulatory expropriation and the standard of compensation were
critically highlighted once again in the Chorzow Factory case, which concerned a
nitrate factory located in the Polish city of Chorzow.55 In the Chorzow case,
Bayrische Stickstoffwerke A.G., a German company, was granted a permit to
operate a nitrate factory in Chorzow in the Upper Silesia region of Poland in 1915.
The company was entitled to the rights to enjoy all contractual benefits arising out of
the nitrate operation. However, during 1920-1922, the government of Poland
introduced legislation to transfer the ownership to the Polish Treasury, permitting the
Polish authority to take control over the nitrate factory as well as possession of its
licenses, permits and patents.56 One of the key issues that the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ) had to decide was whether State interference with
contractual rights could be considered a compensable expropriation. The PCIJ
decided that in addition to taking possession of the factory, Poland had deprived the
foreign investor of the enjoyment of contractual rights and management of the firm.
The Polish Government’s actions were unlawful, unless compensation was paid.57
There are also examples of inconsistency in the legal approaches used by tribunals
when deciding the expropriation cases, resulting in a denial of compensation for
regulatory expropriation. In the Oscar Chinn case,58 for example, the tribunal held
that a sharp reduction by the defendant government in tariffs on its own government52
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owned shipping line was not regarded as expropriation warranting a compensation
claim by competing shipping companies. The government of the United Kingdom
had brought the case on behalf of a British shipping firm, Oscar Chinn, against the
Belgian Congo government. Although contractual rights are considered as property,
protected by customary international law, the Tribunal in Oscar Chinn held that a
speculative possibility of future profit-making is not protected and can be
legitimately expropriated under international law.59 The Tribunal also disregarded
the claim that the commercial situation of Oscar Chinn was a vested right.60 The
Tribunal asserted that it was:
unable to see in his original position - which was characterized by the possession of
customers and the possibility of making profit - anything in the nature of a genuine
vested right. Favorable business conditions and good will are transient circumstances,
subject to inevitable changes.61

The examples of judgments outlined above largely indicate that, prior to the Second
World War, there was no precise single formula applied in indirect expropriation
cases. Due to the lack of a specific legal doctrine, the ‘international minimum
standard’ developed over the years into the core basis of the protection of foreignowned interests in foreign countries. Despite its success in providing protection, a
broad and vague standard such as the ‘customary international minimum standard of
treatment’ was unable to offer a satisfactorily ‘workable test’ to determine with
certainty both the types of measures and the determinative threshold qualified as a
regulatory expropriation under international law.62 Aside from the Oscar Chinn case,
which excluded future profit from the notion of property, a number of early decisions
fashioned the law of expropriation by expanding the scope of protection to include
59

Ibid 88.
August Reinisch, 'Expropriation' in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Interantional Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 407,
412.
61
Oscar Chinn (Judgement) (1934) PCIJ, Series A/B, No 69, 12 December 1934, 88.
62
Andrew Paul Newcombe, Regulatory Expropriation, Investment Protection and International Law:
When is Government Regulation Expropriatory and When Should Compensation be Paid?
(Dissertation/Thesis Thesis, ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing, 1999)
<http://uow.summon.serialssolutions.com/link/0/eLvHCXMwVV27DsIwDIwQAwtLJchXpEqbtqnni
ooBMXUAtjpxxopH-H-cAhKMlgcvpzvL8tnJBlyXLt2EKXRgvURrkHt807ZYUDMiwt8w_4fN0wsaNqIod8N3V59ngGoK1OmqtAZTOfCMHk768oQMDTRBhu0B8c6RAwIHcjo_YErWsIylA0nPKBZW0r1mPaGZ_i7C3zUizj_Ukyca7klKsTtCdj5dD_w6zb5g_Zv9TfouSKX6Ghypz_QKOSTin> 110 (‘Regulatory Expropriation’).
60

63

not only physical seizure, but also the breach of a contract and the refusal of a
permit. This generally validated broad claims for compensation under international
law.

B. Calvo Doctrine, Decolonization and the State’s Rights to
Expropriate Private Property after the Second World War
Faced with the expansive foreign protection provided in bilateral treaties, FCNs and
the international minimum standard under customary law, some developing
countries began to oppose these external standards of treatment imposed by
advanced nations. Instead of surrendering to outside pressure, these countries
maintained that they had the right to determine their own development goals and
dealt with foreign investors in accordance with their own national legal orders.63 In
this next section, the study will highlight legal changes which articulated the
interests of developing countries after the Second World War. In addition to
outlining the emerging concept of the Calvo Doctrine, this section also focuses on
the establishment of the principle of State sovereignty in a series of United Nations
Resolutions and their critical implications for the regulatory expropriation doctrine.
1. Calvo Doctrine and the Challenges to the Traditional Standard of
Expropriation Law
To defend against external interference over their domestic affairs, some capitalimporting countries opposed the Western doctrine of international minimum
standards of treatment and insisted upon state sovereign rights. In Argentina, for
example, jurist Carlos Calvo proposed the ‘Calvo Doctrine’ in the 19th century.64 He
revitalized the essence of sovereign equality and rejected the customary international
minimum standard of treatment, as well as the exercise of diplomatic protection and
military interventions.65 He also asserted that discriminatory treatment favoring
63
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Western powers is unacceptable and that foreigners should not be entitled to greater
protection than the local people of the host State.66
In the 20th century, the Soviet Union, inspired by socialist doctrine, then rejected the
concept of private property protection adopted by Western society.67 Based on
socialist principles of property, the confiscation of private assets was a fundamental
part of that country’s revolution to socialize the factors of production. 68 To achieve
the Soviet’s development goals, the government promulgated decrees to abolish
private ownership in 1918, and acclaimed its right to nationalize private property
without incurring an obligation to compensate or restitute the aggrieved party for the
expropriated assets.69 The socialist countries of Eastern Europe also challenged
Western practices, and carried out extensive expropriations of private property. As
Brazell indicates, the regulation of alien property based on the traditional concept of
state responsibility was problematic since ‘it addressed the concerns of one side, the
investor’s home state, [and] [excluded] of those of the host.’70
In response to the changing geopolitical and global economic structure, as well as
dissatisfaction with Western positions, 1960-1977 was a period characterized by
significant movement in expropriation programs in many developing countries,71 in
order to end economic domination of resource exploitation by Western powers.72
Burton observes that the nationalization of properties belonging to foreign investors
after the Second World War came in many different forms, varying from outright
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confiscation, to expropriation, intervention, forced sales and forced contract
renegotiation.73
Expropriation of foreign-owned investment was directly related to political attempts
to abolish the doctrine of private property protection introduced by industrialized
countries.74 As part of a massive movement of nationalization, the taking of alien
properties occurred in many countries worldwide, including the Soviet Union in
1917, Mexico in 1938, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland between
1945 and 1948, China in the 1950s, Bolivia in 1952, Egypt in 1956, and Cuba in
1959.75 This proliferation of nationalizations covered a wide range of key resource
industries, such as oil, mining and petroleum.76
To end the inequality in economic and political relationships, newly independent
small countries ultimately united in the call for a new system, which would ensure
that every state could freely exercise full and permanent sovereignty within its
territory, in order to regulate the activities of transnational corporations for the
benefits of the host country.77
2. A New Expropriation Regime to Promote State Sovereignty
Since the right to expropriate alien property is a part of the State’s economic
sovereignty, newly independent countries proclaimed their full authority to
expropriate foreign-owned investment without incurring full compensation
payments.78 To achieve these sovereign right goals, a series of United Nations
declarations were negotiated and concluded. Although those declarations did not
explicitly specify a position on the issue of regulatory expropriation, they generally
affirmed a state’s right to expropriate foreign-owned properties, and rejected the idea
that good faith expropriation is subject to compensation obligations under
international law.
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The first of these was advanced by some developing countries in 1962 as the
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR 1962).79 The
PSNR 1962 provided groundwork for assuring rights to permanent sovereignty over
natural resources. In the PSNR 1962, a new concept of expropriation was introduced
in its Preamble:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons
of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding
purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules enforced
in the State taking such measure in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance
with international law.80

Importantly, it highlighted the principle of self-determination and non-intervention in
domestic affairs of developing countries.81 Moreover, it opposed the Hull Formula
that called for prompted, adequate and effective compensation and, instead,
introduced the term ‘appropriate compensation’.82 Based on this new standard,
developing countries strongly affirmed their rights to expropriate private property on
the ground of general national interests. To override the individual investor interests,
the PSNR 1962 asserts that the determination of monetary damages must take into
account economic, context, and historical and national self-determination factors.83
The PSNR 1962 was controversial. Despite broad acceptance by and support from
developing and many developed countries, a number of countries refused, and others
were reluctant, to accept the PSNR 1962 as a general international norm.84
In 1973, the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a new resolution on
Permanent Sovereign and Natural Resources to promote the interests of developing
countries. Resolution 3171 (PSNR 1973) states that:
79
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[A]s an expression of their sovereignty…each State is entitled to determine the
amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment, and that any disputes
which may arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of each
State carrying out such measure.85

This Resolution explicitly granted a wide discretion to the State to implement
expropriation in accordance with the national law. Without making a reference to
international law, the Resolution proclaimed that a right to expropriation is a matter
that falls under a State’s national law.86
The Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
(NIEO), formed in May 1974 (Resolution 3201), strongly supported a State’s
sovereign powers and insisted that the determination of compensation must be
subjected to the national law.87 Also in 1974, the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States (the 1974 Charter) went a step further than this, elaborating upon the
principles in the NIEO Declaration and asserting that every State has the
responsibility to promote economic, social and cultural development, and progress
for both its own people and those of developing countries.88 Moreover, it specified
that each State has freestanding rights:
[t]o regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national
jurisdiction in accordance with its law and regulations and in conformity with its
national objectives and priorities…[and] … in which case appropriate compensation
should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent….89

Despite wide acceptance of these UN legal instruments by developing countries,
Cassese asserts that these UN legal instruments could not be regarded as ‘declaratory
of customary international law’ due to the lack of real consensus from within the
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international community.90 For example, although the Charter was adopted by a
majority of developing countries in the General Assembly, its resolutions are only
specified as recommendations91 and most developed countries voted against its
adoption or abstained from voting. While 120 countries voted in favor of the Charter,
six countries voted against and ten countries abstained.92
One of the most contentious issues was the standard of compensation for
expropriation. Disagreement over the standard of compensation has occurred
between developed and developing countries. While powerful European countries
maintain that compensation must be determined according to the Hull formula, as
required under ancient customary law on state responsibility, developing countries
emphasize the application of national laws rather international law to determine the
amount of compensation of expropriated foreign-owned properties.93 These
contrasting approaches continue to underlie the positions of the developed and
developing countries. However, in the last decade of the 20th century, this
controversy has seemed to decline, following the end of the Cold War and the
changing landscape of economic order to focus more on the free market economy
and economic growth.
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3. The Implications of the New International Economic Order for the Right to
Regulate
The UN General Assembly Resolutions obviously encouraged UN Member States to
reclaim their ‘full permanent sovereignty’.94 As former judge of the International
Court of Justice, Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga asserted, the exercise of a sovereign
right of the State to expropriate is lawfully acceptable95 and, in his opinion, the
proposed NIEO reflected the growing trend toward ‘recognition of the right of each
State to organize its economic structure as it chooses and to introduce all the
economic and social changes which the government of the day deems desirable’.96
The proposed legal regime thus allowed post-colonial States to assert full
sovereignty to nationalize, expropriate and requisite alien’s property by omitting the
obligation to pay full compensation, and by asserting the predominant role of
domestic legislation in determining the appropriate amount of compensation.
The adoption of the NIEO purported to have far-reaching implications on the manner
in which each country exercises its regulatory powers. Although the state cannot
refer to its domestic law as an excuse for failing to comply with international
obligations and compensation payments,97 the host state government could invoke
the supremacy of their domestic legislation as recommended in a series of
subsequent UN Resolutions in order to deprive foreign investors of their property
rights without paying the full amount of compensation. The quest for selfdetermination could thus preclude the host State government from international
responsibility when conducting an expropriatory measure that deprives the owner of
the value of investment.
Although the Charter and the NIEO Declaration were strong political statements,
they were not legally binding and did not purport to be restatements of existing
law.98 Part of the failure of the Charter and the NIEO was due to the unwillingness of
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industrialized countries to adopt the PSNR Resolutions that did not serve their
economic interests.99 Their conflicting ideas on transnational standards of
compensation for expropriation between industrialized states and developing
countries stimulated political tensions relating to the State’s right to regulate. A lack
of shared principles in the international community made it difficult to predict the
way in which the legal doctrine of expropriation should be applied in order to meet
the expectations of the local society, the government and a foreign investor.
In addition, the impact of the debt crisis of the 1980s also shifted the focus of
developing countries from self-determination objectives towards more liberal
investment policies.100 As a consequence, many developing countries ratified
investment treaties. The changing positions of developing countries reflected not
only the preference for liberalization, but also open market policies to attract the
limited resource of foreign investment into their countries.101 The variations in
international economic regimes undoubtedly affected the uniformity and consistency
of legal spirit of the Charter and the NIEO in international law.
To resolve international tensions and legal ambiguities and to reconcile conflicting
interests between developed and developing countries, attempts have since been
made to codify the substantive rights of investors as well as the compensation
obligations of host state governments in the area of regulatory expropriation. This is
not only to ascertain the meaning and scope of expropriation, but also to achieve a
balance between the host state’s rights to regulate and investor interests.

C. Early Attempts to Codify the International Standards for
Expropriation by Non-Governmental Agencies
The success of decolonization processes after the Second World War led to the
intensifying of demands for economic sovereignty, resulting in a proliferation of
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national expropriation programs undertaken worldwide.102 However, due to the
vague standard of expropriation in customary international law, international codes
on expropriation were needed. A diverse body of non-governmental agencies,
therefore, sought to draft codes that addressed both direct and regulatory
expropriation.
The following two sections consider codes made during the 1960s-1970s, with a
special focus on the Abs/Shawcross Draft Convention, the Harvard Draft and the
OECD Draft Convention. Whilst these codes have never been adopted by
governments, the proposed legal frameworks are illustrative of the attempts to
harmonize the customary international law on both direct and indirect expropriations
following the period of the Second World War.
1. The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention
In 1957-1958, the German Society to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investment,
under the chairmanship of Dr. Abs and Lord Shawcross, prepared a draft
international convention for the protection of private property rights in foreign
countries.103 The Abs/Shawcross Draft Convention (hereinafter the Abs/Shawcross
Draft) contains standards of treatment which are adapted from the rules of customary
international law.104
To protect against expropriation, the Abs/Shawcross Draft states that:
No Party shall take any measures against nationals of another Party to deprive them
directly or indirectly of their property except under due process of law and provided
that such measures are not discriminatory or contrary to undertakings given by that
Party and are accompanied by the payment of just and effective compensation. 105
[emphasis added]
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The Abs/Shawcross Draft expressly includes not only direct expropriation, but also
‘indirect’ expropriation in the corpus of an international law text. Although the text
expressly distinguishes between direct and indirect expropriation, it does not
articulate clearly the legal criteria for determining when a state regulatory action falls
into the category of an indirect expropriation.
Despite its lack of clarity, Schwarzenberger argues that a reading of the
Abs/Shawcross Draft cannot avoid ‘the evaluation of objects and motives’ of
governmental action.106 He asserts that since the Abs/Shawcross Draft was an
attempt to resolve the ideological differences between developed and developing
countries within the international economic system,107 a reading of it should take into
consideration the ‘purpose of the measures’.108 Thus, from Schwarzenberger’s point
of view, not all governmental interference amounts to compensable indirect
expropriation. Rather, when deciding an expropriation claim, the adjudicator should
take into account other non-legal factors in verifying the existence of compensable
regulatory takings.
2. The Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States
for Injuries to Aliens
Another attempt to codify expropriation powers was made through the Harvard Draft
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens
(hereinafter the Draft Convention). Upon the request of the UN Secretariat, the
document was prepared in 1961 by rapporteurs Louis B Sohn and Richard R Baxter
from the Harvard Law School. The Draft Convention was presented to the
International Law Commission (ILC) in an attempt to develop the codified model
law, based on the doctrine of international state responsibility for ‘acts’ and
‘omissions’ of States causing an injury to an alien.109
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In the context of expropriations, the Draft Convention was prepared based on the
customary international law principle of a minimum standard of treatment for
aliens.110 In Article 10(3)(a), it includes all forms of expropriation. Besides an
outright taking of physical asset, it specifies that an expropriation can also occur
when legislation results in:
[A]n unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment or disposal of property
so…that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy or dispose of the property
within a reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference.111

However, in Article 10(5) of the Harvard Draft Convention, it includes an exemption
clause precluding some governmental interference from international state
responsibility. It states that:
An uncompensated taking of property of an alien or a deprivation of the use of
enjoyment of property of an alien which results from the execution of the tax laws;
from a general change in the value of currency; from the action of the competent
authorities of the State in the maintenance of public order, health, or morality; or from
the valid exercise of belligerent rights; or is otherwise incidental to the normal
operation of the laws of the State shall not be considered wrongful.…112

Regarding the compensation standard, Article 10(2) of the Harvard Draft Convention
states that the taking of private property is wrongful if it is not accompanied by
prompt compensation, which is referred to as ‘just’ compensation. What is meant by
‘just’ compensation is quite vague. However, in Article 10(2)(b) of the Harvard
Draft Convention, it establishes that ‘just’ compensation has to refer to the ‘fair
market value’ of the property in question before the date when the value of the
property was depressed by the expropriatory measure.113
The Harvard Draft Convention provides a fundamental principle for the adjudicator
to distinguish a compensable taking from a normal exercise of regulatory power.
Although the Harvard Draft Convention was an academic project, it was cited in
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several cases in the context of the minimum standard of treatment in
expropriation.114 However, in the accompanying Explanatory Note, there is no
explicit guidance regarding types of regulatory interference that might justify noncompensation in some key areas. For example, in spite of the justification of
exercises of power to maintain ‘public order, health or morality’, it is unclear
whether the host state government is subject to international responsibility when
imposing measures for environmental protection. For example, the government
might need to regulate to protect endangered species through legislation,115 which
permanently prohibits the operation of a business. Due to the vagueness of this
provision, it is unclear if the host country imposing environmental protection law is
granted a specific compensation exemption in the area it wants to regulate.
Bonnitcha criticizes the unclear scope of what the term ‘public order, health, or
morality’ really means in order to justify a non-compensation measure.116
According to the Explanatory Note of Article 10(5), what is meant by a measure
‘incidental to the normal operation of the law’, includes only a ‘deprivation of
property rights’ by a court judgment in relation to ‘a civil case or a fine or penalty in
criminal proceedings’.117 In other words, the damage caused by court actions is to be
exempted from the compensation obligations under international law only in the case
where the deprivation of private property rights is attributed to a court judgment in
relation to civil or a criminal law, but not anything else.
It is still questionable whether this clause is applicable to administrative law-related
issues. If foreign investors have suffered from judicial decisions under domestic
public law, it is uncertain whether the Harvard Draft Convention is to be interpreted
in a manner that includes the effect of judicial review of administrative actions.
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Despite a broad scope of legal exemption, many issues in the Harvard Draft
Convention are arguably unclear and full of controversies.
3. The OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property
In 1967, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
prepared the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property
(hereinafter the OECD Draft).118 It provides that expropriations can be both ‘direct’
and ‘indirect’ deprivations of property. Article 3 of the Draft Convention states that:
No Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, of his property a
national of another Party unless the following conditions are complied with:
(i)

The measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law;

(ii)

The measures are not discriminatory or contrary to any undertaking which

the former Party may have given; and
(iii)

The measures are accompanied by provisions for the payment of just

compensation.119

Again, there is no explicit rule to define the concept of indirect expropriation in the
OECD Draft. Despite the apparent difficulty in identifying the nature of measures
considered as indirect expropriation, the OECD Draft respects a State’s autonomous
power, asserting that each country has sovereign power to control foreign-owned
property in its territory for the sake of ‘political, social or economic ends’.120 In the
accompanying Explanatory Note, the OECD Draft observes that a State may be
subject to international responsibility if the government has an ‘intent’ to impose a
‘wrongful’ regulatory measure causing the deprivation of foreign property rights. 121
Thus, it is a State’s intention to commit wrongful action that the adjudicators need to
take into account when identifying the emergence of an indirect expropriation.
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4. Inconsistencies of Various Legal Texts Concerning Indirect Expropriation
Even though the above international drafts have never been adopted as treaties, they
provide a strong basis for the formulation of a standard of treatment in subsequent
international treaties on foreign investment protection.

The protection against

expropriation as found in the Abs-Shawcross Draft, the Harvard Draft Convention
and the OECD Draft share some common principles drawn from the customary
international law of minimum standards. In order to provide protection for foreignowned investments, the draft laws provide similar protections against all forms of
expropriation and constrain the host state government from expropriating foreign
investments directly or indirectly unless certain conditions are met. A comparative
study of the above legal texts reveals that the term ‘indirect expropriation’ was
repeatedly included in the draft conventions. Moreover, each of the legal texts has
cited similar standards of compensation. In place of full compensation, each
convention refers to the payment of just compensation. This may reflect an attempt
to resolve the inconsistent standards of compensation for expropriation and to strike
a balance between the needs of the public, on the one hand, and property right
owners on the other.
In addition to these basic features, each convention similarly sets out ‘exceptions
clauses’, which exclude compensation obligations from following good faith and
non-discriminatory regulations. These exceptions are generally accepted under the
‘law and order power doctrine’ recognized under both international and domestic
laws.122
Nevertheless, in relation to the specific threshold for regulatory expropriation, the
different draft texts propose diverse legal criteria to determine when a compensable
expropriation has occurred. For example, the Abs/Shawcross Draft contains a vague
term of indirect expropriation in the clause. Without specifying explicitly, the Draft
simply proclaims that no party can indirectly deprive owners of their property rights
without paying compensation. In the Harvard Draft Convention, in contrast, the term
is delineated more specifically by proposing the concept of ‘unreasonable
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interference’ as the critical criterion in determining indirect expropriation.123 This
implies that the Harvard Draft Convention focuses on the ‘effect of interference’ as
the key criterion in identifying the existence of a compensable expropriatory act. The
OECD Draft, on the other hand, focuses on an ‘intent to commit a wrongful
measure’ as a key criterion in finding an indirect expropriation.124 Ultimately, the
lack of a consistent legal framework makes the subject less predictable.

D. Conclusions
This Chapter has captured the evolution of the international law on expropriation in
the early periods, prior to the emergence of international investment treaties. The
protection against nationalization has long been recognized in international law. This
type of taking was considered a prime concern in public international law and mainly
occurred when the host State forcibly removed the property owned by a foreign
investor located within that host State. However, there was also an emerging trend to
protect investors against regulatory interference by public authorities, since an
increasing number of regulatory takings posed a new threat to foreign-owned
property.
Through a series of international treaties concluded by Western nations, the
customary international law principles of minimum standard of treatment and full
protection were codified to protect against regulatory takings. Any government
conduct that fell short of the internationally acceptable standard was challenged and
subject to international responsibility. Despite the prominent role of the customary
international minimum standard of treatment, its vagueness has fuelled international
tensions between developed and developing countries over the way in which
international law should reconcile the protection of property rights with state
regulatory autonomy. While Western countries developed legal doctrine and
international legal rules to ensure maximum protection of property rights, based on
the international minimum standard of treatment and the Hull Rule of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation, developing countries opposed these standards,
123
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and affirmed the ‘national treatment’ standard, which held that an alien has no more
rights than the citizen of a sovereign State. Through a series of UN General
Assembly resolutions, developing countries supported all state’s sovereign rights to
expropriate foreign-owned investment for their national development goals. Further
affirming the state’s autonomous power, they also supported the ‘appropriate
compensation’ standard, demanding less than full compensation or no compensation
at all for any good faith regulatory interference.
To resolve this political disagreement, there were numerous attempts to create
international codes on expropriation that take into account the conflicting interests
between developed and developing countries. Despite the common frameworks for
expropriation clauses proposed by these codes, there were inconsistencies in the
ways in which the boundary of ‘indirect expropriation’ was defined. Due to profound
political disagreement and different legal frameworks, these problems have sustained
ongoing uncertainty in a struggle between property rights protection, on the one
hand, and state regulatory power to expropriate for social benefits, on the other.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONCEPT OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: LEGAL PROVISIONS, DOCTRINES AND
UNSETTLED BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

The issue of ‘indirect expropriation’ has become the most controversial and
important aspect of contemporary international investment law. In comparison with
the rather stable concept of ‘direct expropriation’, drawing the precise boundaries
around those types of government interference that will amount to ‘indirect
expropriation’ has sparked enormous debate within international law.
When does state regulatory interference become subject to compensation for an
indirect expropriation under international law? To answer this question, this Chapter
will examine the concept of indirect expropriation developed by the international
tribunals established under key investment treaties, in the Post-World War II period.
These investment treaties include the Iran-US Claim Settlement Declaration
(Declaration), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).
This Chapter will study the economic and political backgrounds, as well as the
mechanisms to settle investment disputes provided by each forum.
The following study provides a broad review of the treatment of indirect
expropriation by tribunals in order to assist adjudicators in the interpretation of the
meaning of an ‘indirect expropriation’ that is compensable under contemporary
international investment law. This Chapter sheds light on the evolving nature of the
relevant legal principles and, in the final part, a discussion of key factors
contributing to the problems of legal uncertainty will be provided.
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A. Dispute Mechanisms and Legal Principles of Indirect Expropriation
under Contemporary International Investment Treaties
1. Iran-US Claims Settlement Declaration
(a) Background: The Reflection of Political Turmoil during the Iranian Islamic
Revolution and the Creation of the Claims Settlement Declaration and the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
Historically, the establishment of the ‘Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims
by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran’ (or ‘Claims Settlement Declaration’) was the consequence
of civil unrest and political tensions between Iran and the United States, during the
1970s. The revolution in Iran was attributed partly to opposition against the Shah,
who favored Western ways of development and announced a ‘White Revolution’ 1 in
order to modernize the country in the areas of economics, science and technology,
and military weaponry, according to Western standards.2 The program also included,
among other things, land reform, nationalization of forests, and the sale of stateowned enterprises to the private sector.3
These development programs, coupled with huge economic growth in the country
due to an oil boom, contributed to unequal wealth and development in Iran.4
Discontent spread and resulted in uprisings in Iranian society.5 In addition to
dissatisfaction with the ruling elites, the opposition was also attributed to discontent
1

Shiva Balaghi, A Brief History of 20-th Century Iran
<https://www.nyu.edu/greyart/exhibits/iran/briefhistory/body_index.html>.
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oil price rise in 1973, Iran recorded high economic growth, with the industrial growth rate of 15% and
9-19% of GNP. The sudden increase in the price of oil generated impressive growth of the economy.
However, the huge inflow of revenue caused serious distortion of economic development. There were
so much unproductive economic activities and, coupled with shortage of skilled manpower and
infrastructure, these problems caused uneven development and income distribution in the country.];
Hassan Hakimian, 'Institutional Change, Policy Challenges and Macroeconomic Performance: Case
Study of Iran (1979-2004)' (Paper presented at the ERF Annual Conference on the World Bank's
Commission on Growth and Development, Kuwait, 2007) 3.
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over the predominance of foreigners and a capitalistic model of development that
relied too heavily on foreign influences. Due to high economic growth in the
country, Iran experienced a significant inflow of American corporations and
multinational companies.6 This stirred discontent among the Anti-Shah groups,
resulting in nationwide opposition. As Graham notes, the fear of Westernization
grew because ‘the Shah’s modernization plans had permitted too many foreigners to
work in Iran, [and] had made Iran too dependent on foreign technology and allowed
Iran to be a tool of American imperialism’.7
Significant change in the society boosted discontent among revolutionaries,
especially Iran’s clergy. These changes led to an uprising and the subsequent
proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Iran on February 11, 1979. The newly set up
government of Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini undertook numerous public measures
in an attempt to take control over Western enterprises.8 In addition to its
expropriation programs, the revolutionists seized the American embassy in Tehran,
and forced other American representatives and businessmen to leave the country.9
Corresponding to this changing political climate, the new Iranian government
enacted a new Constitution, as well as other statutes, to discourage and exert control
over foreign companies hoping to invest in Iran.10 Some commentators consider that
these incidences were greatly influenced by the attempts of an extremely
conservative group of people who feared foreign influence and wanted to claim the
independence of the country from Western powers.11 In response to the
expropriations, the United States imposed import blocks on oil from Iran and froze
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approximately US$ 8 billion in Iranian assets held within the United States and
American financial institutions located abroad.12
To resolve the conflict between the United States and Iran, the Algerian government
acted as a broker, bringing the two countries into negotiations. Through the good
office of Algeria, on January 19, 1981, the United States and Iran entered into an
international agreement referred to as the Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, which is commonly known as the ‘Claims Settlement Declaration’
(‘the Declaration’).13 This document provided that American diplomats, and other
personnel of the US embassy, had to be released.14 In return, the United States was:
firstly, prohibited from interfering in the internal affairs of Iran; secondly, mandated
to suspend its claims relating to the hostage crisis before the International Court of
Justice (ICJ); and thirdly, required to return frozen assets back to Iran.15
Paragraph 7 of the Declaration also required that a $1 billion security fund had to be
reserved from Iran’s assets situated in the United States.16 The fund, managed by the
Central Bank of the Netherlands, which is an escrow bank appointed by Iran and the
United States, was mainly used to pay awards made by the Tribunal.17 So as to
secure the payment of compensation pursuant to the Declaration, Iran was required
to maintain a minimum balance of $500 million in the account.18
(b) An Overview of the Dispute Settlement System of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal
Under the Algiers Accord, both Iran and the United States agreed to promote the
settlement of disputes through the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (hereinafter
12
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‘Tribunal’). The Declaration states that ‘[a]n international arbitral tribunal (the Iranthe United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding
claims’.19 Accordingly, the Tribunal is considered to be a ‘one-stop-shop’,20 where
all claims are submitted, reviewed and decided by the Tribunal, with the assistance
of its legal staff and administrative personnel who run the office in The Hague on a
full-time basis.
The Tribunal itself is made up of nine full-time arbitrators, comprising three chosen
by the United States, three by Iran, and three chosen by a joint agreement between
Iran and the United States.21 To adequately accommodate incoming cases, the
Tribunal is divided into three chambers, each with three members that hear the
submitted claims.22
The Tribunal was granted the authority to decide a wide range of claims. The
Declaration stipulates that it is:
established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States against
Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, and any
counterclaim…if such claims and counterclaims are outstanding at the date of this
Agreement, whether or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts,
contracts…expropriation or other measures affecting property rights.23 [emphasis
added]

To solve disputes, the Tribunal can apply the law it deems fit in the circumstances.
The Declaration states that:
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such
choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal
determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of trade, contract
provisions and changed circumstances.24
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Due to a broad range of available choices of law, the Tribunal can apply either
principles of commercial law or international law to a case. It is up to the Tribunal’s
discretion to decide which rule it deems appropriate as a governing law. 25 For
example, the Tribunal in CMI International Inc. v Iran,26 a case that concerned the
Respondent’s failure to buy contractual equipment from the Claimant, held that it
was within the authority of the Tribunal to apply international law rather than the
nominated law within the contract. Even though the Claimant referred to the contract
law of Idaho as the appropriate governing law, the Tribunal declined to apply it and
held that, in its search for ‘equity and justice’, it was more appropriate to apply
international law and not ‘rigidly tie to the law of contract’ of Idaho per se.27
Due to the Tribunal’s broad discretionary power, in choosing applicable laws, some
legal commentators are concerned about the resulting legal uncertainty in the awards
rendered by different groups of Tribunal Chambers.28 Despite criticism, the role of
the Tribunal as a mechanism for dispute resolution in the area of international
investment law is significant. Through its long history, the Tribunal has heard a vast
quantity of disputes. Since its establishment in July 1981, it has resolved nearly
4,000 cases. Among them, over 800 awards have been rendered. 29 Thus far, the total
amount of damages awarded by the Tribunal to American claimants is more than
US$ 2.1 billion.30
The work of the Tribunal has also contributed greatly to the development of
international investment law. Drahozal and Gibson take the view that the Tribunal’s
awards are ‘an essential source for lawyers and parties involved in investor-state
disputes’.31 Their empirical study found that about 32 percent of the awards decided
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by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) referred
to the awards rendered by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (IRUSCT), and out
of that figure, 45 percent related to substantive merits issues, while 20 percent were
related to jurisdiction.32
(c) The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal Jurisprudence and the Impact of Civil Unrest upon the Evolution of
Legal Doctrine
Due to the social and political unrest in Iran and as a result of ‘anti-Western
rhetoric’,33 foreign investments in key industries, such as oil and banking, were
nationalized by the government. While the United States requested that Iran respect
the principle of the ‘international minimum standard’, Iran argued that, according to
the principles of international law,34 the country was entitled by sovereign right to
seize the economic enterprises of foreigners, for the purposes of internal affairs and
national interests.35
The Tribunal has the jurisdiction not only to consider claims relating to
‘expropriation’, but also ‘other measures affecting property rights’.36 In actual fact,
only a small number of claims have involved the direct taking of private property
through ‘formal nationalization or expropriation’,37 while a large number of claims
have involved the ‘physical seizure or appropriations of property by Revolutionary
Guards or … deprivations of property rights through the governmental appointment
of temporary managers or other similar measures’.38 Therefore, one of the primary
concerns facing the Tribunal is determining when certain governmental interference
with foreign property is in breach of international law.
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There is no settled understanding of the meaning and scope of the phrase ‘other
measures affecting property rights’. The Tribunal has generally acknowledged the
role of customary international law as a tool with which to analyze the issue.39
However, due to the poor development of indirect expropriation principles within
customary international law, the Tribunal has developed a body of jurisprudence
aimed at distinguishing internationally accepted exercises of regulatory powers from
expropriations. In one of its most highly cited cases, Starrett House Corp v
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,40 the Tribunal held that:
It is undisputed in this case that the Government of Iran did not issue any law or
decree according to which the Zomorod Project or Shah Goli expressly was
nationalized or expropriated. However, it is recognized in international law that
measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that
these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been
expropriated, even though the State does not purport to have expropriated them and
the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner.41 [emphasis
added]

In the Award, the Tribunal held that the Iranian revolutionary government was still
liable for its interference with private property, even though ownership had not been
taken away, and it was to be subject to international responsibility if the alleged
measure interfered in a manner that rendered property rights ‘useless’.
A few years later, a similar concept was adopted by the Chamber Two Tribunal in
Tippetts v TAMS-AFFA.42 Supporting an ‘effects-based’ analysis, which focuses
primarily on the impact of the interference in contention, the Tribunal held that the
State is still responsible for damage to property rights even though the ‘legal title to
the property is not affected’,43 and that the government does not need to ‘acquire
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something of value’ from the alleged interference.44 Interestingly, however, whilst
the Tribunal in Starrett utilized the legal threshold of ‘uselessness’ to delimit
property deprivation, the Tippetts Tribunal articulated a clearer principle of property
deprivation amounting to expropriation.45 It held that:
While assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically
and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the
government, … such a conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the
owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this
deprivation is not merely ephemeral. The intent of the government is less important
than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of the measures of control
or interference is less important than the reality of their impact.46 (emphasis added)

The Tribunal emphasized, that to be considered an expropriation, the interference
must deprive the owner of fundamental rights of ownership and this deprivation
must be more than ‘merely ephemeral’. The Tribunal also stressed that the intent of
the government is not as important as the impact upon the investor. Accordingly,
both the Starrett and Tippett cases were based on an analysis of effect, rather than an
analysis of a state’s intentions.
Nevertheless, the role of a state’s intent was recognized in SEDCO v National
Iranian Oil Co.47 In this case - the only case in which the doctrine of ‘police power’
was expressly employed by the IRUSCT48 - the Tribunal concluded that Iran had no
international responsibility to pay compensation for a transfer of stock as part of the
nationalization of a private bank that left the bank less assets to cover all of its
incurred debts. By referring to the genuine and inherent ‘police power’ doctrine
under customary international law, the Tribunal stated that it is ‘… an accepted
principle of international law that a State is not liable for economic injury which is a
consequence of bona fide regulation within the accepted police powers of States’.49
However, like previous awards, the Tribunal acknowledged that the impact of a
44
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measure was a more important consideration than the state’s intent, but held that the
State is liable only if the governmental interference is ‘substantial and excessive’.50
Despite the continued validity of the ‘police power’ doctrine, a great number of
indirect expropriation claims initiated under the IRUSCT have been resolved through
the use of the ‘effects-based’ doctrine.51 The predominant status of ‘effects-based’
analysis, over the ‘police power’ doctrine, was also echoed in ITT v Iran.52 In this
case, the Tribunal expressly affirmed that ‘the intent of the government is less
important than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of these
measures…is less important than the reality of their impact’.53 The denial of a
‘police power’ defense was further emphasized in the case of Phelps Dodge.54 In this
case, the Tribunal held that a State measure motivated by financial, economic or
social concerns does not give rise to a ‘police power’ defense to an expropriation
claim.55
The predominance of the ‘effects-based’ approach adopted by the Tribunal in IranUnited States Claims was largely influenced by the socio-political context of the
time.56 During the Islamic Revolution, the Tribunal envisaged a considerable
caseload resulting from ‘irregular measures’ carried out by Iran.57 Some
commentators affirm the validity of the approach used by the Tribunal in light of the
prevailing circumstance during that period. Heiskanen, for example, claims that ‘it
was not necessary for the Tribunal specifically to address the due process issue in
each case’ as ‘failure to comply with due process could be effectively presumed’.58
In this context, the Tribunal’s ‘effects-based’ analysis was justified when dealing
with the conduct of Iran, where irregular expropriations of foreign properties were
widespread and the absence of minimum standards of due process could rationally be
expected.
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Even though the Tribunal frequently utilized the ‘effects-based’ doctrine, there are
some practical problems in the application of this concept to an expropriation
analysis. For instance, the Tribunal has encountered some difficulty in characterizing
the property rights that ought to be subject to expropriation analysis. As Swanson
acknowledges, whether a state action affecting property rights could amount to
expropriation, depends on how wide the scope of property rights is conceptualized
and defined.59 In the Starrett case, for example, the Tribunal deemed the government
measure destroying the entire value of the investment a compensable expropriation,
regardless of the magnitude of the controlling power retained by the foreign
investor.60 In contrast, the Tribunal in the Tippett case expressed that regulatory
interference could only be regarded as a compensable expropriation when the
government measure in question deprives the investor of their fundamental rights in
the investment.61 Although both Tribunals similarly focused on the impact of
government conduct on the investors’ property, they proposed different criteria with
which to identify the emergence of a compensable indirect expropriation. Ultimately,
this type of divergence could impact the Tribunal’s expropriation analysis and, as a
result, the ability of a State to exercise its public powers. As Swanson cautions, ‘if a
host state action affecting one fundamental right can amount to a taking, even when
the owner is not deprived of substantially all value in his investment, the ability of
the host state to regulate will be curtailed’.62 This absence of a clear standard would
arguably perpetuate uncertainty and unpredictability within the legal framework
applicable to both foreign investors and host state governments dealing with
expropriation disputes.
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2. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
(a) Background: The Promotion of Trade and Investment Liberalization in the
North America Region
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)63 is a Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico. The NAFTA represents a key
milestone in the area of international economic agreements, encouraging integration
between countries with different economic backgrounds.64 It contains a
comprehensive list of substantive and procedural laws that aim to promote a
continuing dialogue on regional trade integration, and a neo-liberal economic
regime.
The NAFTA was preceded by the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
(hereafter Canada-US FTA),65 which came into effect in 1989 following negotiations
that first commenced in 1985.66 The main objective of the Canada-US FTA was to
eliminate both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. The Agreement was considered
to be one of the first international agreements to address the issue of trade in
services, and provide a dispute settlement mechanism as well as a joint national body
to examine the remedial actions taken by each State Party. 67 Both the United States
and Canada were, therefore, traditional proponents of liberalization.
Aside from advancement in services pertaining to dispute resolution, the Canada-US
FTA was rather limited in scope and application. As Molot remarks, the Canada-US
FTA covered a narrow range of protected properties, which excluded ‘portfolio
investment’, discarded the Most-Favoured-Nation clause (MFN), and relied on stateto-state dispute resolution.68 To expand the economic bloc beyond the Canada-US
FTA, the NAFTA was negotiated under circumstances largely dictated by the United
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States, which wanted to liberalize investment in a manner that had not been achieved
in previous FTAs.69
To build up an effective trade bloc, both the United States and Canada agreed upon
the ‘value of going beyond’ the existing investment protection provisions.70
Mexico’s position was, however, quite different from the other two countries. Before
joining the economic bloc, Mexico was very active in its support for the ‘Calvo
Doctrine’, which opposed the superiority of foreigners, asserting that the settlement
of international disputes should rely upon domestic judicial powers.71 Nevertheless,
Mexico finally decided to sign the NAFTA in an attempt to expand its export market
and attract more foreign direct investment to the country. 72 Against this backdrop,
some commentators conclude that the NAFTA is quite unique in the sense that it is
‘the first time that this type of … agreement has been concluded between two highly
regulated developed countries and a less-developed country’.73
Although the NAFTA represents an important milestone in the development of
international economic law, its progressive neoliberal regime also triggers significant
criticism and controversy, particularly in relation to its effect on the lives of
citizens74 and on ‘norms’ concerning sovereignty, social well-being and public
regulations.75
(b) Key Substantive Rights under NAFTA Chapter 11, Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms and Arbitral Jurisdictions
The principles and norms governing the NAFTA primarily focus on the elimination
of barriers to trade and investment between the United States, Canada and Mexico,
and the promotion of a predictable legal framework that is conducive to the creation
of clear rules governing the commercial relationships among them.76 In general,
NAFTA calls for the gradual reduction of both tariff and non-tariff barriers between
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its three members.77 These principles are addressed in its Preamble, which
acknowledges a wide recognition of free trade, greater legal certainty, and the
enhancement of competitiveness, together with an increased awareness of welfare
and environmental protection.78 One of the unique characteristics of the NAFTA is
the inclusion of the provisions on investment promotions and protections. Chapter 11
of the NAFTA, includes a wide array of new investment rights and protections that
are unprecedented in scope and power.79 A comprehensive list of substantive rights
is contained in Chapter 11 Section A, while the procedural rules of investment
regimes are contained in Section B.
Specifically, Section A addresses the obligations of the host state government and
the foreign investors’ rights.80 Key provisions include, for instance, the National
Treatment obligations, the Most-Favored Nation obligations, the prohibition of
Performance Requirements, and the protection against Expropriation. In relation to
the National Treatment provision, Article 1102 obligates Parties to ‘accord to
investments of investors of another Party treatment that is no less favorable than that
it accords, in like circumstances, to those of its own investors’.81 This provision
requires the foreign investor not to be treated differently from existing domestic
investors. Similarly, Article 1103, the Most-Favored-Nation clause, states that
Parties must accord foreign investors treatment that is ‘no less favorable than it
accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of a non-Party’.82
Therefore, the host state government must provide protections to foreign investors
that are equivalent to those obtained by any other Party or a non-NAFTA state.
Article 1106 of NAFTA also prohibits the host country from placing ‘Performance
Requirements’ as a condition of entry and establishment approval. This provision
streamlines the protection standard, following the WTO Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures (TRIMs) which provides that no Member shall apply a
77

Steven Zahniser, Sahar Angadjivand and Thomas Hertz, 'NAFTA at 20: With Regional Trade
Liberalization Complete, Focus Shifts to Other Methods of Deepening Economic Integration' (2015)
Amber Waves: The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, & Rural America 19.
78
NAFTA Preamble.
79
Jenny Harbine, 'NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration: Deciding the Price of Free Trade' (2002) 29(2)
Ecology Law Quarterly 371, 373.
80
Ibid 376.
81
NAFTA art 1102.
82
Ibid art 1103.

93

trade-related investment measure inconsistent with Article III (National Treatment)
or Article XI (Quantitative Restrictions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).83 The Illustrative List of prohibited measures under TRIMs is
included in the ANNEX84 and this list is largely adhered to by NAFTA Article 1106,
which includes, for example: the determination of a certain level or percentage of
export quota; the requirement of locally produced materials; and the requirement of
technology transfer to local entrepreneurs.85 This provision aims to prevent
‘discriminatory treatment’ by host countries when imposing conditions on foreign
investments.86
Along with the above key provisions, NAFTA also contains a provision that entitles
foreign investors to seek compensation for harm resulting from state actions
‘tantamount

to

expropriation’

and

‘indirect

expropriation’.87

While

the

characterization of ‘direct expropriation’ is relatively uncomplicated, it is far more
difficult to ascertain the types of government regulatory interference that will be
considered tantamount to an ‘indirect expropriation’. This gives rise to some
83

Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Vyoma Jha, 'Performance Requirements: An overview of
Approaches' (Paper presented at the The Fifth Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment
Negotiators, Uganda, 17-19 October 2011) 3.
84
The illustrative list provides that:
1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable
under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to
obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic
source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of
products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related
to the volume or value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of general elimination of quantitative
restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are
mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance
with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production,
generally or to an amount related to the volume or value of local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by
restricting its access to foreign exchange to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows
attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export by an enterprise of products, whether specified in terms
of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a
proportion of volume or value of its local production.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April
1994, 1869 UNTS 299 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1C ('TRIPs').
85
NAFTA art 1106.
86
Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2 ed, 2015) 224.
87
NAFTA art 1110.

94

concerns regarding ‘the scope of application and the uncertainty about what exactly
constitutes an indirect expropriation requiring compensation’.88
In Section B, NAFTA provides a procedural framework available to investors to
settle investment disputes between NAFTA Member States. One of the most striking
features of the NAFTA Chapter 11 procedural framework is that its arbitral
proceedings, which are ‘private in nature’, permit individual investors to make
claims directly against the actions of the host governments of NAFTA States. 89 As
Ranieri notes, this unique dispute settlement mechanism would ensure ‘equal
treatment among the NAFTA investors in accordance with the principles of
international reciprocity, and due process before an impartial tribunal’.90 The Parties
can refer the dispute to arbitral institutions that contain different arbitral regimes.
The Parties can choose either the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID), the ICSID
Additional Facility, or the United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL).91
In addition, Chapter 11 sets out rules concerning the arbitrators. Generally, an
investment tribunal works on an ad hoc basis and consists of three arbitrators.92 One
arbitrator is selected by each of the Parties to the dispute, and the third is selected
through the mutual agreement of the Parties and acts as a presiding arbitrator.93 The
tribunal has jurisdiction to hear issues brought under NAFTA Chapter 11 and is
required to decide cases according to the applicable principles of international law.94
NAFTA’s institutional arrangement is a simple one, consisting of two main bodies:
the NAFTA Secretariat and the Free Trade Commission (FTC).95 Under Article
2002, the Secretariat works as an administrative body to assist the FTC, panels, and
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committees.96 The NAFTA Secretariat, constituted by a ‘national section’ from each
member state, is located in separate national offices situated in Ottawa (Canada),
Mexico City (Mexico) and Washington, D.C. (the US).97 It helps to facilitate the
operation of the Agreement and to ensure that day-to-day operational works can run
smoothly.
Distinct from the Secretariat, the FTC oversees and handles disputes that may arise
regarding the application and interpretation of the Agreement. 98 The FTC is an
authorized panel comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the Parties,99
including the US Trade Representative, the Canadian Ministry for International
Trade, and the Mexican Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development.100 The
power of the FTC is technical, specific and obligatory, so the interpretation issued by
the FTC is binding on a tribunal.101 Besides facilitating legal interpretations, NAFTA
Chapter 11 also provides a mechanism to assist the arbitral panel in dealing with
factual issues. At the request of a disputing party, the panel can appoint independent
experts to report to it on any factual information, including environmental, health,
safety or other scientific matters.102 This mechanism helps the panel to acquire
knowledge and expertise that it may otherwise lack when deciding the dispute.
Nonetheless, receiving information from a third party is not mandatory; it is
dependent upon the exercise of a panel’s discretion.
Despite their perceived effectiveness and flexibility, the ad hoc tribunals based upon
the commercial arbitration model are less accountable, transparent and accessible
than permanent tribunals and have arguably created incoherent legal principles.103
Brower II suggests that these problems have arisen as result of: (1) a lack of
continuity in appointments to serve in Chapter 11 disputes;104 (2) a great emphasis
96
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on confidentiality in proceedings and less systematic reporting of decisions than that
might be expected of domestic courts;105 and (3) the absence of a the doctrine of
precedent.106
(c) Doctrines of Indirect Expropriation and Social Pressure to Change the
Regime
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA endorses a State’s power to expropriate private property
for public purposes. However, such taking of private property is conditional upon the
satisfaction of specified criteria. This principle is spelled out in Article 1110 of the
NAFTA, which provides that:
[N]o Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment, except: (a) for a public
purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; and (c) on payment of compensation in
accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.107

As previously discussed, conduct that amounts to ‘direct’ expropriation is not
difficult to discern; a review of relevant literature confirms that this form of
expropriation essentially involves the taking of ownership over a physical asset.108
By contrast, the phrases ‘tantamount to nationalization or expropriation’ and
‘indirect expropriation’ are particularly problematic.
Through various attempts at interpreting the broadly defined terms of ‘indirect
expropriation’ and ‘tantamount to expropriation’, a series of NAFTA tribunals have
developed a body of legal principles designed to distinguish normal public powers
from regulatory powers that are subject to international responsibility. The tribunals
have derived the meaning of these terms by drawing upon relevant customary
international law.109 Pursuant to this customary international law, there is no
restriction on the host government’s ability to enact a law that regulates private
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property in order to achieve some public benefit. However, the government is liable
for any harmful impact that such a measure may have on the affected parties.110 In
this respect, a large number of NAFTA tribunals have employed an ‘effects-based’
approach when analyzing claims of indirect expropriation.
In carrying out the ‘effects-based’ approach, a large number of NAFTA tribunals
have focused their analysis on harmful impacts affecting the ‘use’ or ‘control’ of
property.111 For example, in SD Myer Inc v Canada112 – a case that involved a claim
by an American Company against orders of the Government of Canada banning the
export of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) out of Canada - the Tribunal utilized the
‘effects-based’ doctrine as a primary indicator of expropriatory conduct. The
Tribunal accepted that ‘[e]xpropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership
rights; regulations a lesser interference’.113 It further asserted that ‘[a]n expropriation
usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its
economic rights’.114 Even though the Tribunal agreed that the ban was motivated by
a desire to protect the Canadian PCB industry from American competitors, it found
that the ban was temporary, and that the Claimant had failed to demonstrate that the
alleged export ban genuinely affected and eliminated the Claimant’s economic
benefits, so as to amount to an indirect expropriation requiring compensation under
Article 1110.115 Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the measure was not an
expropriation violating the NAFTA Chapter 11.116
A similar approach was later supported by the Tribunal in Pope & Talbot Inc v
Canada.117 This case concerned an allegation by an American company against the
Government of Canada on its export ban of lumber from Canada to the United
States. The Tribunal rejected the expropriation claim because the government
measure was not ‘sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the property had
110
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been taken from the owner’.118 The Tribunal also held that it is ‘the degree of
interference’ that distinguishes a non-expropriatory regulation from a ‘measure
tantamount to expropriation’.119
One of the most contentious NAFTA cases dealing with the issue of indirect
expropriation, is Metalclad v Mexico.120 In this case, Metalclad, a US corporation,
launched a claim against Mexico over its decision not to grant a construction permit
for the operation of a landfill facility; even though the permit had previously been
confirmed through various representations by the Mexican federal government.121
An Ecological Decree, issued by the local government to establish a rare cactus
protection area,122 permanently prevented Metalclad from the operation of its waste
landfill.123 In this case, the Tribunal decided in favour of the foreign investor and
strongly endorsed the ‘effect rule’,124 ordering Mexico to compensate Metalclad for
the deprivation of its investments’ value pursuant to a regulatory taking. The
Tribunal held that a denial of the construction permit prevented the Claimant from
actualising its’ planned business operations, and amounted to expropriation.
Moreover, the Tribunal held that the Ecological Decree also constituted an indirect
expropriation in violation of art 1110 of the NAFTA. The Tribunal asserted that to
find an indirect expropriation, it need ‘not decide or consider the motivation or intent
of the adoption of the Ecological Decree’.125
According to this case, the Tribunal adopted an expansive ‘effects-based’ analysis in
interpreting the meaning of indirect expropriation. It held that the enactment of an
ecological decree to protect a rare cactus area, by the local municipality, which
permanently prohibited the operation of a landfill by an American company,
interfered with the company’s use of property. In the Tribunal’s words:
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expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged
takings of property…, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of
property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part,
of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state.126

The Tribunal also advanced the ‘effects-based’ concept by stating, that to establish
an expropriatory effect, it was unnecessary to ‘decide or consider the motivation or
intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree’.127
The decision of the Tribunal in Metalclad raised a number of controversial issues,
especially by reason of its expansive interpretation of the standard of protection for
foreign investors. As Molot noted, the tribunals have always referred to the NAFTA
Preamble as a guiding interpretive principle in order to promote a predictable
commercial framework for business planning and investment.128 Therefore, from the
Tribunal’s view, the NAFTA is oriented to the protection of trade and investment,
and failing to provide a predictable framework would amount to a breach of
obligations under Chapter 11.129 However, through its expansive definition of
expropriation and the absence of any public policy considerations, some
commentators believe that the Metalclad Tribunal ruled in favor of investors who
seek to exploit the benefits of Chapter 11. Despite providing a stable and predictable
framework for Metalclad’s business, some commentators assert that the criteria
formulated in Metalclad would restrain the State’s regulatory capacity as ‘substantial
interference was enough to establish expropriation, and it was unnecessary to ask
why that interference had occurred’.130
There has been much debate regarding the appropriateness of the legal standards
adopted by the Tribunal in the Metalclad case. Public interest groups, as well as
NGOs, placed pressure on the governments of the Member States to take serious
action to address the fear of high levels of foreign investment protection conferred
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by commercial arbitration.131 NAFTA States, especially Canada and the United
States, appeared to modify their positions.132 The debates were rigorous in these two
advanced countries that had become defendants in a number of disputes and were
suffering from a pervasive threat of legal challenges to internal public policy under
Chapter 11.133 As a result, both countries played an active role in urging NAFTA
partners to make changes to the investment protection regime.
A particularly critical development was the enablement of ‘non-disputing party
participation’ or amicus curiae in the arbitral proceedings. The significant role of
amicus curiae in influencing the arbitral award was apparent in Methanex v United
States,134 which is considered to be the first example of the Tribunal exerting its
power to accept an amicus submission.135 Essentially, this development improved
the transparency and legitimacy of NAFTA arbitration mechanisms.
Methanex, a Canadian-owned business, made an investment protection claim against
the US government in 2005, regarding the ban imposed on MTBE (methyl tertiary
butyl ether) by the State of California. During the proceedings, Methanex referred to
the legal standard in Metalclad v Mexico, which focused on the ‘effects-based’
approach as its key analytical framework.136 Methanex claimed that the California
ban took ‘a substantial portion of its investments… and handed them to the US
domestic ethanol industry’, a move that was ‘tantamount … to expropriation within
Article 1110’.137 In its Amended Statement of Defense, the United States argued that
the ban was not expropriatory as Methanex failed to prove that the investment had
actually been taken by a state measure.138
In the final decision, the Tribunal rejected Methanex’s claim and departed from the
Metalclad standard. Instead of adopting a solely ‘effects-based’ doctrine, the
131
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Tribunal applied the classic ‘police power’ approach, which confers all necessary
rights upon the government to enact laws that are in the public interest.139 Finding
that the ban did not violate Article 1110, the Tribunal stated that:
Methenax is correct that an intentionally discriminatory regulation against a foreign
investor fulfills a key requirement for establishing expropriation. But as a matter of
general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which
is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign
investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensatory unless specific
commitments had been given by the regulating government…140

The Methanex case is considered to be the first NAFTA award to accept the ‘police
power’ approach.141 The swing from the ‘effects-based’ doctrine to the ‘police
power’ approach was very much welcomed by groups critical of NAFTA.142 Some
commentators attributed this to the participation of amicus curiae in the investment
arbitration.143 Through the submission of amicus briefs, the Tribunal was able to
consider the concerns raised by a group of NGOs -that international investment law
should be reinterpreted to include environmental protection.144 The NGOs contended
that ‘the interpretation of The Chapter 11 of NAFTA should reflect legal principles
underlying the concept of sustainable development’.145 The direct involvement of a
group of civil society thus provided an opportunity for the Tribunal to obtain further
information and apply a broader approach, which takes into account non-economic
factors when discussing the merits of a case.146
Nevertheless, the impact of the 2005 Methanex decision is somewhat unclear and
may not be sustained in the long run. One of the reasons for this is that the
139

Howard Mann, 'The Final Decision in Methanex v United States: Some New Wine in Some New
Bottles' (International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), August 2005)
<http://www.iisd.org> 6.
140
Methanex (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 3 August 2005) part D, ch D [7].
141
Sebastian Lopez Escarcena, 'Takings in Multilateral Treaties' in Indirect Expropriation in
International Law (Edward Elgar, 2014) 147, 170 (‘Takings in Multilateral Treaties’).
142
Jessica C. Lawrence, 'Chicken little revisited: NAFTA regulatory expropriations after Methanex'
(2006) 41(1) Georgia Law Review 261, 291.
143
Mann, above n 139, 11.
144
Methanex (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 3 August 2005) part IV, ch D [27].
145
Methanex v United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions of Third Persons to Intervene as
Amicus Curiae (15 January 2001) International Institute of Sustainable Development
<https://www.iisd.org/pdf/methanex_tribunal_first_amicus_decision.pdf> [5].
146
Mann, above n 139, 12.

102

arbitration award has no binding effect; in the absence of the doctrine of precedent,
tribunals in subsequent cases are not bound to interpret and apply the legal principles
in the same manner.147 In addition, the status of amicus curiae is uncertain as their
participation rights do not necessary materialize in every single case. A tribunal can
deny the request for amicus participation at its discretion, and has no duty to receive
third party submissions.148 Accordingly, the arbitral panels in subsequent NAFTA
cases do not have to apply the ‘police powers’ approach when deciding cases under
expropriation provisions.149
Indeed, a return to the ‘effects-based’ approach occurred in the 2007 case, Archer
Daniels,150 where the Tribunal held that:
[t]he test on which other Tribunals and doctrine have agreed… is the effects test.
Judicial practice indicates that the severity of the economic impact is the decisive
criterion in deciding whether an indirect expropriation or a measure tantamount to
expropriation has taken place ... There is a broad consensus in academic writing that
the intensity and duration of the economic deprivation is the crucial factor in
identifying an indirect expropriation…151

The ‘effects-based’ standard has been used in a number of subsequent cases,
including the 2009 cases of Glamis Gold152 and Cargill.153 Each of these was
similarly decided on the basis of the severity and degree of interference with the
property rights or economic value of the investment concerned. However, in the
more recent case of Chemtura,154 the arbitral panel recognized the applicability of a
‘police power’ rule, as described in Methanex,155 and held that the challenged
regulatory measure ‘constituted a valid exercise of the Respondent’s police powers
147
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because the Canadian agency had acted within its mandate, in a non-discriminatory
manner, motivated by a public purpose’,156 and this ‘as a result, does not constitute
an expropriation’.157
The above cases heard under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, highlight that an unclear legal
provision relating to expropriation triggers the issue of interpretative inconsistency.
Divergent applications of the provision by arbitral tribunals have resulted in an
incoherent legal distinction between normal regulation and compensable
expropriation. This inconsistency not only raises uncertainty for foreign investors, it
also prevents the host state governments from undertaking active regulations for
bona fide public purposes, due to potentially expensive compensation obligations.
3. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
(a) Background: The Promotion of Bilateral Investment Protections through the
Newly Codified Rules in the Post-World War II Era
The development of BITs was primarily attributed to significant limitations and
uncertainties surrounding the international law of foreign investment protection,158
which resulted in a strong demand to standardize the protection of foreign
investment through the codification of rules within BITs.
Prior to the emergence of BITs, the protection of foreign businesses was carried out
through Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties.159 Initially, the FCN
treaties focused on trade relationships between developed nations based on the
‘principle of symmetry, reciprocity, and mutuality’.160 The success of FCN treaties
was widely recognized due to their role in protecting property rights acquired by an
alien. The comprehensive legal content of FCNs covered not only trade relations, but
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also other issues related to human rights, immigration policy and religious
practices.161
Despite their widely recognized role in promoting trade and commerce, FCN treaties
were criticized for the limited investment protection they provided, as they primarily
focused on the issue of trade relations.162 Since there was no specific rule governing
the protection of foreign investments,163 the adjudicators hearing matters under FCN
treaties applied the vague customary international law of state responsibility relevant
to the dispute.164 Moreover, the complex and comprehensive nature of FCN treaties
was designed to deal only with ‘symmetrical economic exchanges’ between likeminded developed countries, rather than asymmetrical power among parties.165
The shift from FCN to BITs became necessary after the Second World War, when
many small countries enjoyed newfound independence. Due to a surge in
decolonization, capital-exporting countries, which were mainly developed nations,
had a strong demand for international legal order in order to ensure a sound and
secure ‘investment’ environment within developing countries.166 Then the first BIT
was signed between West Germany and Pakistan in 1959.167
The early BITs were well regarded,168 and there was enormous growth in their
adoption during the 1990s.169 Several factors contributed to the popularity of BITs.
First, unsuccessful negotiations for a multilateral agreement on investment
liberalization encouraged both developed and developing countries to change their
positions and to begin negotiations at the bilateral and regional levels. 170 The failures
of negotiations of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the at Annual
161
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Meeting in of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
Council (OECD) at Ministerial level in 1995 and on investment liberalization at the
Cancun Round of the WTO in 2003 were demonstrative of the sensitivity that
surrounded investment issues, at both national and international levels, and the
extent to which this concern could conflict with national interests.171 To overcome
these tensions, countries negotiated bilaterally and regionally as opposed to
globally.172
In addition to the unsuccessful investment liberalization negotiations at multilateral
levels, the success of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s also stimulated
international commitment to market liberalization173 and property rights protection
across the globe.174 The favoring of free trade and property rights protection helped
promote economic freedom and development.175 As a consequence, countries
(especially developing nations during the world economic crisis of the 1990s)176
entered into more BITs, in the hope that this would foster greater investor confidence
and more foreign direct investments (FDIs).177
The role of BITs is still widely recognized today, despite a decline in the annual
number of concluded BITs since the mid-1990s.178 Although there has been a steady
decrease in the number of newly signed BITs each year, the number of new claims in
investment disputes, between 1995 and 2014, has reached a record high and the
number continues to increase over time.179 Such an increase in the number of
disputes appears to suggest that BITs are still workable legal instruments upon which
countries could rely. In spite of their effective role in providing investment
protection, BITs have been criticized for codifying the ‘asymmetrical economic and
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political relationship that existed between capital exporting and importing states’.180
As a result of being shaped by Western countries, BIT programs were intended to
protect the benefits of capital-exporting countries. In addition, early BITs were
criticized for the vagueness of their treaty provisions.181 Legal ambiguity allowed
arbitral panels to interpret the legal texts in inconsistent ways,182 and perhaps
according to an ‘expansionary spirit’ that favored the interests of foreign investors.183
(b) Overview of the Scope of BIT Protection, Jurisdiction and the Dispute
Settlement
BITs generally protect a broad range of properties and investments. The term
‘investment’ in the early BITs was usually defined very briefly, but included all
categories of assets entitled to protection.184 However, in subsequent BITs, a broader
formula containing a series of illustrative examples of assets entitled to protection
was adopted.185 Although BITs have utilized different approaches in defining
protected investments, they have typically incorporated all of the kinds of property
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rights that make up an investment; regardless of whether they are tangible or
intangible, property or contractual rights, or rights of control or management.186 An
open-ended definition is often preferred in order to ensure the flexibility of the
treaty’s application.
In addition, the parties are subject to agreed substantive rights and obligations as
well as procedural rules. Most BITs contain similar substantive protection standards
despite some variations in the legal wording of details.187 The majority of BITs also
incorporate the traditional concept of a ‘minimum standard of fairness in the
treatment of foreigners and investments’.188 Typically, they contain provisions such
as National Treatment, Most-Favored-Nations Treatment, Fair and Equitable
Treatment, Free Transfer of Funds and the Protection against Expropriation.189
Whenever a dispute arises, the affected foreign investor can bring claims directly
against the host state government under the investment treaty. Although some BITs
call for the settlement of disputes between contracting parties through intergovernmental arbitrations,190 the majority of BITs grant investors the right to pursue
arbitral proceedings under investor-state arbitration systems.191 In the context of
investor-state arbitration, each State generally commits itself in advance to consent
to ad hoc international arbitration,192 and is strictly bound by the arbitral awards
rendered.193 Presently, the affected investors can submit the investment claims
through ICSID arbitration or other forums of non-ICSID arbitration, such as United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).194
When an investment dispute arises, an arbitral tribunal usually applies the laws as set
out in the governing BIT. Normally, under investment treaties, both contracting
parties have the freedom to agree on the applicable substantive law to be used to
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settle the dispute, and the arbitrators are bound by such an agreement.195 As
indicated by a 2014 survey by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), however, there is no uniform framework within current
investment treaties for setting out the applicable substantive laws. In the majority of
treaties, the arbitral panel is normally required to decide the dispute based on
treaties, international law, and the domestic law of the host State. 196 Nevertheless, in
practice, arbitral panels tend to apply international legal principles to address an
investor’s injury caused by a host State’s breach of substantive provisions within
BITs.197
(c) Doctrines of Indirect Expropriation and the Evolution from the Sole-Effects
Doctrine to the Principles of Proportionality
A survey of recent BITs, conducted by UNCTAD, revealed that virtually all BITs
explicitly prohibit the host country from taking any direct expropriation measure,
and any other measure that has an equivalent effect, without providing
compensation. However, not all BITs address the issue of indirect expropriation in
the same fashion.198 For example, Article 5 of the BIT between Lebanon and
Malaysia199 does not include the specific issue of indirect expropriation in the
agreement, but Article 6(1)(a) of the BIT between Kuwait and Lithuania200 (2001)
generally addresses protection from direct and indirect expropriation. Article 5(2) of
the BIT between France and Uganda201 (2003) goes a little bit further by including
195
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explicit guidance regarding the level of interference that would be considered ‘a
measure tantamount to expropriation’. The survey showed a remarkable trend
towards increasing the clarity of the expropriation provisions within BITs, as much
as possible.202 The inclusion of more explicit criteria with which to identify measures
that amount to a compensable expropriation would improve legal certainty and foster
coherent interpretative approaches rendered by arbitral tribunals.
Although BITs have codified indirect expropriation provisions in many different
ways, the problem of language ambiguity, concerning the parameters of ‘indirect
expropriation’, arguably remains. As a result, inconsistent legal approaches are often
adopted; while some arbitral decision-makers have applied the ‘effects-based’
doctrine to the investigation of indirect expropriation under international law, others
have departed from this dominant principle and applied the ‘proportionality test’.
A series of decisions demonstrate the dominance of the “effect-based” test. The
Tribunal in Wena Hotels,203 for example, referred to the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in
its application of the ‘effects-based’ doctrine, and held that Egypt’s ‘non-ephemeral’
deprivation of foreign ownership constituted a regulatory taking.204 In Santa
Elena205, the Tribunal affirmed that the purpose of a measure couldn’t be used to
avoid compensation; ultimately, a measure that caused disruption to an investment
was subject to compensatory obligations.206 In the Occidental case207 , the Tribunal
concluded that there had been ‘no deprivation of the use or reasonably expected
economic benefit of the investment, let alone measures affecting a significant part of
the investment’.208 In Siemens,209 the Tribunal found that the host state’s interference
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with the execution of a contract was the exercise of public authority.210 This Tribunal
also held that the measure carried out by Argentina, through a Decree, to terminate a
contract between Siemens and the Government of Argentina for the provision of
services related to immigration control, was ‘by itself and independently…an
expropriatory act’.211 The Tribunal further asserted that the Decree was permanent,
and thereby affected the termination of the contract.212 The Tribunal granted a
compensation award against the Government of Argentina because the measure was
unlawful and there was no clear evidence to show that the Decree was enacted for a
public purpose.213 In Aguas del Aconquija (Vivendi II),214 the Tribunal emphasized
the role of the ‘effects-based’ approach; although it accepted the importance of the
State’s intent, it was the effect of the measure that was said to be decisive in
determining the occurrence of indirect expropriation.215 Indeed, the Tribunal found
that the measure had a ‘devastating effect on the economic viability of the
concession’ and rendered it ‘valueless’.216
Although arbitral panels under BITs predominantly apply the ‘effects-based’
doctrine, another series of arbitral decisions, handed down at a similar time, were
approaching the notion of indirect expropriation differently, and adopting alternative
tests to analyze expropriation claims. For example in 2001, the Tribunal in the CME
case217 recognized the ‘police-power’ as a defense and held that a non-discriminatory
general regulation could not constitute an indirect expropriation.218 The question of
intent was again highlighted in the Saluka case,219 where the tribunal expressly
endorsed the view that, under international law, ‘States are not liable to pay
compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory
powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner … that are aimed at the general
welfare’.220 However, the Tribunal admitted that there is still no clear line in
210

Ibid [252]-[260].
Ibid [271].
212
Ibid [272].
213
Ibid [273].
214
Vivendi II (2007) ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) (‘Vivendi II’).
215
Ibid [7.5.1]-[7.5.20].
216
Ibid [7.5.21]-[7.5.34].
217
CME (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 13 September 2001) (‘CME’).
218
Ibid [321].
219
Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic (Partial Award) (2006) UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal
(‘Saluka’).
220
Ibid [255].
211

111

international law to distinguish between legitimate non-compensable regulatory
power and expropriation.221 Based on its ‘police power’ perspective, the Tribunal,
nevertheless, decided against the foreign investor, declaring that the regulatory
conduct of the Government of the Czech Republic was within the ambit of a regular
power, and was not considered to be an indirect expropriation.222
One of the most remarkable shifts in the legal paradigm came in 2003, when the
Tribunal in Tecmed v Mexico223 declared a more innovative doctrine with which to
analyze expropriation claims, by combining both ‘effects-based’ and ‘police-power’
approaches.224 The Claimant in Tecmed was a Spanish Company that had acquired a
hazardous industrial waste landfill in Mexico in 1996 through its Mexican
subsidiary, Cytrar. Tecmed was given the authorization to operate the landfill from
the National Ecology Institute of Mexico (INE) and had been granted a permit that
could be extended every year at the applicant’s request. However, in 1998, the
renewal of the permit was denied, and the Mexican government took action to close
the landfill.225 In its analysis of the expropriation claim, the Tribunal investigated
whether Tecmed ‘was radically deprived of the economic use and enjoyment of its
investments, as if the rights related thereto - such as the income or benefits related to
the Landfill or to its exploitation - had ceased to exist’.226 The Tribunal found that
compensable expropriation had occurred.227
In determining the existence of the compensable expropriation in the case of
Tecmed, the Tribunal’s evaluation was not based solely on the ‘effects-based’
doctrine; rather, it also took into account the proportionality of the measure. 228 To
prove the expropriation, the Tribunal stated that it is necessary to examine ‘whether
such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest presumably protected
thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments’ [emphasis added].229 By
acceding to the host State’s defense, in conducting a proportionality analysis, some
221
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commentators opine that the Tecmed Tribunal became more deferential to the state’s
authority to exercise its legitimate power, when assessing a reasonable relationship
between the interests of the host state and foreign investors, ie: the impact of the
measure on the investors and objectives of the state measure.230 Noting failure to
meet the appropriate balance, the Tribunal concluded that:
[I]t would be excessively formalistic, in light of the above considerations, the
Agreement and international law, to understand that the Resolution is proportional to
such violations when such infringements do not pose a present or imminent risk to the
ecological balance … without providing for the payment of compensation.231

This line of analysis was later adopted by recent arbitral awards in the Azurix,232
LG&E233 and Continental Casualty cases,234 which also took into account both the
necessity and proportionality of the measure when assessing the existence of indirect
expropriation.
The variation in the methodologies used in the aforementioned cases does not only
result in uncertainty regarding the outcomes rendered by tribunals in BITs, but also
fails to define a satisfactory balance of interests between host states and investors
under an investment treaty.235 In an attempt to resolve these issues, the United States
adopted a new model BIT in 2004,236 and the revised one in 2012,237 which aimed at
clarifying some key substantive issues.238 These model BITs similarly provide the
following modified substantive rule on expropriation:
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(a) the determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case,
fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(iv)

the economic impact of the government action, although the fact

that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an
indirect expropriation has occurred;
(v)

the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct,

reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and
(vi)

the character of the government action.

Annex B of the US model, both 2004 and 2012, similarly set out a clearer guideline
to distinguish a normal exercise of regulatory power from indirect expropriation
triggering compensatory obligations. It states that:
...(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.

Besides the United States, some other developed countries such as Canada have also
followed this approach and drafted similar guidelines on the definition of
expropriation in foreign investment protection law.239 Canada's new Model Foreign
Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA),240 stipulates that:
...(c) Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are
so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having
been adopted and applied in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives ... do not
constitute indirect expropriation.

Under the leadership and influence of the United States, other countries have
similarly re-negotiated new investment treaties.241 The rise of a new generation of
239
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BITs is reflective of an endeavor to redress problems inherent within early BITs.242
The new model does not only clarify the legal text, it also adds a more substantive
consideration of state sovereignty protection and sustainable development issues.243
Yet, the new model BITs still suffer from the problem of language ambiguity. For
example, in the US model BIT, the phrase ‘except in rare circumstances’ in Annex B
of the expropriation clause is open-ended, and potentially problematic, as it leaves
the arbitral tribunals to the use of their own discretion in analyzing factual
evidence.244
4. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)
(a) Background
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (the TPP) is the most recent regional trade
and investment agreement concluded by twelve countries across the Asia-Pacific
region.245 At the beginning of negotiations, there were only four countries forming
the bloc,246 which were the United States, Australia, Peru and Vietnam.247 After five
years of negotiations, the TPP has developed into a comprehensive and ambitious
agreement that promotes greater economic integration among contracting countries,
which include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam.248
The TPP has five key objectives. Firstly, it aims to eliminate both tariff and nontariff barriers across a wide range of manufactured goods and services. Secondly, it
aims to facilitate the creation of jobs and cross-border production and supply chains.
Thirdly, it promotes new innovations, development of the digital economy and the
role of state-owned enterprises. Fourthly, it encourages new players in the economy,
242
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such as small-and-medium enterprises, by providing assistance through tradecapacity-building programs. Lastly, the TPP will be used as a platform for further
economic integration in the future.249
The TPP is a significant agreement and is formulating a great deal of strategies to
expand the market between countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As indicated by
Lewis, the TPP is an ambitious attempt to establish a free trade pact with countries
that have already taken part in other Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). He also
predicts that, since the TPP goes beyond the traditional agreements to cover a wide
range of issues, such as intellectual properties, labour and environmental standards,
and cross-border trade in services, the TPP will attract many more countries from
both sides of the Pacific, capturing a greater cross-border trade and investment
flow250 and that it could potentially serve as a ‘model of open regionalism’, 251 which
‘open[s] the pathway to a free trade area across the entire Asia-Pacific region’.252
Despite the benefits of the TPP, on 23 January 2017, the US President signed an
Executive Order to formally withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement. The withdrawal was due to the concerns over the potential impact of the
TPP on US manufacturing and job losses, resulting from the ease with which US
manufacturers are able to relocate their investment bases to overseas countries with
lower production costs.253
(b) A Brief Picture of the TPP
The TPP, like most of the FTAs, contains both trade and non-trade issues. In relation
to trade, it largely aims to eliminate tariffs among the TPP member countries,
pursuant to the proposed mandates as agreed by the TPP countries. In addition to
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tariff reductions, the TPP also focuses on the elimination of other trade restrictive
measures that could potentially result in technical barriers and trade distortions. The
TPP members have also set rules for cross border trade in services but each of them,
however, could submit a list of sensitive sectors which need to be exempted from the
TPP obligations.
In addition to the trade issues, the TPP provides rules for non-trade issues. Despite
its similarity to other FTAs, the TPP includes provisions that have impacts far
beyond any other typical FTA and the WTO, in certain areas, such as competition
policy, intellectual property protection, investment protection and environmental and
labor regulation. The conclusion of the TPP, with its new ambitious standards, is
marked as an important step in the ultimate goal of trade and investment
liberalization in the region.
Apart from the trade and non-trade issues, the TPP also includes specific procedures
for the settlement of disputes between States and between States and investors.254 In
relation to the former, the TPP aims to guarantee ‘a fair, transparent, timely,
effective and binding procedure’ for settling disputes between the TPP Parties.255
Specifically, the TPP is designed to resolve disputes in three main areas: the
interpretation and application of the TPP, a failure to carry out the measure in
compliance with the obligations under the TPP, and an unfair nullification of
benefits expected by a TPP Party.256 In the context of disputes between State and
investors, settlements must be carried out through a neutral international arbitration.
The TPP includes key provisions designed to safeguard the neutrality of arbitration,
such as transparent arbitral proceedings, amicus curiae submissions, non-disputing
Party submissions, review procedure for interim awards, binding joint interpretations
by the Parties, and rules to prevent a claimant from pursuing the same claim in
parallel proceedings.257
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(c) A New Paradigm of the Indirect Expropriation in the TPP’s Investment
Chapter
In the Investment Chapter, the TPP contains the fundamental protection standards
that can be found in other typical investment treaties, such as National Treatment,
the Most-Favored-Nation treatment, the minimum standard of treatment, the
treatment in case of armed conflict or civil strife, and the free transfer of funds and
investment. However, the expropriation provision of the TPP carves out clearer
guidelines for arbitral tribunals to identify the circumstances in which a state should
be held accountable for the harm caused through its regulations.
Annex 9-B of the TPP Investment Chapter, which clarifies the scope and
applicability of the expropriation clause, sets out the legal threshold with which to
distinguish a normal regulation from a compensable indirect expropriation, in
accordance with the US Model BIT. To determine indirect expropriation, Article
(3)(a) of Annex 9-B states that a tribunal must consider each dispute on case-by-case
basis, taking into account the economic impact of the government action, the extent
to which the government action interferes with distinct and reasonable investmentbacked expectations, and the character of the government action.258 In addition,
Article (3)(b) of Annex 9-B establishes that, ‘except in rare circumstances’, the
measure is not considered to be a compensable expropriation if the regulation is
applied on a ‘non-discriminatory’ basis and to ‘protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment’.259
Moreover, this Chapter of the TPP also provides exemptions in Article 9.8.5, stating
that the expropriation liability is not applied to the ‘issuance of compulsory licenses
granted in relation to intellectual property rights’ in accordance with the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)’, or to the
‘revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that the
issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter 18 (Intellectual
Property) and the TRIP Agreement’.260
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Exemptions from expropriation liability are also contained in other Chapters of the
TPP to protect the host government from liability associated with any harm arising
from a regulatory measure relating to financial and tobacco controls. Article 29.3
states that, in exceptional circumstances, the State may adopt a measure to counteract
serious financial situations, if the measure is non-discriminatory and designed to
protect legitimate public welfare interests. Likewise, Article 29.5 recognizes the
ability of the State to deny benefits that flow to investors in relation to claims on
tobacco control measures.
Although the TPP expressly broadens the State’s right to regulate, the expropriation
provision appears to retain significant ambiguity. For example, Annex 9-B, which
provides public welfare exemptions, does not elaborate upon the ‘rare
circumstances’ in which a non-discriminatory measure can be considered an indirect
expropriation requiring compensation.261 Due to the ambiguity of this language,
investors are likely to claim that their circumstances are rare and that the State
should, therefore, not avoid international responsibility.262 Moreover, some legal
scholars claim that the new IP-related exemptions for compulsory licensing measures
have a very limited impact.263 For example, Article 9.8.5 states that a compulsory
license is free from liability only if the measure satisfies the conditions required by
the WTO’s TRIPs or those contained in the TPP’s Investment Chapter. In this
respect, the private companies suffering from a compulsory license measure264 could
challenge the host state government and pursue investor-state arbitration only if they
261
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can prove that the regulatory interference does not meet the conditions required by
TRIPS or the TPP’s Investment Chapter.265
In spite of some concerns regarding inherent ambiguity, the TPP is not yet
practically realized and, to date, no claim on indirect expropriation has been brought
to arbitration. As the TPP has just been concluded by the Member States, each TPP
country is now required to follow its own domestic treaty-ratification process before
the agreement can be enforced.266 Therefore, the manner in which the agreement will
be interpreted by the arbitral tribunals is not yet known.

B. Analysis of Past Jurisprudence on Indirect Expropriation under
Contemporary Investment Treaties: Concurrence, Differences and
Causations
1. General Characteristics of Expropriation Clauses under Investment Treaties
In general, the basic standard of protection against expropriation contained in the
IRUSCT, NAFTA, BITs and the TPP is the customary law ‘minimum standard of
treatment’. Under customary law, the host state government has the sovereign right
to regulate commercial businesses and take the property of an alien, 267 but is subject
to compensatory obligations when such conduct results in the deprivation of property
rights or wealth of protected foreign investors.268 These key principles are explicitly
included in virtually all international investment treaties and require lawful
expropriation to be: in the interests of the public, as provided by law; made on a nondiscriminatory basis; and subject to compensation.269
The IRUSCT, NAFTA, BITs and the TPP also contain codified rules allowing a
protected foreign investor to make claims regarding both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’
265
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expropriation. Again, what constitutes a direct expropriation is quite obvious. It
involves the outright seizure or legislative nationalization of the physical assets of a
private party. However, what constitutes indirect expropriation is much more
complicated as there is no uniform definition, but there have been many attempts to
define the scope and application of this legal concept (as seen in the Model US BIT
and the TPP). Various treaties use different phrases to signify ‘indirect
expropriation’, including ‘indirect taking’, ‘de facto’, ‘creeping’, ‘constructive’,
‘disguised’, ‘consequential’, ‘regulatory or virtual expropriation’.270 Notwithstanding
apparent differences, each phrase similarly characterizes a measure as expropriatory
if it ‘involves total or near-total deprivation of an investment but without a formal
transfer of title or outright seizure’.271
2. Overview of the Legal Standards on Property Protections from Indirect
Expropriation
The tribunals charged with considering claims of expropriation have attempted to
develop various guidelines to define the concepts of property and expropriation.
Despite these attempts, various judgments and awards provide inconsistent legal
interpretations of these critical issues.
When considering the scope of affected properties, all surveyed treaties similarly
concern a broad range of protected property rights. It was found that virtually all
surveyed investment treaties include not only tangible property, but also intangible
property and other contractual interests. In relation to this broad range of protected
property, arbitral tribunals generally accepted that the host state government is
subject to international responsibility to compensate investors for loss of property
even when actual ownership rights or formal titles have not been destroyed or taken
away.
However, the surveyed arbitral tribunals sometimes applied an even more expansive
concept of protected property rights. This was particularly evident within the
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NAFTA investment dispute in Metalclad v Mexico.272 The arbitral tribunal in this
case interpreted the meaning of an investment in an expansive fashion, by including
‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefits’, i.e. an expected stream of benefits
not yet realized as part of protected rights.273 According to this reasoning, tribunals
might declare the occurrence of indirect expropriation whenever investors believe
that their investment activities have been impacted by new policies or laws that
disappoint the investors’ legitimate expectations.274
When considering whether measures qualified as compensable expropriations, the
arbitral tribunals for IRUSCT, NAFTA, BITs and the TPP have generally accepted
that an indirect expropriation may include a wide range of regulatory actions taken
by a host state government. Indirect expropriations can range, for example, from the
appointment of a manager to control a private business, to the freezing of bank
accounts and exchange controls, a cancellation of permit, excessive taxation, the
enactment of restrictive environmental protection laws, or even IP-related claims
concerning compulsory licensing and tobacco control. Each of these measures, taken
by host state governments, has at some point in time been considered as having an
effect equivalent to expropriation or nationalization, therefore, falling within the
definition of ‘indirect expropriation’ or ‘measures tantamount to expropriation’.
Despite the complexity of the regulatory actions scrutinized, the arbitral tribunals for
all treaties surveyed (except the TPP)275 have developed a framework within which
to identify the boundaries separating non-compensable state measures from
compensable indirect expropriation. Generally, international jurisprudence focuses
on the ‘effects-based’ approach to distinguish the two forms of government
regulation. The arbitrators in IRUSCT, NAFTA and BITs tribunals most often
decide their cases using the effects-based doctrine as the sole determinant of indirect
expropriation. Disregarding the state’s intent and the inherent characteristics of the
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measure, these tribunals have held that a substantial deprivation of rights to use and
control property constitutes an illegal interference that may breach international law.
The ‘effects-based’ doctrine has often been cited by arbitrators of the IRUSCT,
NAFTA and BITs tribunals. The doctrine has been widely used to ensure an
investor-friendly environment and protect the interests of aliens. These tribunals
have usually required a high threshold of interference to find expropriation. As
opposed to a transitory impact, the doctrine requires a lasting and substantial
deprivation of property rights or investment value to be utilized as an exclusive
criterion in the examination of an expropriation claim. The doctrine was heavily
employed by the IRUSCT, when deciding cases arising from social unrest in Iran in
the late 1970s, which culminated in the vast expropriation of foreign-owned
investments. The ‘effects-based’ doctrine was understandably supported by the
IRUSCT tribunals since the State of Iran failed to comply with international
minimum standards and its measures were, presumably, politically motivated and
undertaken in bad faith. The ‘effects-based’ approach has also been frequently
referred to by arbitral tribunals formed under other international investment
agreements, including NAFTA and BITs.
However, following a surge in investment disputes experienced by both developed
and developing countries, there was a need to combine foreign investment protection
by host states with wider ideas of host state domestic social responsibility and
accountability. 276 From the perspective of both the United States and Canada, a host
state’s ability to regulate has been adversely impacted by NAFTA, as both countries
are becoming major respondent states to investment treaty disputes. Their exercises
of sovereign power to protect public interests have been frequently challenged by
affected foreign investors.277
Following social pressure from civil society and interest groups, States and arbitral
tribunals have expressed an inclination to depart from the traditional ‘effects-based’
276
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approach, and have developed competing concepts to preserve host-state regulatory
autonomy.278 To preserve the State’s rights to control domestic social policy, arbitral
tribunals have applied various degrees of scrutiny over policy justification. While
some use the concept of ‘police-powers’, others emphasize the ‘doctrine of
proportionality’. These two competing approaches employ distinct methodologies to
evaluate the state’s right to expropriate. While the former, utilized in Methanex279
and Saluka280, deploys a strict public purpose element as the decisive criterion,
thereby affirming that a regulatory measure made in good faith can never attract the
duty to compensate,281 the latter approach, as confirmed by SD Myer282 and
Tecmed283, examines the proportionality of the relationship between the ‘effect of the
measure’ and the ‘purpose of the measure’ when characterizing the expropriatory
behavior.284
3. Legal and Non-Legal Factors that Create Inconsistency and Incoherence in
the Applications of Indirect Expropriation Clauses
The inconsistency in the concept of indirect expropriation found in past arbitral
jurisprudence is indicative of the tension between the right to regulate and the right
to be protected in changing socio-economic circumstances. Legal and non-legal
explanations of the legal inconsistencies and incoherence surrounding the various
applications of indirect expropriation clauses are presented here.
(a) Legal Aspects
(i) Unclear Legal Text
It is obvious that the inconsistency in arbitral decisions is largely attributable to
ambiguity with the investment treaty texts. As a matter of pragmatism, it is necessary
to draft legal provisions broad enough to cover a range of contingent circumstances,
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as broadly drafted text provides parties and adjudicators with the flexibility to deal
with unforeseen issues.285 In addition to these practical benefits, open-textual
language in an international treaty can assist negotiation processes to move forward
as such provisions help the contracting parities to reach a consensus easily, no matter
how vague the treaty text is.286
Notwithstanding these advantages, broadly drafted text can also promote inconsistent
interpretations, which may destabilize investment protection regimes,287 by
increasing the adjudicative discretion available to arbitrators. This problem has even
been highlighted in the TPP. Some critics assert that inherent ambiguity in
investment treaties could give rise to ‘expansive interpretation’ by arbitral
tribunals,288 leading to the incorporation of a wide range of prohibited regulatory
interferences, which might impede host state’s legitimate regulatory powers in key
areas such as the environment, taxation, and export controls.289
(ii) Lack of the Doctrine of Precedent and the Absence of Appeal Mechanism
Incoherence and inconsistency in legal doctrine concerning indirect expropriation is
also derived from the ad hoc nature of arbitration. When deciding a case, an arbitral
tribunal follows the rules of a specific arbitration treaty to which the parties have
agreed. As a result, ad hoc arbitration allows the parties to achieve consensus
regarding the rules best suited to their transactions and needs, and to reach decisions
that are final and binding upon the consenting parties only.
To a large extent, the lack of any precedential effect in arbitral decisions contributes
to the inconsistencies and incoherence of legal reasoning inherent in the arbitral
system.290 The nature of non-binding precedent is established in Article 53 (1) of the
ICSID Convention, Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL and Article IV of the Claims
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Settlement Declaration establishing the IRUSCT. Despite different wording, they
each provide that the decisions of the respective tribunals have no legally binding
force except as between the parties to a particular dispute. Future arbitral tribunals
have no duty to follow the judicial decisions of previous tribunals as authoritative
statements, and each tribunal is ‘at liberty to cite or not to cite previous decisions of
other tribunals on similar questions of law’.291
The problem is further pronounced due to the absence of an appeal mechanism
within the investment arbitration system. Under the WTO, the Appellate Body (AB)
can review, modify or set aside the findings of a panel. The AB thus acts as a last
resort to correct possible legal errors committed by arbitral panels. The advent of the
AB in WTO jurisprudence promotes consistency and predictability within dispute
settlement decisions. This is a central function of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Body.292
In contrast, the existing system of international investment arbitration has no single
appellate body to review decisions of investment tribunals.293 In addition, under the
existing investment dispute settlement system, an arbitral decision can be reviewed
only under narrowly defined conditions. In the case of an arbitration governed by the
ICSID Convention, the Secretary-General of the ICSID, by request of a Party, has
the power to annul awards which manifestly fail to meet due process standards or
were unfairly conducted.294 The Secretary-General has no other power to correct
awards rendered by the ICSID tribunals. In the same vein, under the UNCITRAL
291
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Rules, the award is subject to challenge in the national court of the seat of
arbitration. Awards are subject to challenge only in the event of some serious
procedural mistake or a conflict with the host state’s internal public policy.295
The lack of binding precedents and the absence of an appellate mechanism in
investment arbitrations can result in inconsistent decisions and makes it difficult to
ascertain the applicable legal standards or the proper interpretative approaches to
employ. For example, while most investment tribunals use the ‘effects-based’
approach to assess indirect expropriation claims,296 the ‘police power’ doctrine was
nevertheless adopted in some NAFTA awards (such as Methanex297) and BIT
arbitrations (such as Saluka298). In addition, the ‘proportionality test’ was used by
NAFTA arbitrators in Archer Daniels299 and by BIT arbitrators in Tecmed300 and
LG&E.301 These contradictory awards introduce further uncertainty to this field of
law.
(b) Non-Legal Aspects
In addition to the legal factors described above, inconsistent and incoherent
interpretations of texts on expropriation may also be attributed to non-legal factors
that influence the operation of the international law of investment protection. The
295
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impact of non-legal factors cannot be underestimated, as arbitrators’ personal
backgrounds and ideological positions can inevitably affect their arbitral decisions
and, consequently, the development of investment treaty jurisprudence.
Both history and experience reaffirm that non-legal factors can affect the attitudes of
individual decision makers, and result in inconsistency and incoherence across
various decisions.302 This proposition is supported by the study of Gus Van Harten,
who claims that ‘different legal attitudes, economic strategic and institutional
factors’ significantly influence the performance of arbitrators and the coherence of
their judicial decision making.303
As Schill points out, different investment tribunals may have different perspectives
and philosophies about the role of law, the state and the function of dispute
resolution.304 While certain groups of arbitrators with profound commercial
backgrounds rely heavily on commercial law principles, other panels listing
arbitrators with public international law backgrounds may approach the issue using
general principles of law.305 Variations in professional backgrounds, legal culture
and legal ideologies impact the ways in which investment arbitrators deal with the
legal issues at hand, causing interpretative inconsistency in the investment protection
standard.306
A reading of international investment awards on indirect expropriation illustrates this
critical issue. In the context of the Iran-US Claims Tribunals, for example, the
downfall of the Shah and the setting up of a revolutionary government in Iran caused
social turmoil, due to a strong demand to restructure the economy and a massive
expropriation of foreign investments in the country. The Iran-US Claim Tribunal was
thus established to settle conflicts between the Iranian government and American
investors. Being generous to foreign interests, the Tribunal expanded the scope of
measures that could amount to expropriation. Deploying the ‘effects-based’ doctrine,
302
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the Tribunal frequently held that ‘any measure that led to deprivation in the value of
the investment could amount to expropriation’.307 In this context, the Tribunal’s
‘expansive interpretation’ was reflective of a strategy to deal with the irregular
expropriations by the Iranian government, during a particularly tumultuous time.308
Expansive interpretations by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal have also affected the
approaches taken by other tribunals under NAFTA and BITs. As discussed in the
previous section, a key objective articulated in the arbitral awards of NAFTA and
BITs is to provide protection for property rights. This attitude towards the protection
of property rights, over competing interests, was also shaped by the overwhelming
success of economic liberalism following World War II, when policies for the
promotion of inward economic development and rapid growth were adopted by most
countries.309 The success of economic liberalism not only accelerated the free flow
of trade and investment across countries, but also the protection of property rights of
foreign investors. A strong ethic of protection of property thus permeates
international arbitration practices and influences the ways in which international
arbitral tribunals form their analyses. In the early period of NAFTA and BITs, we
have seen that a series of arbitral tribunals adopted liberal interpretations of
investment treaties, deciding repeatedly in favor of investors, irrespective of the
state’s intent in carrying out the regulations in question.310
Due to this perceived bias in favor of the protection of investors, many host countries
have started questioning the appropriateness of an extremely high protection
standard. Some advanced countries, like the United States and Canada, together with
NGOs that have interests in the environmental and human rights aspects of arbitral
proceedings, are exerting pressure upon investment tribunals to depart from the
traditional approach. This evolving interpretation was obvious in the 2005 Methanex
case, where the Tribunal adopted an approach that was more sympathetic to the
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sovereignty of the host State, in order to enable a regulatory space for
expropriations.311 Besides rejecting the traditional ‘effects-based’ doctrine, the
Methanex Tribunal made an important contribution to public participation in
investment arbitral proceedings through the acceptance of submissions from an
amicus curiae.312 The Tribunal’s contribution was a response to public pressure
arising from a perceived failure to protect social interests, in some high profile
regulatory areas. Therefore, within the new approach formulated by Methanex, the
public interest concern is acknowledged and amicus curiae participation in the
proceedings is permitted for the purposes of providing information and expert
advice. Further, the Tribunal held that non-discriminatory regulation would not
attract compensation.313

C. Conclusions and Legal Challenges
This Chapter has studied the development of international jurisprudence on indirect
expropriation in three renowned international agreements. Prior the Second-World
War, the principles of the international law of indirect expropriation were unsettled.
After the Second World War, rules on expropriation, based on customary
international law, were codified through numerous investment treaties. Each of the
agreements examined within this Chapter explicitly contains provisions safeguarding
foreign investors from both unlawful direct and indirect expropriation of their
property, both tangible and intangible. Nevertheless, there is still no coherent legal
principle or jurisprudence with the ability to clearly and consistently distinguish
normal exercises of governmental regulatory powers from expropriatory conduct
triggering a legal obligation to compensate property owners.
At the heart of this issue is the lack of a clear guideline and threshold standard with
which to delineate practices that may constitute indirect expropriations. The very
nature of ad hoc arbitration prevents arbitrators from adhering to the standards
311
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established by previous adjudicators. Moreover, non-legal factors, such as personal
background and ideological divides influence the divergent attitudes of arbitrators
charged with formulating the awards. Consequently, different bodies of arbitral
tribunals have applied a variety of legal standards to address indirect expropriation
questions despite encountering similar substantive provisions and sets of facts.
On the whole, the ‘effects-based’ approach is still the dominant methodology
employed by investment arbitrations, especially those appointed under the IRUSCT,
the NAFTA and BITs. However, an increasing number of arbitral tribunals have
departed from this traditional rule and have adopted alternative tests, emphasizing
either ‘police power’ or ‘proportionality’, to analyze expropriation claims, which
signifies a revival in the emphasis of the state’s sovereignty to regulate.
Although the surveyed arbitration regimes suffer from the aforementioned legal
deficiencies and systematic limitations, investment arbitration is still considered to
be the most effective way to resolve investment disputes. In light of advantages, such
as cost effectiveness, flexibility, finality of awards, and political independence,
investor-state arbitration is the most reliable way to resolve complex public-private
conflicts.314 To preserve the inherent strength of the investor-state arbitral system, a
considerable number of recent academic publications have proposed various
methods for improvement. These include: introducing several public interest
dimensions,315 promoting the consistency and coherence of the unity of legal
reasoning, and encouraging greater transparency in arbitration systems.
In the next Chapter we will discuss the rationale for using a ‘comparative public law’
approach for the purpose of developing interpretative guidance for unclear legal
provisions in investment arbitrations concerning expropriation claims. It will be
argued that the proposed approach will contribute greatly to the consistent and
coherent interpretation of vague terms in the area of international investment law,
without demanding significant reform to the existing system of investment
arbitration. This new approach may assist in establishing justifiable decisions that
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adhere to the most common legal standards found within current international law, as
well the domestic public laws of countries with different legal traditions.316
Ultimately, it will be contended that the proposed approach has the potential to
neutralize ideological bias arising from the personal, professional and educational
backgrounds

of

arbitrators

in

international

316

investment

disputes.

Stephan W Schill, Comparative Public Law Methodology in International Investment Law (3
January 2014) Blog of European Journal of International Law <http://www.ejiltalk.org/comparativepublic-law-methodology-in-international-investment-law/>.
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CHAPTER V
A CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO TREATY
INTERPRETATION

AND THE ROLE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC

LAW TO PROMOTE LEGAL CONSISTENCY AND COHERENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW ON INDIRECT
EXPROPRIATION

As the previous Chapter revealed, there is no uniform standard of interpretation that
can be used to identify, with satisfactory consistency, the occurrence of indirect
expropriation. The issue becomes even more complex in cases where foreign
investors are economically impaired by a public measure of the host government that
is claimed to have been implemented to serve a public interest. The ambiguities and
complexities of current standards of interpretation have contributed to the legal
uncertainty and incoherence that characterizes the assessment of indirect
expropriation claims before arbitral tribunals. As a consequence, the manner in
which these standards are applied by arbitral decision-makers is, arguably,
influenced by extra-legal factors such as personal biases, which adversely impact the
legitimacy of international investment-agreement arbitration.
In this Chapter, a public law framework is proposed as a more coherent method of
legal interpretation for international investment treaties. To support the potentiality
of the public law framework, this Chapter begins with an overview of the traditional
interpretative approach under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).1 It then analyzes the limitations inherent within the traditional approach to
treaty interpretation, which draws upon the ordinary meaning of words and the
treaty’s objectives and purposes. Following this analysis, it will be argued that
international arbitral tribunals should refer to general principles of law as a potential
source of treaty interpretation in relation to investor-state disputes. Since
international investment law generally concerns the protection of foreign investors

1

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331
(entered into force 27 January 1980) ('Vienna Convention').
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against arbitrary conduct by host state governments, the nature of investment
arbitration is analogous to the review of administrative conduct under domestic
public law. Investment treaties can, therefore, be described as a body of law that
reflects the ‘hierarchical relationship’ between superiors and subordinates.2 In this
respect, the control of the legality of the state’s conduct exercised under an
investment treaty is functionally comparable to administrative or constitutional
judicial review in domestic law.3
This Chapter will then highlight the current practices of arbitral tribunals when
reviewing indirect expropriation claims. It analyzes how, and to what extent, current
arbitral tribunals utilize legal principles drawn from public law frameworks, at both
domestic and international levels, to define vague treaty provisions and resolve
disputes, in the area of indirect expropriation. Although arbitral tribunals frequently
defer to public law concepts when resolving disputes, the precise criteria adopted by
these tribunals are arguably uncertain and unpredictable.4
In order to better respond to these problems, this Chapter will articulate the potential
benefits of deploying the ‘general principles of law’ approach to search, by means of
a comparative study, for legal principles commonly accepted in public law at both
domestic and international levels. It is argued that these commonly accepted
principles may increase unity of legal reasoning for vague provisions, and assist in
developing a normative framework for the law of indirect expropriation under
international investment treaties.
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A. The Conventional Treaty Interpretation Rules under the Vienna
Convention and Their Limitations
1. A Current Framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT)
The VCLT is an international legal instrument that codifies the international
customary law of treaty interpretation, binding all nations.5 The VCLT outlines the
specific rules pertaining to treaty interpretation in public international law. The
applicable general rules are found in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. In essence,
Article 31 specifies the primary means of interpretation,6 whilst Article 327 is only to
be used to confirm a meaning found via the primary means, or to determine meaning
when the primary means does not produce a clear result.8
Fundamentally, when interpreting treaty texts pursuant to the VCLT, adjudicators
must bear in mind three distinct elements. First, the treaty must be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with ordinary meaning. This fundamental principle is
articulated under Article 31(1) of the VCLT. In addition, given that the term exists
within a treaty, Article 31(1) also requires that deference be paid to the objective and

5

Richard K Gardiner, Treaty interpretation The Oxford international law library (Oxford : Oxford
University Press, 2008) 12.
6
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1.A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the
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(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provision;
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purpose of the treaty. Article 32 stipulates that in order to ascertain the correct
meaning, adjudicator can also refer to the original intention of the parties as a
supplementary means of interpretation.9
2. The Limitations of the Conventional Interpretative Approach under the VCLT
when Construing an Ambiguous Text in International Investment Treaties
International investment treaties generally impose an obligation on the State parties
to provide investment protection for foreign investors covered by a treaty. To ensure
that the rights of foreign investors are protected, investment treaties generally
establish standards of treatment within substantive and procedural rules. Despite the
provision of comprehensive standards of treatment and protection, in typical
investment treaties, key provisions contained within these treaties are often vague.
Due to the presence of ambiguity in many key provisions, such as the provisions on
Fair and Equitable Treatment and Indirect Expropriation, arbitral tribunals frequently
engage in the formulation of definitions.10 In this way, investment arbitral tribunals
inevitably need to utilize the VCLT as a guide for treaty interpretation.11
In spite of the significant influence of the VCLT, the application of the interpretation
rules has encountered some difficulty. One of the reasons for this difficulty is that
unclear legal provisions within investment treaties make it hard to interpret terms
based on the ordinary meaning of the text. As discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis,
typical treaty texts are deliberately crafted to ensure that provisions are broad enough
to cover the unforeseen circumstances that may arise after the treaties come into
effect.12 Whilst the flexibility of open-textual provisions is important, ambiguous
language also leads to inconsistent interpretations by the various arbitral tribunals.
Some commentators even claim that arbitral tribunals adopt different interpretative
approaches when interpreting international agreements with similar rights and
obligations, as well as treaty language.13 A good example of this occurred in the
context of challenges to measures implemented during the economic crisis in
9

UNCTAD, 'Interpretation of IIAs: What Sates Can Do' (No 3, UNCTAD Investment and Enterprise
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Argentina in 2001, where different arbitral tribunals adopted distinct interpretations
of the scope and application of the ‘necessity defense’.14
In addition to the difficulty of ascertaining the ordinary meaning of ambiguous treaty
text, some commentators claim that interpreting provisions in light of the treaty’s
objectives and purpose is also problematic. As discussed by Bücheler, arbitral
tribunals have so far used two different strains to understand the role of an
international investment treaty when interpreting its provisions. While some arbitral
tribunals focus on the role of international investment treaties in the protection of
foreign investment,15 others argue that Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are
created in order to promote a balance between development objectives and investor
benefits.16 Thus, interpretative techniques focused on upholding a treaty’s objectives
and purpose might not be the most effective means of ensuring coherent and
consistent interpretations by arbitral tribunals.17
Due to inherent problems in applying the conventional approach of the VCLT to
investment treaty disputes, arbitral tribunals might interpret investment treaties in an
inconsistent and unpredictable manner.18 As illustrated by Fauchald - in a study of
the variation of legal reasoning cited in investment treaty disputes, by International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitral tribunals - arbitrators
tend to use a broad range of interpretive arguments and sources when deciding cases.
Although arbitral tribunals often interpret rules by relying on decisions in earlier
investor-state cases, Fauchald points out that the interpretative arguments are based
on other sources, which include legal doctrines espoused within academic
publications, treaty preparatory works, customary international law, objectives and
purposes and state practices.19 The divergent methods and sources of treaty
interpretation adopted by investment arbitral tribunals undoubtedly make it difficult
14

Ibid, 3 footnote 12.
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to develop a body of consistent and coherent case law. To produce sound arbitral
awards, attempts have been made to look for a better interpretative approach that can
potentially resolve the challenges and tensions posed by the current regime of
interpretation rules. In more recent times, arbitral tribunals and scholars, alike, have
turned to the ‘general principles of law’ as a potential source of guidance for treaty
interpretation. This conceptual framework could be adopted in relation to relevant
rules of international law within the context of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.

B. Searching for a New Potential: The General Principles of Law and Its
Recognizable Role as a Source of Legal Interpretation in
Public International Law
Pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, adjudicators can interpret treaties based on
any rules of international law applicable to the circumstances faced by the parties.
Legal scholars and practitioners normally consider the ‘rules of international law’ in
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT by making reference to all sources of international law
as stated in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.20 Therefore, ‘a general principle of law
recognized by civilized nations’ stipulated by Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute is
labeled as one of the sources of law applicable to the resolution of disputes between
parties under international law. This Article authorizes the adjudicators to draw
relevant principles that are universally accepted in legal systems around the world in
order to fill any gaps produced by vague provisions.21
To search for these ‘general principles of law’, one should not simply rely upon
broad generalizations; but rather, one should draw these principles from a
‘comparative survey’ of the world’s legal systems.22 Cassese held that the source of
this comparison is fundamentally based on legal doctrines commonly shared by
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‘major legal systems of the community of nations’.23 When adopting this approach,
the comparative study should resort to the principles shared within both common law
and civil law systems, as well as other legal traditions found in Islamic, African and
Asian nations.24
There is a growing body of literature that advocates the advantages of this approach
for modern society. One of the most frequently highlighted advantages of the
‘general principles of law’ methodology is its ‘residual nature’; that is, its ability to
fill gaps in treaties and customary law, when those sources of law are neither clear
nor complete.25 The strength of this approach was confirmed by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the case of Furundzija
decided in 1998.26 In this case, the Trial Chamber used the ‘general principles of
law’ approach to clarify the indeterminate meaning of the term ‘rape’, in the context
of war crimes. The Chamber held that the definition of this term could not simply be:
drawn from international treaty or customary law, nor is resort to general principles of
ICL or to general principles of international law of any avail. The Trial Chamber
therefore considers that, to arrive at an accurate definition of rape based on the
criminal law principles…it is necessary to look for principles of criminal law common
to the major legal systems of the world.27

This judgment reflects that the ‘general principles of law’ must be discovered from
the commonality and representativeness of legal doctrine generally accepted by
civilized nations.
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To be universally applicable, the examination of ‘general principles of law’ must
satisfy at least two additional conditions. Firstly, as mentioned by Jaye Ellis, the
general principles of law should be a ‘viable source of law in a heterogeneous
society’28 and the distilled legal doctrine should not be considered as ‘a discrete,
autonomous entity but as part of a much larger and very complex narrative’.29 Judge
Stephen in Dražen Erdemović case,30 held in his dissenting opinion that, in order to
arrive at a solution by way of the ‘general principles of law’, ‘the enquiry must go
beyond the actual rules and must seek the reason for their creation and the manner of
their application’.31 From his point of view, international jurists are encouraged to
discover general principles not only from the legal text, but also, other non-legal
factors with which the legal doctrines were derived and framed.
Secondly, the search for ‘general principles of law’ should not be limited to
principles embedded in municipal law, but should also acknowledge those found
within the context of international law. In the Corfu Channel Case,32 which
concerned questions regarding Albanian civil liability for the mining of the Corfu
Channel, the ICJ stated that:
[T]he fact of this exclusive territorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers
has a bearing upon the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that
State as to such events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other State, the victim
of a breach of international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving
rise to responsibility. Such a State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to
inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in all
systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions. It must be
regarded as of special weight when it is based on a series of facts linked together and
leading logically to a single conclusion.33 [emphasis added]
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The Court judgment thus implied that the application of ‘general principles of law’
should expand to broader normative considerations, which respect other international
obligations generally recognized by civilized countries and the international
community. This view is supported by Moshe Hirsch, who asserts that even if the
principle is present in municipal law, it is not automatically transposable to the
‘general principles of law’ unless such a principle is settled within the international
community.34
Although the use of general principles of law may fill gaps when interpreting vague
provisions in international laws, some limitations to this remain. As Nolan and
Sourgens have commented, to demonstrate that the principle is regarded as a general
legal principle, there must be sufficient state practice to authenticate its adoption into
the legal system.35 In addition, the level of acceptance must be strong enough for the
purpose of establishing the general principle, regardless of any diversity in legal
traditions.36 Moreover, the said principle must be transposable at the international
level.37 These requirements might cause some difficulty for adjudicators. This may
lead to a decrease in use of general principles of law in the resolution of international
disputes in the 21st century, which are inherently intertwined with complex layers of
stakeholders and interests.
Due to the increased complexity of conflicts in the contemporary world, no complete
set of laws to adequately address all issues faced by adjudicators currently exists.
One of the common issues for adjudicators is conflicts arising from human activities
that ultimately affect the global environment. To ensure that a substance or activity
posing a threat to the environment is prevented from causing extensive harm, the
‘precautionary principle’ is used to deal with unfavourable human pollutions.
Briefly stated, the precautionary principle permits the host state to negate the
possible risks stemming from the introduction of new products or any human activity
that consequently cause a threat to the environment or human health, even where
scientific proof of the relationship between the risks and consequence is not firmly
34
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established. This principle is deeply incorporated in the domestic laws of many
countries such as Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Norway and Canada.38 However, whether this principle will become relevant to
international law and therefore be regarded as a general principle of law is
questionable. This is because the United States, despite incorporating the principles
into its domestic law,39 has voiced strong opposition against the principle’s binding
nature at the international level.40 Based on this, there may be difficulty in
transforming the principle at a domestic level to an international principle. This gives
rise to concerns on the effectiveness of the general principles of law under art
31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the modern world.

C. The Application of the General Principles of Law in
International Investment Treaties
Although the practical application of the ‘general principles of law’ approach is
prominent in the field of public international law, to date, this concept plays a less
significant role in the area of international investment law.41 According to the study
by Fauchald, who conducted an empirical analysis of the use of ‘general principles
of law’ as an interpretative tool in investment treaties by ICSID tribunals from 1st
January 1998 to 31st December 2006, tribunals have applied ‘general principles of
law’ as a source of legal interpretation in only eight out of 98 tribunal awards.42
Nevertheless, a number of investment arbitral tribunals in more recent cases have
adopted the ‘general principles of law’ approach to solve interpretive tensions.43
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Despite the minor presence of the ‘general principles of law’ in current investment
treaty jurisprudence, some commentators argue that this approach should not be
underestimated and overlooked. Schill, for example, asserts that since international
investment agreements are not limited to inter-state relations, but also govern the
relationship between public and private entities, the search for universally
recognized legal principles, especially from public international and domestic law,
can help arbitral tribunals to identify some certain standards in investment treaties.44
He also stresses that because investment treaties share core functions with public law
in resolving public-private disputes, ‘general principles of law’ could provide
interpretive guidance for arbitral tribunals attempting to achieve an optimum solution
in the reconciliation of conflicting interests between states and private entities.45 He
argues that the crafting of arbitral decisions based on standards commonly accepted
by civilized nations would promote the development of a strong system of ‘arbitral
precedent’, according to which both the parties in a particular investment dispute as
well as non-parties in subsequent, analogous cases will be bound.46
Similarly, the Working Group on General Public International Law and International
Investment Law of the Transnational Economic Law Centre, which is a sub-branch
of the International Law Commission,47 has demonstrated how international
investment law can be influenced by the ‘general principles of law’ and vice versa.
Its research devised a new legal approach to define vague international legal
provisions for investment protection, by taking into account the domestic law of the
countries.48 According to its research, which specifically focused on the issue of ‘fair
and equitable treatment’, the standard of treatment embodied in investment
agreements generally adheres to the rule of law of host countries.49 The approach
44
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proposed by this working group is to search for the ‘common features that those
legal systems establish for the exercise of public power’ by means of a ‘general
principles of law’ methodology.50 This approach has the potential to ensure that the
adjudicators’ discretion is limited and interpret vague investment rights in
compliance with the standards commonly accepted under both domestic and
international law.51
Although the applicability of the general principle of law is not free from ambiguity
and vagueness, the discovered principle may, at the very least, create a common base
to which coherent accounts of law are addressed, which indirectly contributes to the
clarity of vaguely drafted provisions. As MacCormick states; a ‘value coherence’
with the established law is regarded as a necessary condition for a decision to be
legally justified, even in a difficult case.52 According to MacCormick, when the legal
decision contains a principle which formulates the joint policy or common value, the
ruling achieves value coherence with some part of, or all of, the existing law. 53 The
value coherence in rulings therefore help to establish and clarify general trends in
law and the consistency of legal rulings in subsequent cases. When connecting this
underlying principle to international investment law, the value coherence could
arguably be identified from the commonly accepted principles inherent in domestic
public law that governs the relationship between the host state and individuals. Such
value coherence characterises the influence of social, political and moral
considerations commonly agreed within the community.

D. Domestic Public Law Comparison as a Potential Source of
Interpretation under Investor-State Arbitration
The proliferation of international investment treaties has generated criticism from a
wide-range of sources, including States, foreign investors, civil society and
academia, due to the frequent presence of poorly articulated legal principles within
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some vaguely crafted provisions. In the context of investment treaties, this issue has
not only produced uncertainty and incoherence in the application and interpretation
of law, but has also exacerbated the tension between public and private interests in
investment protection.
This next section of the Chapter tries to argue that international investment
arbitration could be regarded as a form of public law adjudication. As such, the
construction of ‘general principles of law’ could be made through an analysis of the
core values found within the domestic public law of major legal systems. In order to
illustrate the nature of the relationship between international investment law and
public law, this section begins with a discussion of the distinctiveness of
international investment treaties and their departure from both traditional public
international law and international commercial law. It then discusses how the
importation and adaptation of a public law framework could enhance legal certainty
and the stability of legal expectations for both States and investors.
1. Key Characteristics of the International Investment Treaty as a New Field of
International Law
The system of international law binds members of the international community to a
set of agreed values and standards.54 International law is frequently referred to as
‘public international law’ and this traditional concept determines the relations
between states in all their myriad forms.55 However, in the context of international
commercial law, it contains a body of rules with which to govern international
business- and sales- transactions between countries. Due to the proliferation of
international business transactions, international commercial rules have been created
to remove the impediments to trade that are embodied in local laws, and to promote
cross-border business flows.56 However, since the 1990s, which saw an upsurge in
foreign investment flows across countries and a corresponding rise in the number of
investment arbitrations, the international law of investment protection has become an
54
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increasingly important area of study. The growth in international investment has
resulted in the development of a discrete area of law, distinct from the traditional
genres of international law and characterized by its own unique features.57
This section analyzes the distinction between international investment law, on the
one hand, and public international law and international commercial law, on the
other, in relation to four key issues: subject of law, scope of review, interpretative
approaches and dispute settlement mechanisms. This section also develops a
framework to argue that international investment agreements are neither examples of
purely public international law nor purely international commercial law, but rather a
specific area of international law that governs the relationship between States and
individuals and imposes upon States the obligation to protect foreign investments.
(a) Subject of Law
According to traditional principles of public international law, only States have
personality under international law and only States can bring claims against other
opposing States before an international forum.58 In international commercial law, by
contrast, an individual is a subject of law and has the right to invoke a claim against
an opposing contracting party.59 The relationship between the contracting parties
under both traditional public law and international commercial law is generally
described as an ‘equality of parties’ in each sphere of law.60
Under an investment treaty, however, an individual foreign investor who is covered
by the treaty’s provision is considered to be a subject who can directly initiate
arbitration against the host state government, for the recuperation of compensatory
damages, in an international arbitration forum.61 The relationship between a
protected foreign investor and the host state is generally characterized as a
‘hierarchical relation’ between a superior and a subordinate wherein the state is
entitled by sovereign right to unilaterally impose binding decisions on a foreign
investor, either through an administrative order or the implementation of domestic
57
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law.62 Even though the state acts in a public capacity, a private investor can bring the
matter before an international arbitral tribunal as a dispute between a state and a
foreign investor.63 Therefore, the investment treaty elevates the legal rights of an
individual to entitle him/her to pursue a claim directly against the host state
government, unless specified otherwise. A natural person or an enterprise can, thus,
be the subject of obligations and rights at international law, and is entitled to make a
claim against the State directly through the investment treaty.
(b) Scope of Review
Traditional public international law typically involves disputes between two states.
The aim of public international law is to provide criteria with which to settle disputes
between equal sovereign nations, on the basis of mandates set by the United
Nations,64 or procedural rules under the ICJ.65
International commercial law governs business matters between private commercial
actors of more than one country. The rights and obligations of the commercial parties
are governed by the contract under private law.66 This is different from an
investment treaty where the rights invoked by a foreign investor are derived from the
obligations that the host state government has undertaken with other sovereign
states.67
International investment laws largely stipulate the standard of treatment that the host
state government needs to respect.68 Typically, an international investment treaty
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covers a wide range of issues, including: the legality of the conduct of host state
government vis-à-vis foreign investors; regulatory oversight over public utilities; and
the state’s rights to terminate commercial permits. The scope of investor protection
is mainly determined by the range of obligations assumed under a treaty, following
the terms agreed upon by the State parties.69 As such, by preventing host states from
engaging in abusive uses of government power, international investment law is
analogous to public law, which concerns the control of regulatory or administrative
acts taken by states.70
(c) Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
The settlement of disputes under public international law is fundamentally structured
to handle conflicts between states by means of diplomatic protection, or in other
domestic courts or agreed forums, acceptable under public international law
principles.71 However, public international law usually requires the exhaustion of
local remedies within the host states prior to requesting diplomatic protection or
international dispute remedies. Furthermore, in relation to the right to seek remedies
under public international law, only the government of an aggrieved foreign investor
(as opposed to said investor) is eligible to invoke compensation from the host state
alleged to have committed the wrongful acts.72
This is different from an international commercial law where the settlement of
disputes generally occurs in accordance with agreed terms stipulated in the contract.
The jurisdiction to arbitrate, under international commercial law, is typically based
on a contractual commitment between the specific parties to arbitrate on specific
issues.73 As a result, the parties in a commercial arbitration have full control over the
arbitral proceedings,74 and therefore, enjoy full autonomy in determining matters
such as the applicable law, the composition of the tribunal, and the location at which
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the arbitration will occur.75 The award rendered by arbitral tribunals can also be
enforced worldwide under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (known as New York Convention 1958),76 and the national
courts of the country in which the enforcement is sought may only refuse the foreign
arbitral awards on limited grounds.77
In context of an international investment law, States mutually consent, by treaty, to
commit themselves to compulsory arbitration in the event of a dispute with foreign
private investors.78 The jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to consider a case is not
derived from a contract in the private sphere, but from a prospective offer to arbitrate
made by the state parties.79 Pursuant to the nature of investment arbitration, ‘consent
without privity’ is a hallmark of the settlement of disputes under investment
agreements.80 As Van Harten puts it, arbitration under investment treaties is a type of
‘blanket contractual obligation on the part of the state to all existing and future
investors’.81
Although the procedural rules for arbitration in investment treaties are similar to
those made under private commercial international contracts,82 treaty-based
investment arbitration usually involves claims associated with the exercise of state
sovereignty, and not the breaching of obligations arising out of purely commercial
acts by the host state government.83 Therefore, arbitral tribunals, under investment
treaties, have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide issues regarding state
sovereignty and public interests, and this type of dispute settlement power is not
found in typical commercial arbitration contracts.
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All in all, investment treaties have unique characteristics distinct from both purely
traditional public international law and purely international commercial law. The
distinctiveness of investment treaties mandates, therefore, the development and
application of new ways of legal thinking. Accordingly, the next section of this
Chapter will discuss the rationale for, and relevance of, the development of a new
public law framework, applicable to investment treaty disputes.
2. Rationale of Public Law Framework and Its Practical Utility in Investor-State
Dispute Analysis
As the awareness of the public law dimension of investment treaties is steadily
growing, the application of a public law framework to investment treaties is
conceptually justifiable, and is becoming an increasing focus within academic
scholarship. Further reasons for this focus include:
(a) Public Law as a Governing Rule for Unequal Relationships
Firstly, the investment treaty is a legal instrument that governs the relationship
between a State and foreign investors. Unlike traditional public international law and
commercial law, the investment treaty reflects the existence of a ‘vertical
relationship between host state as governors and private investors as governed
party’.84 The current regime of investment treaties is thus comparable with the
function of domestic public law, which governs the unequal relationship between the
State and individuals.
(b) Public Law as Governing Rules for Regulatory Disputes
Secondly, public law thinking could help arbitrators to formulate a new method of
analysis when confronting conflicts between a State and foreign investors. Investorstate arbitration is not purely a commercial dispute, nor is it an inter-state dispute;
rather, it is a ‘regulatory dispute’ wherein the host state government unilaterally
imposes legislative or administrative orders on the foreign investor.85 Under a typical
investment treaty, the parties’ objectives include not only the admission and
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promotion of foreign investment, but also the setting of standards of treatment for
foreign investments within the host country.86 If the host state government
unlawfully imposes an administrative order, the aggrieved foreign investor can bring
a compensation claim against the host state for its breach of international obligations,
and the arbitral tribunals then play a role, much like that of a judicial review body, in
hearing and resolving the matter. The process of settling a regulatory dispute under
international investment law is, thus, similar to that of a national administrative or
constitutional court where the contending citizen can bring a claim against the
government’s actions.87
(c) Public Law as a Potential Source of Legal Interpretation to Strike Justice and
the Fair Balance between State and Private Interests
Under the current regime, a typical investment treaty aims to protect foreign
investments from abusive regulatory interference by host state governments.88 If
broadly formulated, the investment protection mechanisms could, nevertheless,
permit foreign investors, who have suffered harm as a result of legitimate regulation,
to sue the host state government in an arbitral tribunal for a significant amount of
compensation. This type of protection limits the exercise of legitimate power, by a
host state, to regulate for the common good.89
Critiquing the restriction on the state sovereign right to control, Fuentes questions
the legitimacy of the existing system of investment treaties and arbitration. He
argues that the current system of investment law poses a serious threat to the
fundamental values of the rule of law and democracy; heavily favoring foreign
investment at the expense of state sovereignty.90 Been and Beauvais even claim that
investment treaty-based tribunals have interpreted vaguely crafted provisions in a
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manner far-exceeding the scope of the standards of treatment provided under
national law.91
Given these problems surrounding the existing investment treaty-based protections,
the utility of domestic public law, as a source of interpretative guidance for
international investment treaties, should be considered as instrumental in clarifying
vague obligations and striking an appropriate balance between private and public
interests. This position is also advocated by Fuentes,92 in a study examining the
influence of international investment law on domestic law and national priorities.
The author argued that, although investment tribunals exercise a power similar to
constitutional or administrative tribunals, they use private law principles without any
consideration of the rules within domestic public legal orders to settle claims
between States and private entities.93 This lack of deference to national authorities
could potentially (and irrationally) impose a stricter standard of protection for
foreign investors than that provided for domestic investors.94
In addition to clarifying the meaning of vague terms, the use of a public law
framework would enable arbitral tribunals to better frame their decisions, by
deferring to domestic laws and national authorities, in a manner which promotes
justice and the balance of competing interests.95 When determining whether a breach
of an international investment treaty is reasonable or justifiable on the basis of the
national interests of the affected party, the incorporation of the opinions of national
legislative, executive, and judicial bodies could help to ensure that arbitral tribunals
adequately consider all relevant ‘voices’ representing democratic values,96 as well as
the ‘expertise’ of the state authorities over some complex issues with which the
arbitral tribunals are not familiar.97 This could prevent investment tribunals from
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arbitrarily second-guessing government decision-making and ensure that they are
reaching an appropriate decision in light of all relevant circumstances in the
country.98
Schneiderman,99 a constitutional law expert, presented a similarly critical study of
the international investment system. He supports the application of domestic public
law in investor-state arbitration. While he focuses on the public law dimensions of
international investment disputes, he also provides an analysis of the constitutional
implications of investor-state arbitration. According to Schneiderman, the strong
protection of foreign investment favors foreign investors too heavily and
‘destabilizes the functioning of democratic processes, represented by other
constitutional rules’.100 Therefore, he argues that rather than relying on different
standards of treatment, foreign investors should be subject to the same standards that
are applicable to local people, and those foreign investors should utilize alternative
means of investment protection, such as investment insurance, to safeguard
themselves from unforeseen policy risks that might arise unexpectedly.101
In order to find the ‘minimum standards of treatment’, with which an investment
treaty could ‘achieve effective and operative balance of conflicting interests’,
Mahmood suggests that the protection of foreign investment should be in line with
standards accepted in national and international human right regimes. 102 Mahmood
also argues that the government should commit to a duty under the doctrine of
‘social contract’ between state and citizens, and it should have freedom to regulate
according to its democratic mandate.103 Therefore, even though the state has
committed itself to international obligations, the interpretation of investment treaties
should be guided by the some social norms and the underlying role of the state in
providing the required minimum standards of protection to its citizens, as recognized
by local and international laws.104 By means of the ‘minimum standards of
98
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treatment’ approach, international arbitrators could utilize both domestic and
international human rights law, as a source of interpretive guidance, in order to
ensure that all common goods and interests are properly evaluated.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be argued that the adoption of a ‘public law
framework’ could be highly instrumental in shaping the legal analysis of
international investment disputes, particularly, in circumstances where public and
private interests collide. As an investment agreement reflects the relationship
between a host state and foreign investors, reference to legal doctrines found in the
public law jurisprudence of national legal orders could potentially help arbitrators to
interpret treaty provisions in a clear, consistent and effective manner.

E. The Application of the General Principles of Public Law in the
Context of Indirect Expropriation Law
In this section, the focus will be on the applicability of the concept of ‘general
principles of public law’ in relation to ‘indirect expropriation’ provisions. The
section evaluates the existing analytical frameworks that arbitral tribunals use in
assessing the existence of compensable indirect expropriations. Due to different
degrees of arbitral tribunals’ deference to domestic laws/policies in analyzing
indirect expropriation enquiries, the section will propose that arbitral tribunals
should make use of the ‘general principles of public law’ that are commonly adopted
in civilized nations, as a useful interpretive guide in confronting indirect
expropriation claims.
1. Deference to Domestic Public Law in the Existing Jurisprudence on Indirect
Expropriation
As discussed, there is no sound and coherent principle with which to determine the
existence of a compensable indirect expropriation under the current regime of
international law. Due to the shortcomings of the existing legal principles discussed,
tribunals are confronted with the ‘dilemma’ of choosing between conflicting legal
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standards when analyzing the tensions between public and private benefits.105 Often,
the choice between these standards is dependent on the exercise of discretion by each
tribunal.106 The use of public law principles has been advocated as providing a
predictable methodology with which to interpret the relationship between the state
and individuals. To date, there are generally three basic frameworks that are variably
used by current investment tribunals to decide when a compensable indirect
expropriation has occurred. These include: strong deference, moderate deference and
non-deference to domestic public law.
(a) Strong Deference to Domestic Law/Regulation
In some cases, investment tribunals have strongly recognized the state’s intent
behind an interference with foreign-owned property when approaching an indirect
expropriation claim. To decide whether there is an expropriation requiring
compensation in such cases, tribunals have acknowledged the State’s capacity to
regulate in favor of public interests. Since it is a fundamental commitment of a
government to ensure that social interests are satisfactorily addressed, investment
arbitral tribunals occasionally defer to the concept of ‘police power’ inherent in
domestic and international laws; according to which the national government cannot
be held liable for harm suffered by an individual as a result of legitimate
regulation.107 The right to regulate without paying compensation is not only accepted
under national law, but is also widely recognized by international legal orders.108
Adopting the concept of inherent ‘police power’, the tribunals in Saluka109 and
Methanex110 took into account the purpose of the respective State interferences. In
Saluka, the Claimant submitted that the Czech National Bank (CNB), which is the
central bank of the Czech Republic, breached the BIT between the Netherlands and

105

Aikaterini Titi, The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law (Nomos and Hart
Publishing, 2013) 40.
106
Ibid 41.
107
Ursula Kriebaum, 'Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State'
(2007) 8 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 717, 726.
108
Titi, above n 105, 53-67.
109
Saluka (2006) UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal. (‘Saluka’).
110
Methanex (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 3 August 2005) part IV, sec D.

155

the Czech Republic111 by imposing an unlawful administrative order over a private
bank. In this case, the arbitration followed the alleged unlawful privatization of the
Czech banking sector following a period of Communism in 1990.112 The Czech
Republic privatized Investiční a Poštovní Banka (IPB), (one of the major banks in
the Czech Republic) and sold its State-owned shares to Nomura Holding Company,
which were later transferred to Saluka Investment BV (a subsidiary company of
Nomura set up under the law of the Netherlands).113
However, due to mismanagement in the administration of the company, in lending a
large amount of non-performing loan portfolios,114 the CNB stepped in and provided
financial assistance to all banks, including IPB that suffered ‘liquidity’ problems in
‘payment ability both in Czech currency and in foreign currencies’.115 To deal with
the issues, the government decided to force the sale of IPB to Ceskoslovesnka
Obchodni Banka (CSOB). Due to the ‘forced administration’ measure, Noruma was
deprived of its 46 percent shareholding in the IPB.116 As a result, it initiated claims
against the Czech Republic for breach of the BIT on the violation of numerous
provisions including Article 5 concerning the expropriation.
The Tribunal decided that, even though the Czech Republic deprived the Claimant of
its interests, the exercise of regulatory action by the host state government was
justified. The Tribunal pointed out that, under established international laws, a State
has no duty to compensate foreign investors affected by the normal course of
regulatory acts adopted in a ‘non-discriminatory manner under bona fide
regulations’.117 After reviewing the facts, the Tribunal acknowledged that the
decision of the CNB to impose forced administration on the bank was made in
accordance with domestic laws, which aimed to stabilize the damaged domestic
economy.118 Thus, the Tribunal held that the CNB’s decision was lawful and
permissible under Czech law, as well as established international laws, and did not
111
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fall within the meaning of compensable deprivation under Article 5 of the BIT
between the Netherlands and the Czech Republic.119
Methanex v United States120 is another important case that illustrates the prominent
role of domestic public law in the decision-making process of an investment arbitral
tribunal. Methanex Corporation, a foreign investor and producer of methanol (the
main ingredient of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE)), brought a case against the
United States under NAFTA investment chapter 11 to seek compensation regarding
a dispute arising from California’s environmental legislation. In this case, the
Canadian Claimant, Methanex Corporation, was greatly impacted by legislation
passed by the State of California to ban MTBE. The company complained that after
the enactment of the law, it experienced a loss of $150 million.121 In addition, the
Claimant also criticized the legislation for being discriminatory because it benefited
US ethanol producers.122 Methanex alleged that California breached NAFTA’s
investment protection provisions, including Article 1110 on expropriation.
The Tribunal found that MTBE caused tremendous negative effects on public health
and the environment. When interpreting the expropriation provision, the Tribunal
reasserted the State’s legitimate right to enact environmental measures despite their
impacts over investor’s expected economic benefit.123 Rejecting the allegation of the
Claimant, the Tribunal held that:
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public
purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects … a
foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless
specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then
putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain
from such regulation.124
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The aforementioned cases postulate the supremacy of domestic law, as well as the
superior position of public bodies, to enforce measures that are needed to safeguard
public welfare and social benefits.
(b) Moderate Deference
Some investment tribunals have approached the interpretation of expropriatory
behaviours differently by focusing on the rationality and the ordinary meaning of the
measures when identifying whether an indirect expropriation has occurred. To
analyze the issue of indirect expropriation, these tribunals have, to some extent,
deployed a pubic law framework to reconcile conflicting interests.
In Alex Genin v Estonia,125 for example, the Tribunal found that the ‘reasonableness,
soundness, legitimacy’ and ‘propriety of the State’s decision’ to revoke a banking
license were the key factors in deciding whether the government’s conduct qualified
as an indirect expropriation.126 A similar approach was adopted by the tribunals in
Gemplus127 and Feldman128 when considering whether the measures were
reasonable.129
In contrast to Genin, Gemplus and Feldman, however, the Tribunal in Tecmed130
relied on a ‘proportionality test’ to examine the occurrence of indirect expropriation.
In analyzing the issue, the Tribunal considered whether the relationship between the
‘effect’ and ‘purpose’ of the governmental measure satisfied a ‘proportionality
test.’131 Inspired by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), the Tribunal held that:
[I]n addition to negative financial impact of such actions or measure, the Arbitral
Tribunal will consider, in order to determine if they are to be characterized as
125

Alex Genin and others v Republic of Estonia (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No
ARB/99/2, 2001).
126
Ibid [347], [352]-[353].
127
Gemplus, SA, SLP, SA Talsud, SA v United Mexican States (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal,
Case No ARB(AF)/04/4, 16 June 2010) (‘Gemplus’).
128
Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No
ARB(AF)/99/1, 16 December 2002) (‘Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa’).
129
Gemplus Case (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB(AF)/04/4, 16 June 2010) [8.6]-[8.26];
Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB(AF)/99/1, 16 December 2002)
[113], [129].
130
Tecmed (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003) (‘Tecmed’).
131
Kriebaum, above n 107, 727.

158

expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest
presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments.

132

Despite a considerable methodological difference between Genin, Gemplus,
Feldman and Tecmed, they are all alike in examining the validity of the exercise of
public powers over individuals, by referring to standards of ‘reasonableness’ and
‘proportionality’. Even though these concepts are the hallmarks of public law
jurisprudence, the applicability of these concepts within the field of international
investment law is full of controversy and uncertainty. For example, since
‘reasonableness’ is a normative concept drawing upon ‘moral considerations’ and ‘a
series of practical and normative requisites for judging decisions’,133 Kriebaum
suggests that the proportionality test employed by the Tecmed Tribunal is a better
solution than the open-ended concept of reasonableness. She points out that the
doctrine of proportionality commits tribunals to disclosing the method it has used in
weighing the public interest of the host State against the effects of the measure on
the individual investor.134 However, some argue that despite its advantages, the
application of the proportionality test tends to rely too much on the discretion of the
arbitral tribunal as to what it believes is an appropriate balance between public and
private interests, respectively.135 As a consequence, the methods produced by
different tribunals might reflect a diversity of techniques to estimate the relative
weight assigned to each interest group in diverse situations. This might arguably
aggravate the problem of legal indeterminacy in investment treaties.
(c) Non-Deference towards Domestic Public law/Policy
Non-deference means that the sole factor used to indicate whether an indirect
expropriation has occurred is the ‘effect’ of the governmental measure on the
investment. Some investment tribunals have explicitly stated that the intent of the
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state, and its motivation to implement a public policy, is not relevant to deciding
whether a governmental interference amounts to an indirect expropriation.136
One of most prominent cases applying this line of reasoning is Metalclad v
Mexico,137 which was discussed in Chapter Four. The Tribunal strongly adopted the
‘effect-based’ rule to decide whether the Ecological Decree issued by the local
government to protect rare cactus amounted to expropriation in violation of the
states’ commitment under the NAFTA’s.138
The approach used by Metalclad Tribunal has been criticized by several legal
scholars. Dubava pointed out that the Metalclad Tribunal not only provided
excessive protection to foreign investors, but also overlooked ‘the possible police
powers exceptions or inner limits of the indirect expropriation standard.’139 Thus, the
award imposed an adverse effect on a state’s legitimate power to regulate for
environmental protection and social interest goals. The same criticism applies to the
expropriation award in Santa Elena v Costa Rica.140 In this case, the Claimant’s
tourist resort was expropriated by a governmental decree to turn the area in question
into a preservation area.141 The Tribunal held that the obligation to pay compensation
to aggrieved investors remained even though the governmental measures were
motivated purely by environmental purposes.142
From the decisions in Metalclad and Santa Elena, it is obvious that some arbitral
tribunals have considered the impact of a state measure on the investor’s rights to use
and enjoy their property as the primary factor indicating the occurrence of indirect
expropriation. In the course of such legal reasoning, the tribunals had to disregard
any legitimate state intent to expropriate private property. In applying this analytical
framework, the tribunals have interpreted international investment treaties primarily
as an instrument to protect foreign investments, and have attributed less significance
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to a host state’s duty to pay compensation under domestic laws when determining
whether a compensable expropriation has occurred.
2. General Principles of Public Law and the Proposed Comparative Study in the
Context of Indirect Expropriation Inquiries
An examination of the development of indirect expropriation jurisprudence
demonstrates that tribunals have variably adopted a wide range of public law
approaches to analyze this issue. These approaches have ranged from emphasizing
the State’s ‘police power’ to applying a proportionality/balancing test, and to
prioritizing investor interests. The absence of a uniform approach suggests that the
parameters of indirect expropriation are still ill defined, and that this area of law
lacks a conceptual framework with the potential to operate as a ‘practical tool for
predicting, describing and critiquing the result of the indirect expropriation
enquiries’.143
Consequently, diverse interpretative approaches applied by arbitral tribunals make it
hard to know when a certain legal standard/concept should prevail over another, in
any given circumstance. What is needed is a legal framework within which to
conceptualize the appropriate standard of treatment and assist arbitral tribunals in
determining when state actions are exempted from international responsibility and
when the interests of investors should be prioritized.
To develop this theoretical framework, a growing body of scholarship has
recommended the utilization of the ‘comparative law’ approach to distill the ‘general
principles of law’ of civilized nations; these ‘general principles’ can then assist in
reconciling civil liberty and national security considerations in the context of indirect
expropriation. Mann, for instance, asserted that although the State is generally liable
under international law for its breach of contract, a mere regulation giving rise to
interference with private property may not attract liability under international law.144
He suggested that the matter could be investigated by considering whether the state’s
interference is tantamount to the acquisition of property owned by a private party,
143
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which requires compensation according to extant state practices in most civilized
countries.145 Mann proposed that the issues needing to be taken into consideration
include the extent of property rights protection, the concept of taking, as well as the
legal doctrines regarding compensation, etc.146
This analytical framework was subsequently endorsed by Dolzer in 1986.147 He
emphasized the role of ‘general principles’ recognized by domestic laws, as a useful
tool to examine the doctrinal concept of indirect expropriation under international
law. He found that the concept of indirect expropriation was interpreted differently
by various adjudicators,148 and that major capital exporting countries, such as France,
Germany and the United States of America, formulated investment treaties to protect
their investments located in overseas countries but that these treaties notoriously
suffer from a lack of clarity and ‘fall below the mark of acceptability’ in defining
what constitutes an indirect expropriation.149 Dolzer argued that the boundaries of
indirect expropriation should be established on the basis of rules comparable to those
found in domestic legal orders.150
This line of analysis was later supported by Levesque, who emphasized the role of
‘general principles of law’ drawn from national laws concerning the ‘protection of
property rights’.151 In her view, the idea of a ‘property owner’s legitimate
expectation’ can play a significant role in providing judicial guidance on the question
of who should bear the burden and risk of government intervention.152 In a highly
risky industry, the private property owner should reasonably expect a high level of
government control and possible interference. Any good-faith regulatory change
causing additional burden on the investor should not impose a financial burden on
the government. As private property has a ‘social junction’,153 she also argues that
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international investment tribunals should apply not just customary international law,
but also domestic laws, drawn from both developed and developing countries,
regarding the protection of private property. These laws could form a ‘minimum
standard’ for the protection of property, as reflected in ‘general principles of law’.154

F. Conclusions
A survey of scholarly writings as well as the decisions of various tribunals reveals
that the concept of indirect expropriation remains unclear and inadequately defined
in international investment law. This problem causes a lack of consistency and
coherence of legal reasoning in international arbitral proceedings. In response to
vague legal rules, investment arbitrators have often disregarded the public law
perspective, and consequently, provided excessive protection to foreign investors.
This approach ultimately restrains the State’s sovereign right to regulate in the public
interest.
The problem of legal uncertainty is also attributed to the ad hoc nature of
commercial arbitration, which contributes to the dysfunctional development of the
standard of protection in investment treaties. Moreover, open-ended standards of
protection can directly impact investors, who may face unpredictable international
arbitration outcomes.
Consequently, there is growing criticism of the legitimacy of arbitration systems, and
a demand for interpretative guidance in order to mitigate the problem of vague treaty
texts. The special public-private bridging features of international investment
treaties, as mentioned above, indicates that a ‘public law approach’ to the
identification of the general principles of international law could provide this sort
after guidance for treaty interpretation. Ultimately, there is a need to develop a stable
legal framework with which to resolve legal ambiguities and to strike an appropriate
balance between public and private interests.
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To improve the consistency and coherence of legal reasoning of the vague provisions
in investment treaties, a universal set of general principles of public law could
provide constructive guidance for investment treaty interpretation. Deference to the
‘general principles of law’, through the comparative law study in the light of Article
31(3)(c) of the VCLT and Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, could enable the
identification of common legal principles, which synthesize domestic and
international legal principles that are universally recognized by civilized nations. It is
not suggested that arbitrators transplant doctrine, but that they take into account the
institutional settings, contextual factors and norms in which the common legal
principles are embedded. The resultant principles would establish generally
applicable legal standards and the coherence of legal reasoning, without the need to
favor any specific legal tradition or system.
The aim of the following Chapter, therefore, is to search for the innovative legal
rules that can contribute to the formation of a common legal doctrine in the field of
indirect expropriation law. To find these legal principles, a comparative public law
analysis of decisions by domestic courts, in the United States, Thailand and Mexico
and the jurisprudence developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
will be undertaken. The following chapter seeks to draw a clearer and more
comprehensive picture of the international rules on indirect expropriation.
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CHAPTER VI
REGULATORY TAKINGS UNDER THE US CONSTITUTION: THRESHOLDS,
CONTEXT AND EVOLUTION

The current United States Constitution guarantees the protection of individual rights
and freedoms. It also incorporates basic institutional limits on the government’s right
to take private property for public use. The Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution
(hereafter ‘the Takings Clause’) provides that ‘… nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation’.1 The provision thus imposes a legal
restriction on the government’s authority to seize private property without paying
just compensation. However, what constitutes a government action that is subject to
this ‘just compensation’ obligation is surrounded by controversy.
In relation to the Takings Clause, the US Supreme Court (‘the Court’) typically hears
two types of lawsuits; these are a ‘condemnation’ and a ‘taking’.2 While the former
lawsuit involves a formal expropriation, whereby the government takes possession of
a physical asset from a private property owner through legislation and in exchange
for a monetary payment, the latter involves a regulatory action affecting property for
which the property owner can obtain compensation only through litigation. The first
type of government action is clearly compensable; however, the latter has drawn
much attention and debate, due to the ambiguity surrounding the exact conduct that
ought to constitute a ‘regulatory taking’ and necessitate compensation under the
Takings Clause.
This Chapter aims to analyze the conceptualization of regulatory takings developed
by the US Supreme Court, and to identify the distinction between non-compensable
exercises of public authority and compensable regulatory takings. This Chapter
commences with a discussion of the original understanding of the Takings Clause
and examines the genesis of ideas regarding the proper relationship between
1

United States Constitution amend V.
Robert Meltz, 'Takings Decisions of the US Supreme Court: A Chronology' (Research Report No
97-122, Congressional Research Service, 20 July 2015) <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97122.pdf> 1.
2

165

government conduct and private property rights from the 19th century. It then
investigates takings jurisprudence as developed by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The examination will address evolving legal concepts through constitutional
interpretation by the Supreme Court from the early 19th century until the present. It
will be demonstrated that the Court’s rulings reflect a range of legal reasoning
approaches that have served to promote the prevailing legal values, norms and ideas
of justice of a particular period of time, within a matrix of social, economic and
political relations. Following this section, the Chapter examines recent trends in
judicial decision-making, and legal approaches that the Court has employed in
response to contemporary regulatory takings disputes. The Chapter will expose the
legal approaches that the Court has used to identify compensable regulatory takings
and will anticipate future cases that are likely to be resolved in this broad area of
law.

A. The Genesis and Historical Development of the Protection against
Property Takings in American Laws
Modern American takings law is largely based upon centuries of English legal
principles concerning the state sovereign right to control private property. Both the
genesis and subsequent development of American takings law reveal the
complexities associated with this issue and the dominant nature of political and
social structures within American society.
1. The Genesis and Conceptualization of State Sovereign Power in the Colonial
Period
In the US, takings law can be traced back to the 15th century.3 By the time
Christopher Columbus reached America in 1492, the ‘Doctrine of Discovery’ was
well established in the Christian World.4 As a consequence of the predominance of
Christianity, Western European nations claimed a divine right to take control of all
3
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the land in non-Christian countries and used Christian ideology to justify war,
colonization and slavery.5 The right of discovery was not surprisingly permeated in
American law and was intertwined with the notion of white supremacy, which
emphasized the superiority of Western civilization and Christianity over indigenous
people including Native American Indian people, tribes and their lands.6
Based on this concept, the English Crown empowered various agencies to establish
colonies in America, and legally infringed on sovereign rights and properties of the
American Indian nations.7 According to Power, various interest groups founded a
number of colonies. For example, Jamestown, which was established in 1607, was
founded by a London-based company; Plymouth Colony was founded in 1620 by the
Plymouth Company; and Maryland and Pennsylvania were established by a group of
businessmen in 1632 and 1681, respectively.8
In accordance with their exclusive rights to govern the newly founded areas, the
colonies’ settlers were granted the authority to enact laws to control and regulate the
land.9 In the early colonial period, most colonial charters followed the legal template
outlined within Magna Carta, in order to constrain any arbitrary exercise of power
by the King against the governed.10 Nearly all of the founding documents in the early
period with the exception of the colonial charter of Massachusetts and Carolina,
failed to incorporate a compensation requirement as a means of protecting individual
property rights.11 Rather than granting property holders a ‘substantive right’ to
protection against governmental intrusion on property rights, most colonial charters
and state constitutions imposed a requirement of ‘procedural regularity’.12 For
example, the 1683 New York Charter of Liberty and Privileges did not contain a just
compensation clause, but it followed Article 39 of Magna Carta (1215), by declaring
that ‘[n]o free man shall ... be dispossessed…except by the legal judgment of his
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peers or by the law of the land’.13 Pennsylvania’s Constitution similarly stated that a
‘freeman cannot be dispossessed of freehold without due process of law’.14
Likewise, in the Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey Chapter XVII, it
was declared that an individual cannot be deprived of real or personal property
‘without a due trial, and judgment passed by twelve good and lawful men of his
neighborhood’.15
As can be seen from these provisions, the taking of private property was generally
not subject to a compensation obligation. It revealed that colonial and early state
governments showed limited respect for the protection of private property rights.16
Although modeled on the British legal system, American legislative bodies were
granted absolute sovereignty and supreme legal authority over other political
institutions.17 As Gold observed, the legislature had ultimate power to determine the
circumstances under which compensation should be provided, in the absence of any
real democratic consensus, and the mere approval of state legislatures was sufficient
to take over individuals’ properties.18 As a consequence, a court could not order the
executive government to provide compensation unless an explicit compensation
requirement was incorporated within legislation.
Uncompensated takings by American executive governments, pursuant to
authorizing statutes, were widespread. Colonial governments regulated not only land
use, but also business operations and economic policies.19 An early Massachusetts
ordinance, for instance, provided that the state could seize the land title if the owner
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did not utilize the land within the period of three years.20 In Colonial Virginia, the
government could even seize land that had been improved, if the owner abandoned
it.21 In 1669, the General Assembly of Maryland enacted the Mill Act in order to
encourage individuals to build watermills.22 This Act allowed a person who wanted
to build a water-powered gristmill to obtain private land under an 80-year lease.
Even though compensation was required under this Act, it was for an amount less
than the market value of the land taken.23
In the early colonial period, ‘takings by executives, without approval by the
legislature’ drew much more attention than ‘uncompensated takings per se’.24
Although compensation was required when governmental interference deprived
people of their property rights, the executive and the courts had no obligation to pay
compensation if no obligation was imposed by the legislature, 25 or if the relevant
legislative instrument was construed as authorization to take property without
compensation.26 In practice, no colonial charter mandated compensation when a
legislative regulation affected private property rights, and courts generally did not
order compensation in such circumstances.
2. Declaration of Independence
During the colonial period, the British Empire exercised great influence over
colonial governments. Although the colonies had the authority to govern themselves,
their enacted legislation could not conflict with the main policies of the British
Parliament. To ensure the unity of the colonies, the British Parliament regulated the
colonies in many key areas, which included money printing, trade, warfare and tax
on sugar trade.27
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The extent of the control retained by the British Empire triggered dissatisfaction
among the governed and, in particular, merchants. Unfairly treated by the British
Empire, some American colonies rose against the imperial power of the
Parliament.28 As a result of widespread discontent, following Acts of the British
Parliament that deprived the governed of their protected rights and liberties,29
thirteen American colonies joined together to declare their independence from the
English Crown in 1776.30
Having experienced the threat of uncompensated legislative acquisition in the past,
three newly independent colonies - in search of a new system of law - adopted
constitutions that restricted governmental rights to expropriate property without
paying compensation. These were the Vermont Constitution of 1777, the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Despite
some variation within their legal text, all three constitutions similarly rejected the
uncompensated acquisition of property by the legislature.
(a) Vermont Constitution of 1777
Vermont was the first state to enact a Constitution, in 1777, to prevent the eminent
abuse of power by the legislature and executive.31 The Vermont Constitution
declared that:
private property ought to be subservient to public uses when necessity requires
it; nevertheless, whenever any particular man’s property is taken for the use of
the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money.32
This constitutional provision was implemented to resolve the growing distrust
towards governments that impeded the property rights of citizens. As Professor
Treanor has pointed out, this compensation requirement reflected the historic
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difficulty that the people of Vermont faced in 1764, when King George III had given
certain land to New York, and Vermont governors denied their citizen’s rights over
this land, despite the fact that they had originally held grants in relation to this from
New Hampshire.33 Through the passage of state legislation, the governors of New
York tried to deprive citizens of Vermont of possession and enjoyment of their
property rights in connection with this area of land.34 Following the Declaration of
Independence (1776), the Constitution was enacted to ensure that the state
legislatures amended legislation in order to provide greater protection for individual
rights and private property.
Whilst the Vermont takings clause required the sovereign power to appropriate
private property for public use in exchange for compensation, Gold has observed that
the clause did not clearly address whether or not there was a desire to safeguard
against regulatory takings.35
(b) Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
A compensation clause appeared in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.
Professor Treanor has pointed out that the inclusion of the compensation requirement
was a result of the ‘fear of legislatures and heightened concern for individual
rights’.36 During the period when the Constitution was drafted, there were enduring
conflicts between competing interest groups in society; including conflicts between
the patriots of farming interests on the one hand and liberal forces and the royalists
on the other hand.37 To ensure adequate property protection, the Massachusetts
Constitution declared that:
[N]o part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or
applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of
the people…[a]nd whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any
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individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable
38

compensation therefore.

Gold remarks that the Massachusetts Constitution embraced a new insight that was
different from the Vermont Constitution. Apart from the inclusion of the
compensation requirement, the Massachusetts Constitution stipulated that property
could not be taken without the consent of the owner or the state legislatures.39
Given the degree of its advancement of private property protection, it was unclear
whether this legal text was actually intended to provide compensation for ‘regulatory
takings’. Even though Theophilus Parsons, who was a member of the 1788
Massachusetts Convention and the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, supported a broad interpretation of the compensation clause to guard
against ‘indirect consequences of physical invasions of land’,40 the courts in Gedney
v Tewksbury (1807)41 and Perry v Wilson (1811)42 interpreted the clause narrowly to
cover only the acquisition of real property through formal expropriation laws, and
not through other legislative Acts in general.43 Case law jurisprudence was
inconsistent on the issue of whether the compensation clause was applicable to the
taking of physical property only or to all other cases dealing with regulatory takings.
(c) The Northwest Ordinance 1787
The Northwest Ordinance, which is sometimes referred as the ‘Ordinance of 1787’,
was a legislative act passed by the Confederation Congress of the United States.44
The Ordinance was enacted, not only to guarantee individual property rights, but
also, to function as a charter for the new states in the early period.45 The territory,
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subject to this Ordinance, included all the land in the west of Pennsylvania and
northwest of the Ohio River.46
The Ordinance was enacted to respond to social and economic issues that impacted
the stability of the national government. The first of these issues involved significant
political pressure arising from the increased migration of squatters and speculators to
the region. In order to bring the region and its land under the control of government,
the establishment of a law and order regime was perceived as essential to the
administration of the state government and the establishment of the land titles.47
The Ordinance included legal provisions that centered on the guarantee of individual
property rights48 as well as the prohibition of slavery in the Northwest.49 To guard
against the arbitrary taking of property, the Ordinance stated that: ‘
[n]o man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or the law of the land, and should the public exigencies make it
necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person's property, or to
demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same.
And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and
declared, that no law ought ever to be made or have force in the said territory,
that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts, or
engagement…50
Due to the unclear scope of its applicability, some legal commentators have asserted
that the protection afforded by the clause ought to be interpreted in the broadest
manner possible. Gold asserts that, according to an expansive reading of the legal
text, the takings clause includes not only physical assets, but also ‘contract rights’.51
Moreover, the clause itself was designed to protect business interests from ‘every
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conceivable government regulation’.52 A desire to protect private interests in the
Ordinance would arguably broaden the extent of protection as far as possible.
(d) Some Remarks on the Original Understanding of the Taking Clause and the
Regulatory Takings Issue
Following the outbreak of war between England and her American colonies, the 18th
century American state governments reserved the power to redress the failing
economy by adopting various economic regulations, including the taking of land
through legislative Acts. Nevertheless, according to a study by Harrington, there are
no reported cases on the issue of regulatory takings decided by colonial or
confederation courts.53 Harrington found that, in the aftermath of the civil war,
governments extensively used ‘eminent domain’ power to seize private property and
build important infrastructure and public facilities.54 However, he found that, in spite
of the extensive nature of land use regulation, there was little resistance against the
rights of legislatures to govern land ownership.55 In addition, Harrington discovered
that the concept of ‘regulatory taking’ was not a significant source of dispute in the
18th century.56 As opposed to the regulation of physical property and land ownership,
the central concern during this period related to breaches of contract and the burden
of debt, which could lead to hampered commercial development.57 Harrington claims
that because of the lack of evidence of any court consideration of regulatory takings,
the concept of a regulatory taking might not have been widely recognized and
developed by 18th century authorities and legal thinkers.58
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3. Bill of Rights, the Takings Clause and Compensation for Perceived Regulatory
Takings
In 1787, thirteen states joined into a federal union and adopted a Constitution
whereby they limited their own power by conferring authority, in some key areas, to
the national US government.59 The original US Constitution was enacted for the
purpose of economic development, and the central government was empowered to
carry out important fiscal policy tasks, such as tax levies and the control of money
supply.60 However, the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the US
Constitution in 1787 did not set out a clear position on the nature of the relationship
between the government and an individual’s private property.61
Due to the lack of an explicit statement regarding the relationship between
government power and individual rights, protected liberty and freedom, the Congress
added a ‘Bill of Rights’ to the Constitution in 1791 to restrict the sovereign’s power
over its citizens.62 The Bill of Rights took the form of ‘Ten Amendments’ to the
Constitution that focused on the protection of individual liberty and freedom.63
Among these newly inserted rights was the Fifth Amendment (or the Takings
Clause), which was uniquely added to guard against the taking of private property
for public interest. The Fifth Amendment was initially introduced by James Madison
in the First Congress convened in 1789, where he proposed an amendment to the
Constitution by giving more guarantees for individual rights and freedoms.64 It was
created mainly to respond to Anti-Federalists’ fears regarding the extensive powers
of the new national government to oppress the rights of the people through
confiscatory taxes and standing armies.65 As a strong supporter of the Federal
system, Madison proposed a way to alleviate these fears,66 through introducing legal
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provisions to prevent the national government from taking property from citizens
without payment.67
This newly adopted Fifth Amendment granted the Congress and national
government the power to take private property for public use.68 However, under this
Takings Clause, the property could not be taken without paying just compensation to
the property owner.69 Despite its broad ambit of property protection, the Takings
Clause was not used effectively. Skouras claims that during the 18th century the role
of the Federal government was so limited that each State tended to adopt its own
takings clause without being supervised or reviewed by the federal judiciary.70
Skouras found that during this time the control of property rights, especially land use
regulations, was largely dominated by local governments; the state authority
exercised ‘absolute dominion’ and the application of the federal Takings Clause was
limited.71
Since the issue of regulatory takings was not explicitly included at the time of
constitutional enactment,72 there is very little historical material to show that the
concept of regulatory takings was well received in the Takings Clause. 73 Treanor has
explored Madison’s concept of Takings, and has asserted that Madison himself
supported a narrow interpretation of the Takings Clause to preclude regulatory
takings. Madison drafted the text on his own initiative, and the Clause was not
proposed by any of the states that ratified the conventions.74 While the Taking
Clause represented a new development at the time of enactment, 75 it was rarely
enforced due to the authorities’ lack of understanding as to how the Clause should be
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implemented.76 As a result, the Clause arguably had limited value during this
founding period.
However, in the 19th century there was a shift in the US Supreme Court’s practice,
which started to legitimize greater federal involvement in local affairs. Due to a huge
transformation in the economic, social and demographic order, state governments
adopted a wide array of public policies.77 As a corollary, state governments tended to
implement policies that impacted upon constitutionally protected individual rights.
In response, the US Supreme Court started to hear judicial review cases, challenging
legislation and governmental actions that impacted individual rights protected by the
Constitution.78

B. The US Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Regulatory Takings:
Evolving Property Rights, Takings Jurisprudence and Compensation
Standards during the 19th and 20th Centuries
The development of jurisprudence on regulatory takings, reviewed under the Fifth
Amendment of the US Constitution, has been evolutionary. This Section reviews the
doctrines concerning regulatory takings that have been developed by the US
Supreme Court. It begins with the fundamental legal framework of the Takings
Clause. The evolving concepts of property protection, takings jurisprudence and
compensation standards are subsequently examined. This review starts from the
early 19th century and extends to the present.
1. The Takings Clause and Protection against Regulatory Takings
The Takings Clause of the US Constitution states that ‘[n]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.’ Under this Clause, the government
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can take property only for ‘public use’ and must pay ‘just compensation’ for the
property. The purpose of the Clause is to ensure that if the state seizes private
property, the owner must receive compensation in return.79
Two main types of lawsuits are considered by the courts pursuant to the Takings
Clause:

‘direct

condemnation’

and

‘inverse

condemnation’.80

A

‘direct

condemnation’ involves the exercise of eminent domain powers.81 This type of
government power is usually exerted via formal legislation that transfers ownership
from a private property owner to the state. In these circumstances, the government
obtains the property in exchange for compensation. ‘Inverse condemnation’, on the
other hand, occurs when the government takes property without using formal,
eminent domain power. When the government adversely affects a citizen’s private
property to the extent that the property owner loses an essential element of their
property rights, then a ‘taking’ may have occurred. Compensation for the loss of
property value, which has been indirectly taken, can only be obtained if the
aggrieved private party successfully sues the government in court.82
The types of government action that constitute a ‘direct condemnation’ are obvious
as they generally involve the acquisition of physical private property for state use, in
exchange for compensation. However, along with a persistent increase in the demand
for strong state regulations with the ability to respond to social problems, there has
also been an increase in regulatory interferences by the state that impact property
rights, but which do not involve a formal condemnation of a private property. Past
experiences demonstrate that ‘inverse condemnation’ involves a wide range of policy
regimes, including damage resulting from the denial of development permits, loss of
access to land, and the revocation of business licenses. The US Takings Clause has
thus extended to embrace all kinds of ‘regulatory takings’ that interfere with the use
and enjoyment of one’s private property. Even in the absence of physical seizure,
79
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regulatory interference can impose upon an owner of private property excessive
burdens, which justify regulatory compensation.
The difficulty involved in drawing a line between regulatory takings and actions that
fall short of takings, has led the Court to develop legal doctrines to identify when a
governmental interference constitutes a compensable taking under the US
Constitution. Prior to 1922, there were few cases concerning regulatory takings
disputes,83 and the disputes that were heard by the Court were generally decided in
favor of state authority.84 The concept of regulatory takings was first acknowledged
by the Court in the case of Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon in 1922 (‘Penn Coal
case’).85 The Penn Coal case changed the ‘landscape’ of takings analyses by
conferring more weight to the protection of private landowners.86
In this case, the Pennsylvania Coal Company granted H J Mahon ‘surface rights’ to
occupy the land. The Company; however, retained the ‘mineral rights’ under the
property. Mahon accepted the risks inherent within this division of property and
relinquished all his rights to claim for any damages caused by the mining activities.
However, after the enactment of the Kohler Act in 1921 (‘Kohler Act’),87 by the State
of Pennsylvania, which prohibited mining activities that could cause damage to
surface property, Mahon sued the Company to stop mining activities as determined
by the law.
Based on the opinion of Justice Oliver W Holmes Jr, the Court held that the
application of the Kohler Act was unconstitutional. The Court asserted that this law
destroyed the preexisting property rights of the Company, and interfered with their
negotiated contractual rights.88 The Court emphasized that, although the legislation
represented an exercise of the state’s ‘police power’ to prevent damage caused by
mining activities, state power ought to be subject to some limitations.89 The Court
determined that when the diminution in value ‘reaches a certain magnitude…there
83
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must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act’.90 By
mandating that all mining be undertaken in a manner that has no impact on the
subsidence of property, the Court decided that the statute rendered the coal company
‘commercially impracticable’. 91 In order to restrict such expansive use of regulatory
power, the Court held that ‘the general rule at least is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes “too far” it will be recognized as a
taking’ (emphasis added).92
Although the dictum in Penn Coal has provided more ideas with which to analyze
takings issues, compared with cases from the 18th and 19th centuries,93 the Court did
not explicitly define the scope of property, the nature of regulatory interference, or
the magnitude of impact that is equivalent to a physical taking and, therefore,
obligates the government to pay compensation to the property owner.94 Due to a lack
of specificity in dealing with regulatory takings, the US Supreme Court in
consequent cases developed a theory of takings law, grounded in the Fifth
Amendment, to more accurately identify when a regulatory taking amounts to an
expropriation, and the appropriate remedy for such regulatory takings.95
2. The Evolving Concepts of Compensable Regulatory Takings After 1922
Ever since the issue of regulatory takings was first raised in 1922, the Court has been
elaborating and developing the legal principles that govern regulatory takings
requiring compensation under the Takings Clause. In the context of constitutional
debate, the Court has developed new legal doctrines to delineate the scope of
property rights that ought to be protected under the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, the
Court has conceptualized takings law in a manner that distinguishes noncompensable regulatory takings from legitimate government police powers, and has
configured remedies to relieve the harm caused by regulatory takings.
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(a) Defining Protected Property in the Takings Clause
The US Constitution does not provide a clear definition of the types of property that
are to be protected from governmental interference. Generally, the Court interprets
the Takings Clause to encompass not only physical objects, but also anything else to
which a bundle of rights might attach.96 An expansive range of protected properties
was asserted by the Court in United States v General Motors Corp (1945).97 In this
case, the Court held that the scope of property protected under the Constitution is
broad, and includes ‘the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the
physical things, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it’.98 Under modern
takings law doctrine, the US Supreme Court maintains that a wide range of property
rights are subject to Constitutional protection. Generally, they include physical
property, contractual obligations, and investment-backed expectations.
(i) Physical property
Originally, the concept of private property protected under the Takings Clause was
understood as limited to only physical properties. This view of property dates back
to the work of Sir William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England.
In the opinion of Blackstone, property is ‘despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of
any individual in the universe’.99 Garrett Power points out that the ‘things’
mentioned by Blackstone were confined to land and movable properties, under
Roman law.100 Consistent with the concept developed by Blackstone, the Court in
the early period interpreted the Takings Clause narrowly, by protecting against a
‘seizure of physical asset’, and not against ‘regulations’ or ‘taxes affecting its
value’.101
In the 19th century, the Court continued embracing the original understanding of the
term property, by confining protection to ‘real property’. For example, in Pumpelly v
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Green Bay Co (1871),102 a case which involved a navigation improvement project
authorized by the Wisconsin legislature, the US Supreme Court held that ‘where real
estate is actually invaded…so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is
taking, within the meaning of the Constitution…’.103 This concept of property was
followed in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan in 1982,104 where the Court held that
the occupation of physical property permitted through state regulation could
constitute a taking under the Constitution. Despite the prominence of the notion of
physical possession, the Court has recently decided that a taking is not limited to
‘real property’, and could also include ‘personal property’. In Horne v Dep’t of
Agriculture (Horne II),105 Chief Justice John Roberts (writing for the majority),
referred to the history of expropriation law and held that personal property should
gain no less protection than real property. The legislation in this case, which required
farmers to transfer a portion of their raisin crops to the government in order to
maintain price stability in the market, was equivalent to the taking of physical
property, and was therefore subject to compensation under the Takings Clause.
(ii) Contractual Obligations
The jurisprudential concept of property has evolved to include intangible properties.
Originally, contractual obligations were protected under the Contract Clause of the
US Constitution.106 However, the Takings Clause has become an increasingly
important tool for the protection of a wide range of property rights, including
contractual obligations.107
Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld, a professor from Yale Law School, asserts that when
we take into account market realities, property can be appreciated as a ‘very complex
aggregate of rights…which…naturally have to do with the [asset] in question’.108
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Therefore, property encompasses not only the physical thing, but also other
predominant elements that create valuable interests.109
In keeping with Hohfeld’s conception of property rights, the US Supreme Court
developed takings jurisprudence in the 20th Century that indicated that the State
might be liable under the Takings Clause when governmental regulation impairs
contractual rights. In the Penn Coal case,110 for example, where the newly enacted
Pennsylvania statute prevented the mining company from mining, the Court held that
the legislation impaired contractual obligations between the coal company and the
land owner,111 which deprived the coal company of its rights.112
Following the Penn Coal case, the Court decided in Omnia Commercial Co v United
States,113 that contractual rights could constitute property within the context of the
Takings Clause. In this case, the government ordered steel from Allegheny for a
period of one year following the First World War. The government’s order
essentially forced the company to fail to fulfill its contractual obligations to Omnia its existing contractual party. The Supreme Court ruled that Omnia’s contractual
rights represented a ‘property’ within the Takings Clause.114 The Court in
subsequent cases, including Lynch v United States,115 Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v Radford,116 and Armstrong v United State,117 has similarly held that
contractual obligations fall within the scope of property rights protected under the
Takings Clause, and that a violation of these rights could trigger a compensatory
obligation.
(iii) Investment-Backed Expectations
The US Supreme Court has further broadened the scope of property protection by
including the notion of an ‘investment-backed expectation’ within the meaning of
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constitutionally protected property rights under the Taking Clause. 118 The Court first
introduced the concept of ‘investment-backed expectation’ in Penn Central
Transportation Co v New York (1978) (the ‘Penn Central’ case).119 Without much
elaboration, it held that although a government regulation might result in an
economic harm, it would not be a taking if it did not interfere with ‘interests that
were sufficiently bound with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to
constitute property for the Fifth Amendment purposes’120 (emphasis added).
A compensation claim based upon governmental interference with an investmentbacked expectation, was referred to again in 1992. In Lucas v South Carolina
Coastal Council case (‘Lucas case’),121 which concerned the State’s enactment of a
law that prohibited the construction of permanent building in the controlled coastal
zone, the Court relying on the trial court’s ruling, held that this law rendered Lucas’s
land valueless and was subject to a compensatory obligation. To support this judicial
decision, Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, maintained that an owner’s
expectations are a critical factor in the takings analysis, even in circumstances where
a regulation denies all economically beneficial use.122 The Court also asserted that
the property interests protected must not contradict restrictions imposed by the
‘background principles of nuisance law’;123 otherwise, the plaintiff could not sue for
compensation as the regulation could not be said to have impacted any lawful right
of the owner.
Whilst an investment-back expectation could constitute a property right that is
entitled to protection, the property owner must have ‘substantial good faith’ based
upon governmental acts, and the protected expectation must not be a mere
expectation.124 The economic impact of governmental interference is not the only
important interpretative factor, as the property owner needs to also establish that the
measure disrupts the returns that the owner could reasonably expect to flow from the
118
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established investment. If there is a sudden change in the regulatory framework, then
the property owner’s expectation is impacted and should be protected.125
(b) The Development of Takings Analysis in the Fifth Amendment
Following the US Supreme Court’s decision in the Penn Coal case in 1922, the
Court has developed a body of takings jurisprudence to indicate when and under
what conditions regulatory interference is subject to a compensatory obligation under
the US Constitution. From 1922 until the present, the Court has utilized various tests
and analytical methods. An analysis of relevant jurisprudence indicates that there are
five basic types of regulatory takings: (i) police powers, (ii) per se takings, (iii) lessthan-total takings, (iv) undue conditions and (v) judicial takings.
(i) Police Powers
Generally, the use of government regulations is premised on the implied state
authority to protect public safety, health and the morality of its citizens.126 The state
authority to restrict use of private property in order to protect public interests can be
traced back to Chief Justice John Marshall’s reasoning in Brown v State of Maryland
in 1827,127 which stated that ‘the police power…unquestionably remains, and ought
to remain, with the States…The removal or destruction of infectious or unsound
articles is, undoubtedly, an exercise of that power…’128 The power to regulate
property rights for public benefits can be inferred from the necessity of government
action to protect public welfare. The predominance of the government’s police
powers was reinforced in subsequent cases, such as Munn v People of Illinois
(1876),129 and Hadacheck v Sebastian (1915).130
In modern times, the justification of the use of police powers, even when it results in
the diminishing of a property’s value, is recognized by the Court. Although there is
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no specific constitutional clause for the police powers, Article 1, Section 8 of the US
Constitution grants Congress legislative powers to ‘make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof’.131 This clause confers upon Congress wide latitude
to enact laws that are ‘necessary and proper’ for the state authorities to carry on their
functions. The US Supreme Court has endorsed the idea of police power contained in
Article 1, Section 8 by holding that ‘[t]he Constitution…withhold[s] from Congress
a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation’
(emphasis added).132
The Court constitutionally reaffirmed the police power as an implied noncompensable regulation in the landmark case of Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty
Co.133 In this case, the company alleged that the zoning ordinance enforced by the
Village of Euclid, which limited the use of property for residential purposes only,
caused a reduction in the value of the Ambler company’s property. Although the
lower court found that the ordinance was unconstitutional and amounted to a taking,
the US Supreme Court overruled the lower court’s decision. The Court considered
the zoning ordinance to be constitutional, and held that the ordinance was justified as
a means to advance public interests. Affirming that the measure was a valid exercise
of police power, the Court concluded that ‘the reasons are sufficiently cogent to
preclude us from saying… that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare’.134
(ii) Per se Takings
Another type of taking occurs when government action is so extreme as to deprive a
property owner of all use of, and value in, their private property rights. There are two
ways in which a ‘per se taking’ can arise: (1) a permanently authorized occupation
and invasion of private property for government use, and (2) a deprivation of all

131

United States Constitution art I §8.
United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 566 (1995) cited in Legarre, above n 126, 778.
133
Village of Euclid v Ambler Reality Co, 272 US 365 (1926) (‘Euclid’).
134
Ibid 395.
132

186

economic use of the property. To identify these regulatory takings, the Court
generally takes into account only the impact of the measure imposed on the property
owner, regardless of the State’s intent behind the measure.
The first type of regulatory taking occurs when a government grants third party
rights to occupy a property permanently for public use.135 One of the most prominent
decisions was handed down in 1982 in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.136 In this case, the landowner was forced to permit a third party to install
permanent cable lines on their building. Followed the ruling in Pumpelly v Green
Bay & Mississippi Canal Co (1871),137 where a government-authorized flooding
program was considered as a taking of property, the US Supreme Court decided in
favor of the landowner. It held that the permanent occupation of the private property
destroyed the owner’s right to exclude the third party. Even though the government
argued that the occupation of physical property was for public benefits, the Court
maintained that physical invasion is subject to compensation, no matter how minor
the impact is.138
In 1987, the US Supreme Court consequently upheld that a ‘temporary’ physical
occupation can also be a taking under the Taking Clause. In First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v Lost Angeles County,139 the Court
ordered the government to pay compensation for a denial of the use of property even
for a limited period of time. Despite being only a temporary restriction, the Court
asserted that ‘temporary regulatory takings’ are no different from permanent
takings.140
The second type of per se taking results from a government regulation that causes a
complete ‘deprivation of all use or value of property’.141 In 1992, for example, the
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Supreme Court decided in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal142 that a compensable
taking can occur when the government measure takes away all economically
beneficial use of that property.143 However, the Supreme Court also held that the
duty to compensate might be exempted if the said law or regulation simply reflects a
limitation that already exists within the law of private or public nuisance.144 In this
respect, when the property rights in question constitute a nuisance, the property
owner whose property rights are subject to regulatory interference has no right to sue
in relation to this interference and no compensation is owed by the state under the
Takings Clause.145 In 2015, the Court reaffirmed that a ‘physical taking’ could apply
not just for real property, but also for personal property. In Horne v Dep’t of
Agriculture (Horne II),146 which concerned a dispute regarding the National Raisin
Reserve policy, the Court held that the reserve requirement by the government
constituted the taking of property under the Fifth Amendment and the Government
could not avoid the duty to pay compensation, despite the fact that the farmers were
simply required to remove a portion of harvested raisins from the market so as to
resolve the problem of market price instability. The Supreme Court also held that the
Fifth Amendment does not give less protection to personal property than real
property. The Government’s requirement to take a portion of harvested raisins off
the market was regarded as the taking of physical property, and this was considered a
compensable taking under the Constitution.
(iii) Less-than-Total Takings
Another significant form of taking, endorsed by the US Supreme Court, involves
government takings actions that deprive a property of some value, but not necessary
all value.147 In this less extreme case, the Court has indicated that it is relevant to
consider a range of ‘ad hoc’ facts. As there is no set formula with which to predict
the legal outcome under such circumstances, this doctrine is very much fact
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specific.148 To identify whether the governmental interference amounts to a
compensable taking, the Court needs to utilize more complex analytical mechanisms.
Normally under this category of taking, the Court considers whether the property
owner unfairly bears a disproportionate burden, which should be borne by the
society in general.149
The concept of less-than-total takings was first introduced by the Court in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v City of New York (1978).150 In this case the Plaintiff
was prevented by the state from carrying out alterations on the Grand Central Station
landmark building. The Court held that not all use of, and value in, the property was
taken and there was no specific rule to decide when a compensable taking had taken
place. However, the Court admitted that to maintain ‘justice and fairness’, its
analysis required ‘essentially ad hoc, factual enquiries’ to balance three factors,
which are the (1) character of the governmental action, (2) economic impact
attributed to the regulation, and (3) extent to which the regulation interfered with
investment-backed expectations.151 In considering all of these factors, the Court
found that the landmark building law did not totally prevent the owner from use of
the property and the property owner could still use it as if there was no regulation.
In the Penn Central case, the Court also rejected the segmentation or separation of
property interests.152 The Court held that the case must be ‘decided on the premise
that the entire parcel served as a basis for the taking claims’.153 As Justice O’Connor
asserted, this ‘whole parcel’ approach makes it very hard for the Court to find a
taking, as a diminution in the value of property caused by regulation may represent a
very small fraction of the entire property.154 If the ‘whole parcel’ is defined broadly,
the Court is less likely to find a taking. Conversely, if the ‘whole parcel’ is defined
narrowly, it is much easier for the Court to identify the emergence of a taking.155
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The reasoning within Penn Central was referred to by the US Supreme Court in
subsequent cases. In Palazzolo v Rhode Island,156 for example, the Claimant sued
and claimed that the wetland regulation, issued by the Rhode Island Coastal
Resource Management Council, constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment as
it resulted in the denial of the Claimant’s project, leading to a deprivation of all
economic use of property. The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected Palazzolo’s
appeal for two main reasons. The first was that the land still had some economic
value and so the Claimant could not challenge based on the total taking principle
developed in the Lucas case. The second reason was that the Claimant had no legal
stance to challenge the regulation as he acquired the land after the regulation had
been put in place and, therefore, no reasonable expectation to enjoy the property
could be expected by Claimant.
In an appeal to the US Supreme Court, this decision was partially reversed. The
Court held that the Claimant still had the right to challenge the regulation even
though the land was purchased after the regulation was enforced. The Court also held
that, as the property was not totally deprived of value, the Claimant could not claim
the right to sue under the Takings Clause based on the denial of all economic use of
the property. However, the Court asserted that to decide whether a taking existed,
several factors had to be considered, and these included (among other things): the
economic impacts of the regulation, the characteristic of the measure and the extent
of any interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. The Court did
not decide whether or not the regulation violated the investment-back expectation,
causing a compensable taking. Instead, the Court remanded the case back to the State
Court for a reconsideration of whether the measure was a taking, in light of the
doctrine in Penn Central as opposed to the pure application of Lucas’s per se rule.157
In 2002, the Court adopted the balancing principle in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.158 In this case, the Court found that
moratoria were not a per se taking, regardless of the extent to which a moratorium
affects property rights. The Court reaffirmed the adoption of the case-by-case
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approach and the ad hoc balancing test from the Penn Central case to support its
argument.159
The ruling from Penn Central was applied recently in Arkansas Game & Fish Comm
v US,160 which involved a government-induced flooding program. The Court held
that despite being temporary, it could be a taking. The Court refused to rely upon a
per se analysis when analyzing whether the temporary flooding constituted a taking.
It, on the other hand, asserted that impact is not the only decisive factor; rather, all
pertinent elements, such as severity, duration, character of parcel and owner’s
legitimate expectation regarding property use, need to be considered.
(iv) Undue Conditions
Takings claims might concern the ‘required dedications’ or ‘conditions’ that
governments impose on property for the use of a portion of property or land in
exchange for issuing development permits. These requirements may appear in
different forms, such as enforced dedications and charges.161 This type of regulation
may be regarded as a taking if the regulatory conditions make the property owner
bear an excessive burden and if it lacks the established linkage between the means
and the goals of the implementing regulation.
The Court first introduced the doctrine in 1987 in Nollan v California (the ‘Nollan
case’).162 In this case, the Court reviewed the regulation that the California Coastal
Commission (the CCC) enforced on the beachfront property owned by the Nollan
family, which involved the imposition of a public easement in exchange for a permit
to build a new house in place of the family’s old bungalow. The Commission
asserted that the easement requirement was essential to promote public interests as
the new house allegedly blocked the view of the ocean. The Court, nevertheless,
decided in favor of the property owner as the conditions were excessively
burdensome and did not represent an ‘essential nexus’ between the required
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dedication and the harm the community must bear.163 To decide the issue, the Court
examined the nature and characteristic of the state’s required dedication by
investigating whether it would ‘further the end advanced as the justification for the
prohibition’.164 The Court found that although the construction of the house
prevented public access to the beach, Justice Scalia, writing the judgment for the
Court’s majority, held that the state’s required dedication lacked an essential nexus
between a legitimate state interest and the permit condition.165 In the Court’s point of
view, the condition must bear the same policy goal as that which is required to truly
resolve the problem.166 The Court found that the conditions imposed by the
Commission were unconstitutional and amounted to a taking that needed
compensation.
Subsequently in 1994, in Dolan v City of Tigard (the ‘Dolan case’),167 the Court
developed a more thorough approach to examine unconstitutional regulations as a
form of regulatory taking. Aside from the requirement of a close nexus between the
imposed conditions and the impact of the development, the exaction must also
satisfy a ‘rough proportionality’ test,168 whereby the required dedication is
proportional to the adverse impact caused by the proposed development.169 The
Court held in this case that there was a taking as the City of Tigard could not show
that its requirement of public access onto greenway was proportional to the impact
suffered by the landowner.170
In 2013, the Court held in Koontz v St. Johns River Water Management District171
that the conditions must comply with the ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ tests
developed by the Supreme Court in Nollan and Dolan cases. In this case, the Court
found that the issuance of a permit based on the requirement that the licensee must
improve property owned by the state was unconstitutional and constituted a taking.
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(v) Judicial Takings
Recently, the US Supreme Court expanded its takings jurisprudence to encompass
judicial takings. This legal concept was mentioned by the US Supreme Court in Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v Florida Department of Environmental
Protection.172 This case concerned a Florida law,173 which permitted the State
authority to restore sand on eroded beaches that were hard hit by hurricanes. The
District Court of Appeal for the First District upheld the Petitioner’s challenge,
stating that the program impacted the waterfront landowners as the new beach areas
were open to the public and this resulted in the deterioration of private property
holder’s common law littoral rights, without any compensation.174 However, the
Florida Supreme Court reversed the decision of the First District holding that, in
accordance with the property law of Florida, the landowners never possessed the
alleged rights and were not entitled to compensation.175
After considering the case, the US Supreme Court, by a vote of 8-0, decided in favor
of the State and held that the program did not cause a taking under the Fifth
Amendment, since the landowners could not convince the Court that the said
property belonged to them. Despite a unanimous decision favoring state sovereign
rights, there were diverse views regarding the appropriate conceptual framework
applicable to the consideration of the takings issue. Four members of the Supreme
Court delivered a new concept of judicial taking. The opinion of Justice Scalia, who
was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence
Thomas, declared that the Takings Clause is applicable, not only to takings via
administrative actions, but also to judicial actions.176 Justice Scalia stated that ‘[t]he
Takings Clause is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or branches. It is
concerned simply with the act, and not with the government actor’.177 The remaining
four Justices decided the case without referring to the issue of judicial takings, and
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held that it was adequate to refer to the protection of property rights under the Due
Process Clause of the US Constitution.178
The split decision in this case leaves the issue of judicial takings unsettled. Some
commentators remark that the failure to reach a majority in this case contributes to
uncertainty regarding the manner in which the Court will approach similar issues in
the future.179 If this principle were to be endorsed, it would complicate the issue of
regulatory takings and add further difficulties, particularly in relation to the judicial
power of the state courts.180 Furthermore, if this principle is accepted, this would
provide more grounds for litigation by plaintiffs who are dissatisfied with the
decisions of the courts.181
Based on all testing criteria examined above, it can be seen that the US Supreme
Court has developed many useful principles to guard private property rights under a
vague Takings Clause. Despite becoming increasingly focused on the protection of
private property, the jurisprudence developed by the Court still provides little
guidance as to how the takings doctrine ought to be adopted and applied. It is
apparent that rather than focusing on a single formula, the Court tends to decide the
case on a case-by-case basis, and not to overprotect private interests at the expense
of public welfare.
(c) The Remedies for Regulatory Takings under the Takings Clause
Generally, the Fifth Amendment requires that government pay just compensation
when private property is taken for public purposes. However, in the context of
regulatory takings, there is much debate regarding how much to pay the injured
party.

178

Ibid 721-722.
Timothy M Mulvaney, 'Uncertainties Remain for Judicial Takings Theory' (2010) 24 Probate &
Property 11.
180
Jared Policicchio, 'Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v Florida Department of Environmental
Protection' (2011) 35 Harvard Environmental Law Review 541, 551-3.
181
Mulvaney, above n 179, 13.
179

194

(i) Compensation and the Amount of Fair Market Value
In American practice, the exact quantity of compensation rests upon the
government’s discretion, and a court has no direct authority to determine the amount
of monetary damages that ought to be paid to the aggrieved property owner.182
Generally, when the regulation is considered as a permanent taking, the government
has the option to decide whether to keep the regulation in place or to revoke it.183 If
the government decides to keep it in place permanently, the amount of compensation
is calculated on the basis of the fair market value of the property in question at the
time the taking occurred.184 On the other hand, if the government decides to revoke
the measure, such a measure becomes a temporary taking, and damages are usually
calculated with reference to the fair value of the property only during the period of
taking.185
Monetary compensation has been confirmed by the US Supreme Court from time to
time. In order to confer adequate protection, the US Supreme Court in United States
v Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.186 indicated that just compensation has to
involve the payment of ‘fair market value’.187 Although it is hard to ensure an
accurate amount, fair market value is considered as the ‘second-best’ method of
placing the property owner in a subjectively equivalent situation to one in which the
property was never taken.188
The Court asserts that fair market value should offer the property owner ‘what a
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller at the time of the taking’.189 Fair
market value for both permanent and temporary takings was explained in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v County of Los Angeles in 1987 (the ‘First
English case’).190 In this case, the Court endorsed the constitutionality of
compensation as a remedy for regulatory takings. The Supreme Court held that if a
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government regulation amounts to a taking, then the court may revoke it or leave it
in place. If the government carries out a temporary measure, it must pay
compensation calculated from the date the regulation is imposed to the date it is
removed.191 On the other hand, if the government decides to keep the regulation in
place, the compensation must be paid for a permanent taking, based on the full fair
market value of the taken property.192
After introducing a monetary compensation obligation for regulatory takings in the
First English case, the Supreme Court followed this doctrine closely in subsequent
cases by requesting fair market value compensation in response to findings of
regulatory takings.193 In 2015, the Court in Horne v Department of Agriculture
(Horne II) reaffirmed that ‘just compensation normally is to be measured by the
market value of the property at the time of the taking.’194
(ii) Other Remedies
Although compensation is common, the US Supreme Court has also recognized
other forms of reparation for the violations suffered by property owners. With regard
to ‘non-monetary compensation’,195 the US Supreme Court in Agins v City of
Tiburon196 held that compensation obligations are limited to claims concerning
takings made in accordance with the government’s eminent domain powers; that is,
when the government appropriates private property through formal legislation. The
Court asserted that the compensation duty was not available to other forms of
regulatory interference, since the protection under the Fifth Amendment should be
interpreted narrowly. To redress injury from regulatory takings, the Court held that
the only appropriate remedy is ‘declaratory relief’, which simply requires the courts
to determine rights, duties or obligations without ordering monetary damages, or a
‘mandamus to invalidate the offending regulation’, which is an order from the court
to any government agency to suspend an invalid legal order.197 Despite the
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introduction of a new approach to redress the injury caused by a taking, the Supreme
Court in this subsequent case questioned whether the proposed remedy was
sufficient to relieve the impact.198
In some cases, the Court similarly held that monetary damages might not be the only
remedy for a taking, but might include other forms of equitable relief. In Eastern
Enterprises v Apfel,199 for example, Eastern Enterprises challenged the
constitutionality of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (the ‘Coal Act’),
which required coal companies to pay money into a fund run by a private entity to
fund the pensions of former employees.200 The majority concluded that the Coal Act
constituted a taking. Although the Court admitted that compensation is the major
remedy for a taking,201 it asserted that in this situation the Plaintiff could not claim
compensation from the state authority.202 Rather than paying compensation directly
to the Plaintiff, the Court ordered declaratory relief as well as an injunction, asking
the coal companies to indirectly pay money into the pension fund of the
employees.203
In addition to monetary compensation, the courts may find that a government can use
‘transferable development rights’ (TDRs) as a tool to mitigate the negative impact
caused by regulatory takings.204 Since property is conceptualized as a ‘bundle of
rights’, ‘development rights’ are also included as a part of property. 205 Under the
TDRs regime, the government may allow an individual landowner, impacted by a
regulatory taking, to trade his/her development rights in restricted areas to other
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potential parcel landowners who can make use of such development rights in other
non-restricted areas.206
The concept of TDRs was briefly discussed by the US Supreme Court, in the context
of regulatory takings, in Penn Central.207 In this case, the Court found that despite
the emergence of a taking, TDRs ‘undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens
the law imposed…[and] are to be taken into account in considering the impact of the
regulation’.208 Later, the US Supreme Court in Suitum v Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (‘Suitum’)209 reaffirmed the availability of TDRs as a choice of remedy
within a takings dispute. In this case, which involved the deprivation of land use by a
very strict environmental control law imposed by the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TRPA), Mrs. Suitum was offered no direct relief in terms of monetary
compensation, but to preserve the landowner’s asset value, she was encouraged to
relocate the right to use the land from the prohibited area to an area where
development was encouraged. Although she had the authority to transfer her
development rights, she did not do so and, instead, filed a claim before the courts
pursuant to the agency’s breach of substantive due process requirements. Although
the lower courts held that the Petitioner’s action for compensation was unripe to be
admissible, the US Supreme Court reversed and confirmed that the case was ripe to
be reviewed under the Fifth Amendment, even though the property owner did not
attempt to sell the development rights she had.210 Whilst the main issue was related
to the ripeness of the case for litigation, Justice Scalia addressed in his judgment the
role of TDRs in redressing injury. In his words:
TDRs can serve a commendable purpose in mitigating the economic loss suffered by
an individual whose property use is restricted, and property value diminished, but not
so substantially as to produce a compensable taking. They may also form a proper
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part, or indeed the entirety, of the full compensation accorded a landowner when his
property is taken.211

In this respect, the Court held that the government could not avoid liability for the
taking despite the fact that the state was executing a legitimate measure. Instead of
awarding monetary damages, the Court accepted the use of TDRs as a means to
relieve the impact resulting from regulatory takings.
While TDRs appear to be an effective method of alleviating the financial burden
attributed to regulatory takings, they may not be an effective remedial approach. One
commentator argues that, since TDRs engage with an exchange of marketable rights,
a government agency might have some difficulty in finding a ‘well-functioning’
market that makes the trading of TDRs feasible.212 Moreover, the transferring of
development rights to others might not gain support from local communities in areas
impacted by increasing density and decreasing property value, due to the mounting
congestion and pollution within these areas.213

C. The Evaluation of Future Directions in Takings Jurisprudence
The review of successive regulatory takings cases reveals that that the US Supreme
Court has applied various conceptual frameworks to the analysis of compensable
regulatory takings. The unsettled nature of takings law gives rise to different views
of what kind of legal principle should prevail over others. The following section
illustrates the existing tensions and evaluates trends in takings law doctrines.
1. The Inconsistent Legal Doctrines of Regulatory Takings Analysis
The historical development of takings jurisprudence in the United States reveals that
the founders of the Constitution adopted a ‘libertarian attitude’ towards property.214
The protection of property rights was drawn as a principle of ‘natural law’, which
places the utmost importance on individual liberties and freedoms.215 Originally, the
211

Ibid 749-750.
Radford, above n 206, 696.
213
Chiodelli, above n 204, 7.
214
Carol M Rose, 'Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence - An
Evolutionary Approach' (1990) 57 Tennessee Law Review 577, 582 (‘Property Rights’).
215
Eric R Claeys, 'Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights' (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review
1549, 1553.
212

199

Constitution’s framers wanted to protect the people from the abuses of British
power.216 To ensure that the people’s rights are to be properly protected, the
American Bill of Rights was created to protect citizens, following the declaration of
independence from Britain. With a strong position favoring property protection, the
framers of the Constitution ‘thought that the law of property is an institution through
which a rightly-ordered regime assures a domain of autonomy and individuality in
the citizenry’.217
Apart from protecting individuals’ rights, the property rights regime was also
instrumental in promoting the ‘national wealth and strength’ of the country.218
During the time in which the Constitution was drafted, the framers perceived a
linkage between private property and national power.219 To make the nation wealthy
and powerful, a strong system of property rights protection was essential to prevent
‘a commercial republic from internal threats to private property’. The framers
believed that ‘if everyone were secure in his property, everyone would invest more
time and effort in that property, and make the property even more valuable. And in
turn, this would have positive consequences for the nation’s wealth and strength’.220
Moreover, strong property protection schemes would allow owners to trade their
properties more freely in markets.221 For these reasons, a strong political regime
towards property rights protection greatly contributed to the unification of the
Confederation.
Although the Fifth Amendment guaranteed fundamental property rights, the original
understanding and scope of the Takings Clause was narrow, and limited to the
protection of physical seizure by governments. Therefore, whilst used in the context
of eminent domain issues, which concern the appropriation of physical property by
the government through formal legislation, the Clause was rarely applied to
216
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regulatory takings claims, which involve situations where the use of private property
is limited by a government regulation, resulting in the deprivation of economical use
or the value of the property equivalent to expropriation.
Nevertheless, there was a shift in the judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause in
the early 20th century when the Supreme Court’s first real regulatory taking case was
heard in 1922, in the Penn Coal case.222 Despite its vague formulation, the Court’s
decision indicated that regulatory takings could occur if the regulatory interference
causes too much intrusion on property use. This doctrine extended the protection of
private property rights and provided a more favorable test for property owners to be
protected from a wide range of regulatory interferences.
The prominent role of private property protection was also emphasized in Loretto v
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp in 1982,223 where a New York statute was
challenged by a landlord for giving to a third party a state-authorized power to install
cable TV facilities on the private property without paying compensation. This case
was significant as it represented a strict ruling on the protection of property rights. In
Loretto, the Supreme Court found that a permanent physical occupation of property
by a third party pursuant to a state-authorized regulation is a taking, regardless of
how severe the impact of the measure is.224 In this case, the Court made clear that it
did not question the validity of the State authority in regulating property rights.
In light of the development of takings law jurisprudence, it becomes apparent that
the Court is increasingly concerned with the promotion of property rights protection,
adding a greater range of property rights to be protected under the Takings Clause.
Although the Court limited its protection to tangible property at the beginning of its
jurisprudence, the Court gradually included other types of intangible assets. Through
its extensive protection of property rights, the Court’s decisions now favor an
expansive definition of property and the underpinning concept of compensation.
Nevertheless, the Court also limited private interests through its non-compensable
‘police power’ doctrine. The preservation of State’s strict police powers appears in
222
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the Supreme Court’s opinions throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. For example, in
Munn v People of Illinois (1876),225 in which a private business alleged
unconstitutional regulation carried out by the State of Illinois to limit maximum
prices for the storage of grain in warehouses, the Court held that the General
Assembly of Illinois did not commit a taking violating the Constitution. Since grain
storage facilities were used to serve public purposes, the prices charged were subject
to regulatory control. To uphold the state’s police powers, the Supreme Court
concluded that the state had the authority to control the use of private property that
was linked to a public interest.226 Likewise in Hadacheck v Sebastian,227 which
concerned a prohibition on the operation of brickyards within the city limits, the
Court held that a Los Angeles ordinance was not a taking requiring compensation,
since the banning was regarded as ‘the imperative necessity… [that] precludes any
limitation upon [them] when not exerted arbitrarily’.228 The police power of
government to regulate property was also mentioned by the Court in the Lucas case
in 1992.229 The Court held in that case that the governmental regulation of land
completely deprived the landowner of economic benefits,230 but that the government
could be exempted from compensatory obligations if it could prove that the
regulation, despite causing economic loss to private property, was used to prevent
harm arising from a use of property that constitutes a nuisance.231
The police power, however, is not universal. In Penn Coal, the Court explained that:
[The police power] must have its limits… One fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation
to sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts…232
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged the longstanding tension between the
protection of individual rights and the government’s legitimate power to restrict the
freedom of its citizens in order to serve the public good.233
2. Towards the Finding of an Overall Balance of Interests
Today, regulatory controls on private property use are much more complicated. Due
to changing political and social structures, the Supreme Court will not single out
certain legal rights deserving of special constitutional protections. However, there is
a need to articulate takings law principles that are able to ‘create reciprocity of
advantage to all to whom it applies… to avoid singling out a few individuals, to
restrain regulatory excesses, to harmonize competing uses, and to encourage
investment’.234
To define the occurrence of compensable takings, the Supreme Court developed the
three-factor test, as formulated in Penn Central, which attempts to strike a balance
between regulations and their impact on private property.235 Except in circumstances
where there has been a total deprivation of all value in, or use of, property rights, the
Court has affirmed that there is no settled formula with which to determine whether a
taking is compensable. In considering whether a measure that falls short of the total
destruction of property value is a compensable taking, a number of significant
factors must be evaluated together; these include the economic impact, investmentbacked expectation, and the character of the government interference. 236 The takings
analysis developed by the Court in Penn Central created a balancing test requiring
the examination of these three factors in every case.
Additional guidelines emerged in the cases of Nollan and Dolan. These cases
provide a suitable model for the examination of a fair balance between the measure
and the impact of the conditions imposed on property owners. Whilst adopting
different approaches, the Court in both of these cases attempted to consider
233
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important factors on all sides of the issue to define a compensable taking. While
Nollan v California Coastal Commission

237

held that, to be non-compensable, the

regulatory conditions must genuinely advance governmental purposes and satisfy an
‘essential nexus’ between the negative private impact of the development project and
the public benefit associated with the easement that crossed the owner’s property,238
the Court also held in Dolan v City of Tigard239 that the measure must meet the
‘rough proportionality’ test, by which the conditions in a development permit must
be proportional to the negative impacts of the proposed development. 240 If the
government fails to satisfy these requirements, the regulatory interference would be
deemed to have caused a compensable taking under the Takings Clause.
The significance of the Nollan and Dolan decisions is their contribution to judicial
analysis in other exaction cases. In the recent case of Knootz v St. John River Water
Management District,241 the Court based its analysis on the Nollan and Dolan
criteria. In that case, the District Water Management demanded money to pay for
public land improvements as a condition for the approval of the requested
development permit.242 The Court held that even though the property was not
actually taken by the government, the exactions imposed by the District
‘impermissibly burden[ed] the right not to have property taken without just
compensation’.243
The Supreme Court’s decisions in these cases reflect ‘accountability for government
agencies charged with protecting and improving the public interest and empowered
with broad discretion to achieve those goals’.244 By subjecting the conditions of
approval to the Nollan and Dolan standards, some commentators view these tests as
providing a strong reaffirmation of the need for a fair balance between government’s
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broad discretionary power to achieve public interest goals and the accountability that
government has to achieve in order to protect individual interests.245
In addition to the judiciary, the federal government and a number of state legislatures
have become aware of the problem of regulatory burden. In 1988, for example,
President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order requiring that all federal agencies
undertake a ‘takings impact analysis’ before carrying out any proposed action that
could potentially impact property owners and be construed as a taking. 246 This
presidential Executive Order required agencies to:
(1) Identify clearly, with as much specificity as possible, the public health or safety
risk created by the private property use that is the subject of the proposed action;
(2) Establish that such proposed action substantially advances the purpose of
protecting public health and safety against the specifically identified risk;
(3) Establish to the extent possible that the restrictions imposed on the private
property are not disproportionate to the extent to which the use contributes to the
overall risk; and
(4) Estimate, to the extent possible, the potential cost to the government in the event
that a court later determines that the action constituted a taking.247

To allocate fairly the burden of regulatory restriction, some states have enacted laws
with provisions aiming to maintain an equal balance between conflicting interests of
private property rights and public benefits. Florida’s legislature, for example,
stipulates that the state government can exercise powers that may restrict or limit
private property rights without amounting to a taking under the State Constitution or
the US Constitution.248 It requires compensation when a regulation causes an
‘inordinate burden’ on individual property rights.249 Although what constitutes an
‘inordinate burden’ is not clearly defined, the statue gives general guidance for
judicial interpretation by describing it as a state act, which:
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directly restricted or limited the use of real property such that the property owner is
permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the
existing use of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property
as a whole, or …the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share of a
burden imposed for the good of public’.250

Among the state legislatures that have enacted regulatory-takings statutes, the State
of Oregon is of special interest as it adopted the most extreme compensable takings
law in the United States to protect private interests.251 In 2004, Oregon enacted a
land use law that was known as ‘Measure 37’.252 It granted property owners
compensation rights for a reduction in the fair market value of their real property
caused by governmental regulations.253 Measure 37 attracted a lot of criticism for its
excessive property rights protection. Not only could the rule apply retroactively, it
applied to a wide range of land-use-related regulatory decisions, ranging from
planning and zoning to environmental decisions.254 Measure 37 was thus detrimental
to governmental powers to regulate for public benefits as it led to a wave of
regulatory takings claims, causing huge frustrations for land use control by state
government.255 Measure 37 was consequently replaced by ‘Measure 49’ which took
effect in 2007.256 Measure 49, with the support of 62 percent of statewide voters,257
was enacted to deal with the drawbacks of Measure 37. Under Measure 49, property
owners may not override existing zoning laws that prohibit industrial and
commercial developments. To the contrary, it permits a landowner to claim for
compensation only when the regulation restricts the use of private residential
property or of a farm or forest, resulting in the reduction of fair market value on
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these properties.258 Measure 49 is a good example of the state’s attempts to strike the
right balance between the protection of private property rights and the exercise of
powers to regulate by the government.259
3. The Tendencies of the Court’s Jurisprudence on Regulatory Takings
With the wave of regulatory takings claims continuing into the early 21 st century, the
US Supreme Court seems to be extensively applying a balancing approach, as well
as the ad hoc test, more than other approaches when analyzing regulatory takings
disputes. The Court has consistently applied these standards developed during the
1980s and the 1990s, despite attempts to renegotiate the balance between private and
public interests.
In claims decided by the Supreme Court of the United States from 2001 to 2015,260
the Court drew mainly on the balancing approach to resolve the regulatory takings
disputes in four out of nine cases discussing the Takings Clause. Of those four
balancing test cases, three were based on the Penn Central’s three-factor standard,
and the other one on the Nollan/Dolan’s proportionality test. Within the same period,
three cases adopted the per se physical takings approach to analyze the issues, one
adopted the judicial takings doctrine and the remaining one used an unidentifiable
doctrine.

258

Ore Rev Stat §195.305 (2013).
Sullivan and Bragar, above n 257, 593.
260
Meltz, above n 2.
259
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Table 1: Summary of Regulatory Takings Cases in the Early 21st Century
(2001-2015)261
Testing Standards
Balancing

and

Proportionality Test
(Four cases)

Cases

Highlights

Knootz v St John

The US Supreme Court held that the condition of

River

approval of the development permit must comply with

Water

Management District,

the

‘nexus’

and

the

‘rough

proportionality’

133 S Ct 2586 (2013)

requirements of the Nollan and Dolan takings cases.

– the Nollan and

[para 2599] This standard is applied regardless of

Dolan approach

whether the permit is approved on the condition that the
applicant continues using the property or it is denied
due to the failure to meet the requirements. This
doctrine affirms that the government cannot condition
the permit approval without meeting the nexus and
proportionality requirement between the means and
objective pursued. [para 2603]

Arkansas Game &

The temporary government-flooding program could be

Fish Commission v

a compensable taking. (para 519) To constitute a

United States, 133 S

taking, the length and severity of the interference is not

Ct 511 (2012) – the

the only decisive factor. Other factors such as the intent

Penn Central

behind the measure and the owner’s expectation

approach

regarding the foreseeable impact from the authorized
government actions are also relevant. (paras 511-512)

Tahoe-Sierra

The Court held that the enactment of the moratoria to

Preservation Council,

prohibit the development plan in the Lake Tahoe Basin

Inc v Tahoe Regional

was not a per se taking. To analyze the issue, the Court

Planning Agency,

concluded that the use of a per se taking doctrine would

535 US 302 (2002) –

cause too much financial burden on the government

the Penn Central

when implementing public policies. (para 339) The

approach

Court held that to determine the emergence of a
compensable taking, all factors concerning landowner’s
expectation, impact, public interest and the state’s
intent must be taken into account. (para 327, 335-337)

261

Adapted from ibid 3-5; and LEXIS-NEXIS database.
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Testing Standards

Cases

Highlights

Palazzolo v Rhode

Taking claims was ripe. (para 620) The Court held that

Island, 533 US 606

the Rhode Island’s regulation to protect state’s coastal

(2001) – the Penn

properties was not a per se taking as the Claimant still

Central approach

retained some economic use over the land. (para 630631) The Court; however, did not examine whether the
investment-backed expectation was affected by the
regulation. The Court remanded the case to the lower
courts to re-evaluate the case by using the Penn Central
approach. (para 632)

Per se Takings
(Three cases)

Horne v Department

The Court held that the US Department of

of Agriculture (Horne

Agriculture’s Marketing Order authorizing the

II), 135 S Ct 2419

government to reserve a percentage of raisin crops to

(2015)

stabilize the supply and price was a taking. Although
the required reserve obligated the government to return
the net proceeds of the sale of transferred raisins, the
majority held that the Order deprived the growers of
their property rights to ‘possess, use and dispose of’ the
products, which was a ‘clear physical taking’. (para
2428) Despite the personal property, the Court held that
the Takings Clause was applicable in the same way as
the per se taking of the real property. (para 2427)

Brown v Legal

The Court held that the State’s use of interest earned

Foundation of

from lawyer’s trust funds (IOLTA) to pay for legal

Washington, 538 US

services for the poor was a per se taking as the interest

216 (2003)

the state government confiscated from the IOLTA to
finance the public services was the property of the
owner of the principal. However, the majority
concluded that the confiscation of interest was a taking
and a per se approach is more consistent in this case as
it invaded the private individual rights. (paras 233-235)
Nevertheless, the Court held that despite the incurring
taking, the state government was exposed to zero
compensation value. Since the government was
mandated by IOLTA to use only interest grown out of
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Testing Standards

Cases

Highlights
the principal for a legitimate public use, the owners of
those principal lost nothing and were subject to zero
compensation. (para 237, 240)

Verizon

Telecommunication Act of 1996 granted FCC the

Communications, Inc

power to set the rates charged by incumbent local

v FCC, 535 US 467

exchange carriers to new operators. The Court simply

(2002)

insisted that to be determined as a taking under the
Fifth Amendment, the new rates based on the forwardlooking cost methodology must impact the incumbent’s
‘financial integrity’. (paras 523-24)

Judicial Takings
(One case)

Stop the Beach

There was no taking found. The Court unanimously

Renourishment, Inc v

concluded that the Florida State Supreme Court

Florida Department

decision was correctly applied in affirming that the

of Environmental

beachfront property still belonged to the State. Four

Protection, 560 US

Justices affirmed that a taking concept could not only

702 (2010)

be applicable to state action, but also a judicial branch
if a court invalidly declares that the property rights is
no long existed thereby restricting of property use.
(para 715)

Unspecified Doctrine

Lingle v Chevron

The Court held that it is inappropriate to merely use a

(One case)

USA Inc, 544 US 528

‘substantially advance state interests’ element in this

(2005)

case to determine whether a regulation is a
compensable taking. (para 545) The judgment finding
that the statute accomplished an unconstitutional taking
was reversed, and as the case was not ripe, the Court
remanded to case to the lower courts for further
proceedings to determine the case under one of the
other theories - either "physical" taking, a Lucas-type
"total regulatory taking," a Penn Central taking, or a
land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in
Nollan and Dolan. (para 548)
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From the information above, it can be seen that the Court has, since 2001, gradually
moved its analytical framework towards a balancing and proportionality test in its
Takings Clause decisions. This allows the Court to engage in a deeper consideration
of some complex issues. The Court; however, has also utilized the per se takings
doctrine as a bright line rule when the measure involves the full/extreme deprivation
of economic benefits.

D. Conclusions
The taking of private property by government agencies has long been an historic
concern in US politics. The origin of the Takings Clause can be traced back to the
Magna Carta, which stated that property could not be taken unless the law had said
so. However, the obligation to compensate was not spelled out explicitly in the early
period.
During the colonial era, the British colonies in America adopted English property
systems to govern the land. In early American history, the colonial governments
were entitled to dispose of the private property ownership, but the compensation
component was still not well developed.
This matter; however, changed after the civil war in the US. Due to widespread
discontent over abusive use of power by the British, the US declared its
independence and formed the US Constitution and attached to it a Bill of Rights to
restraint governments from arbitrarily intruding on private property rights unfairly.
This fundamental principle of private property protection was set out in the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, requiring that a ‘taking’ be
accompanied by just compensation. Nevertheless, due to inherent vagueness in the
legal text, the notions of property, takings, and remedies under the Fifth Amendment
were open to debate.
A review of the US Supreme Court’s decisions shows that the Takings Clause has
historically been interpreted so broadly as to protect a wide range of property. It is
not limited to tangible assets, but also covers intangible property that includes
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legitimate expectation. Moreover, when the government is liable under the Fifth
Amendment for a taking, the Court has consistently held that fair market value
compensation is the most effective remedy to redress the injury.
However, to indicate whether the regulation in question is indeed a compensable
taking, there is no single formula developed by the Court. The Court has applied
different legal principles to distinguish a non-compensable regulatory action from a
compensable regulatory taking. On the one hand, the Court in a number of cases
expressly advocated stringent property protection regimes. On the other hand, the
Court’s decisions in some cases reflected a preference for a public power doctrine,
providing limited remedies despite significant impact caused by the governmental
acts.
Apart from two extreme conceptual frameworks, the Court has developed a
predominant theme with which to balance between public benefits and private
interests. The Court has ventured to declare that an offending regulation could be a
compensable taking when the property owners have unfairly borne excessive public
burdens. Based on the three factors test used in the Court’s review in the Penn
Central case, the Court will consider the economic impact of the regulation on the
property owner, the degree of interference with the owner’s investment-backed
expectation and the character of alleged governmental action. Besides that, the Court
also applied the “nexus” and “rough proportionality” test from Nollan and Dolan to
determine when regulatory interference is a compensable taking. Corresponding to
political, policy and social exigencies, the balancing test works to reconcile
conflicting interests and to recognize changing circumstances in the community at
large. Any regulatory interference, nevertheless, is deemed to be a compensable
taking when the regulation is so extreme as to deprive the property owner of all
beneficial use of property rights.
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CHAPTER VII
COMPENSABLE INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
TRENDS

The protection of property rights is a principle that has been set out in Article 1 of
the Protocol No.1 (P1-1) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
since 1954. P1-1 aims to afford protection to property rights within the human rights
and fundamental freedoms framework of Europe.
Although P1-1 plays a critical role in protecting human rights, it generated
ideological debates among European countries, making it hard to reach a consensus
on the provision when it was introduced in 1954. Due to the ambiguous nature of P11 – and the complex political backdrop existing at the time of its formation, the
European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) and the European Court
of Human Rights (the ECtHR) have developed a body of jurisprudence to analyze
whether state actions adopted through various regulatory measures contravene the
terms of the Article so as to amount to expropriation. Since there is no set of clear
concepts that dictate the appropriate interpretation and application of P1-1, its
interpreters have encountered difficulty and, as a consequence, the jurisprudence in
this field is somewhat obtuse.
This Chapter examines the jurisprudence developed by the Commission and the
ECtHR, as well as the evolution of legal concepts utilized in determining when a
state action is considered tantamount to a compensable expropriation, under P1-1.1
1

From 1954 until 1998, the European Commission of Human Rights was the main organ adjudicating
issues concerning the violation of human rights law in Europe. However, after the enforcement of
Protocol 11 in 1998, the Commission was abolished and replaced by the ECtHR. Under this new
organization, individuals can have direct access. Regarding the ECtHR, the judgments sought by the
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR were examined. Complaints of violation by member states are first
reviewed by a committee of three judges. If the complaint is declared admissible, the complaint is
heard and adjudicated by a Chamber of 7 judges. Decisions of great importance may be appealed to
the Grand Chamber of 17 judges. Once the Grand Chamber has rendered the decision, the judgment
cannot be appealed and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe plays a supervisory and
monitoring role to ensure that the member states comply with the decision. See European Court of
Human Rights, Your Application to the ECtHR: How to Apply and How your Application is
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The study carried out in this Chapter analyzes the trends in European regulatory
takings doctrines, developed by the Court, as well as their compatibility with the
domestic laws of European countries.

A. Background to the Protection of Property Rights under the European
Convention of Human Rights
Before the emergence of the ECHR in the 18th century, there were existing legal
instruments that concerned the protection of property rights at both domestic and
international levels. One of the most prominent was the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and the Citizen, which was established in 1789 (the Declaration). 2
Article 17 of the Declaration states that: ‘[p]roperty being a sacred and inviolable
right, no one can be deprived of it, unless a legally established public necessity
evidently demands it, under the condition of a just and prior indemnity’.3 This
provision was introduced to grant people specific freedom from oppression via the
illegitimate exercise of state power.
The protection of property rights could also be found in some international
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR). The
UDHR was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10
December 1948.4 Representing commonly accepted but non-binding standards for all
nations, the UDHR set out for the first time universally protected, ‘fundamental
human rights’.5 Article 17 of the UDHR states that:
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

Processed European Court of Human Rights
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Your_Application_ENG.pdf>.
2
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens (France) [Frank MaLoy Anderson trans, The
Constitutions and Other Documents Illustrative of the History of France 1789-1907 (The J W Wilson
Company, 2nd ed, 1908) 59-61].
3
Ibid art 17.
4
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg,
UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948).
5
United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights <http://www.un.org/en/universaldeclaration-human-rights/>.
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2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.6

Despite its universality, a commentator argues that the provision is so vague that it
inadequately provides meaningful protection to property owners, and could hardly
prevent owners from being deprived of their property without compensation.7
The impact of the Second World War in Europe was immense. Not only were large
numbers of people killed, but the violations of human rights on many levels,
including rights of property, were overwhelming.8 Europeans perceived the need to
develop a legally binding international system that could effectively inhibit human
right abuses.9 The ECHR was created as a mechanism to fight against the
‘totalitarian’ and ‘dictatorship’ tendencies, which existed in Europe during that
time.10 The Convention, moreover, was drafted to reflect a ‘core minimum of the
value necessary to create and maintain a democratic society, while also respecting
and allowing for the different social economic and political conditions which
prevailed in the signatory states’.11
When the ECHR was first drafted, the inclusion of a human right to property was not
supported by some member states of the Consultative Assembly (CA) of the Council
of Europe.12 The UK, for example, was initially reluctant to incorporate the
provision on property rights protection in P1-1. Part of the reason could be attributed
to British social democratic politics after the war, as state agencies were keen to

6

Ibid art 17.
Allan Rosas, 'Property Rights' in Allan Rosas and Jan Helgesen (eds), The Strength of Diversity:
Human Rights and Pluralist Democracy (Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 137.
8
Theo R G van Banning, The Human Right in Property (Intersentia, 2001) 64.
9
M Caitlin Sochacki, 'Takings Law: The Similarities and Differences between the European Court of
Human Rights and the United States Supreme Court' (2008) 24(2) Connecticut Journal of
International Law 435, 437.
10
Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From its Inception to the
Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2010) 386.
11
Helen Mountfield, 'Regulatory Expropriation in Europe: the Approach of the European Court of
Human Rights' (2002) 11(1) New York University Environmental Law Journal 136, 139.
12
The Council of Europe (CoE) was an intergovernmental organization of European States, which
was established on 5 May 1949 by ten European nations to achieve greater unity among the member
nations on their common traditions of political liberty. In June 1998, 40 countries were members of
the CoE. There are key organizations following the establishment of the CoE, which were the
Committee of Ministers (CM) and the Parliamentary Assembly (originally named Consultative
Assembly (CA)). The CM was the executive body which decides on policy, co-operation and budget,
and the Parliamentary Assembly brought together elected members of national parliaments of member
states. See van Banning, above n 8, footnote 125.
7
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support national development with public money and nationalization,13 especially in
many key national industries such as coal, steel, railways and shipbuilding. 14 The
UK thus strongly opposed the insertion of the right to property in the draft
Convention.15 In addition to the UK, other socialist countries, such as Sweden, also
questioned the inclusion of the provision due to concerns that it might restrict state
rights to regulate and also encourage a flood of litigation.16
Conversely, some countries were supportive of the incorporation of the right to
property in the draft Convention. These countries included France, Turkey, Ireland
and Italy. They referred to the danger of ‘fascist regimes’, which oppressed
minorities and deprived Jews of property during war time.17 These countries were
active in promoting the inclusion of a provision on the right to property in the early
draft Convention.
After long discussions and debates, the right to property was ultimately included.
Nevertheless, there was difficulty in achieving unanimity among Member States of
the Council of Europe and a resolution had to be achieved regarding conflicting
views as to the scope of property rights protection, the conditions under which the
taking of property was permissible, the nature of compensation obligations, and the
extent to which member states were allowed to impose limitations on property use.18
On 17 August 1950, the French representative proposed the following text:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
Such possessions cannot be subjected to arbitrary confiscation.

13

David Edgerton, 'War, Reconstruction, and the Nationalization of Britain, 1939–1951' (2011)
210(suppl_6) Past & Present 29, 36.
14
Mountfield, above n 11, 139.
15
van Banning, above n 8, 69.
16
Ibid 67.
17
Ibid. It was estimated that during the war-time period, the property of refugees and minorities was
seized and confiscated for more than USD 10 billion.
18
A M Aronovitz 'Individual Patrimonial Rights under the European Human Rights Systems: Some
Reflections on the Concepts of Possession and Dispossession of Property' (1997) 25 International
Journal of Legal Information 87, 91.
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The present measures shall not, however, be considered as infringing, in any way, the
right of a state to pass necessary legislation to ensure that the said possessions are
utilized in accordance with the general interest.19

However, some countries opposed this proposed text. The representatives from the
UK contended that the term ‘possessions’ did not exist in British local laws and this
posed an unclear definition of the right to property.20 Moreover, some delegates were
unwilling to leave such a vague provision to be interpreted by a commission or
international adjudicator who might undermine the national interests of the host
country.21
Following the French proposal, several texts were suggested by other Member
States, such as the UK and Belgium.22 Over several years of the drafting process, the
final text of the right to property was adopted under the Protocol of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which ultimately
entered into force on 18 May 1954. Although the provision on property protection
was successfully incorporated in the Convention, it was nevertheless criticized due to
the ambiguity surrounding the notion of possessions, the nature of interference
falling within the ambit of the Protocol and the circumstances under which an
individual is entitled to compensation.

B. Current Jurisprudence on Regulatory Interference in the European
Court of Human Rights
Currently, the right to property is contained in article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1) to the
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Based on the P1-1, it states that:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
19

van Banning, above n 8, 70 citing the text proposed by Pierre Henri Teitgen, who was a French
representative in the Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions.
20
Ibid 71.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid 73.
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The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.23

Fundamentally, the structure of P1-1 contains three distinct rules governing different
types of interference, which require the State:
1. Not to interfere with the ‘peaceful enjoyment of possession’ (the first
sentence of the first paragraph of P1-1);
2. Not to ‘deprive the owner of their possession’ except in the public interest,
and subject to domestic and international law (the second sentence of the first
paragraph); and
3. To ‘control the use of property’ in accordance with the general interest or to
secure the payment of taxes, other contributions or penalties. (the second
paragraph of P1-1).
Despite the comprehensiveness of the provision, the definition of each type of
interference is ambiguous and broadly crafted. To ascertain the appropriate scope
and application of these rules, this section of the Chapter will examine the
characteristics of each type of interference and the evolution of the legal concepts
developed by the ECtHR to identify when property interference triggers a
compensation duty.
To analyze these issues, this section starts with an investigation of the scope of
property, or interests falling within the ambit of ‘possessions’. It then examines the
jurisprudence relating to situations in which each type of interference and could
become compensable expropriation under P1-1. The final part of this section focuses
on the standards of compensation developed by the ECtHR to redress the injuries
that a property owner suffers from state regulatory interference.

23

Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature 20 March 1952, ETS No 9 (entered into forece 18 May 1954) as amended by
Protocol No 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature 11 May 1994, ETS No 155 (entered into force 1 November 1998).
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1. Concept of Possessions
There is no explicit definition of possessions or property in P1-1. To elaborate the
meaning of what constitutes possessions or property rights under P1-1, the ECtHR
has asserted that the concept of possession is ‘autonomous’ and the ECtHR reserves
the right to interpret the definition of property rights without relying on domestic
law.24 In Gasus Dosier-Und Fordertechnik GmbH v Netherlands,25 for instance, the
ECtHR held that:
[p]ossession …has an autonomous meaning which is certainly not limited to
ownership of physical goods: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can
also be regarded as ‘property rights’, and thus as ‘possessions’, for the purposes of
this provision.26

Generally, the ECtHR accepts tangible property as possessions under P1-1. In
Handyside v UK,27 which concerned the forfeit and destruction of the applicant’s
books relating to liberal sexual education, the ECtHR insisted that the books were
recognized as possessions under the P1-1.28 The ECtHR also recognized tangible
property as comprising possessions in a number of subsequent cases, such as AGOSI
v UK.29 In this case, the Claimant argued that the British government’s forfeiture of
coins without compensation amounted to a deprivation of property. However, the
ECtHR held that the forfeiture was not unlawful since it was the corollary of the
enforcement by the British government of a law implemented to serve public
interests. Although the ECtHR ruled in favor of the host state government, it
confirmed that a tangible asset constitutes a possession within the meaning of P1-1.
In addition to tangible property, it is possible that all contractual and vested rights
that constitute economic interests are also regarded as possessions under P1-1. In its
early applications of the ECHR, the ECtHR held that a contractual right is a
24

Sochacki, above n 9, 460.
Gasus Dosier-Und Fordertechnik GmbH v Netherlands (European Court of Human Rights,
Chamber, Application No 15375/89, 23 February 1995)[53].
26
Ibid [46].
27
Handyside v the United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Court (Plenary), Application
No 5493/72, 7 December 1976) ('Handyside').
28
Ibid [61]-[63].
29
AGOSI v UK (European Court of Human Rights, Court (Chamber), Application No 9118/80, 24
October 1986) ('AGOSI').
25
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possession. In James and Others v UK,30 for example, the ECtHR asserted that
property interests in leasehold were considered as a possession under P1-1.31 In
Mellacher v Austria,32 the ECtHR examined interference with a landlord’s
contractual entitlement to rent. In this case, the Government of Austria passed a new
Act, which affected the pre-existing rental agreement between the Claimant and the
tenant.33 Due to the legislated reduction of rent, the applicants claimed that this was a
de facto interfere with their property.34 The ECtHR held that, despite the absence of
a total deprivation of property, the Act intervened with the freedom of contract and
the Claimant’s entitlement to rent, which amounted to possessions protected under
P1-1.35
In addition to contractual rights, other vested rights have also been accepted as
possessions under the P1-1. For example, in Lars Bramelid and Malmström v
Sweden36, which concerned the forced sale of shares to the majority owner, the
Commission held that P1-1 applied to the ownership of shares in a company. In this
case, the new Company Law empowered a company which owned more than 90
percent of the shares and voting rights in another company to compel the minority
shareholders in that company to sell their shares at the price they originally
purchased through a public offer.37 The minority shareholders complained to the
ECtHR about the unfairness of being forced to sell their shares at less than the
market value.38 The ECtHR considered that a share was a certificate that promises
the holder a quantified interest in a company, plus all corresponding rights. The
ECtHR held that the shares had economic value and were, therefore, possessions.39
The ECtHR also recognized vested rights to seek payment in relation to property or
contract as a part of possession in many subsequent cases. In Stran Greek Refineries
30

James and Others v the United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Court (Plenary),
Application No 8793/79, 21 February 1986) ('James').
31
Ibid [34], [36].
32
Mellacher Application Nos 10522/83; 11011/84; 11070/84.
33
Ibid [10]-[26].
34
Ibid [43].
35
Ibid [44].
36
Lars Bramelid and Anne Marie Malmstrom v Sweden (European Commission of Human Rights,
Report to the Commission, Application Nos 8588/79 and 8589/79, 12 December 1983) ('Lars
Bramelid').
37
Ibid [2].
38
Ibid [3].
39
Ibid [40].
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and Stratis Andreadis v Greece,40 for example, the ECtHR held that the award
rendered by arbitral tribunal was to be regarded as a protected right within the ambit
of P1-1. In this case, Mr. Amdreadis contracted with the State for the construction of
a crude oil refinery by his company, Stran.41 However, after democracy was restored
in Greece, the new government issued legislation to set aside the contract as it was
not in the national interests, and invited the company to renegotiate the terms of
contract.42 The dispute was brought to arbitral proceedings and the arbitration court
ruled in favor of Stran, ordering payment by the State of over US$ 16 million.43
While the State challenged the arbitration award in the Court of Cassation, the Greek
Parliament passed Law no.1701/1987, declaring that arbitration awards regarding
contracts concluded during the previous military regime were invalid and
unenforceable.44 The Court of Cassation upheld the new law and declared that
arbitration award void. The applicant then complained to the ECtHR. The Court held
that under P1-1, the arbitration award gave rise to a debt that favored Stran. Since the
award was legally binding at the time it was decided, it qualified as a property
protected under the scope of P1-1.45
To ensure more effective and practical protection of property rights, the ECtHR
interpreted the concept of possessions covered under P1-1 as including a ‘legitimate
expectation’. As Sochacki notes, whilst the ECtHR considered this as being similar
to the US Supreme Court’s ‘reasonable-investment-backed expectation’, the ECtHR
classified the presence of a legitimate expectation as a decisive factor when
determining whether the measure effectively deprives the owner of possession over
property, thereby justifying an award of compensation.46 To be regarded as a
legitimate expectation within the ambit of protected possessions, the ECtHR usually
agrees to enforce beneficial interests or the rights attached when a legitimate

40

Stran Greek Refineries Application No 13427/87.
Ibid [7].
42
Ibid [9].
43
Ibid [13].
44
Ibid [19]-[20].
45
Ibid [58]-[62].
46
Sochacki, above n 9, 466, where the author compares with the US Court’s jurisprudence under the
Fifth Amendment. The US Supreme Court treated the breach of a ‘reasonable investment-backed
expectation’ as one of three factors that need to be proved to identify the existence of a compensable
regulatory taking.
41
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expectation is non-speculative. In Van Marle v the Netherlands (1986),47 for
example, the ECtHR had to consider whether professional goodwill and licenses
essential to operate a business were to be considered as possessions and entitled to
protection under P1-1. In this case, the applicant was a certified accountant who had
practiced for a number of years. However, after the passing of new legislation that
required accountants to seek registration to continue to practice, the applicant’s
request to the Registration Board was denied due to unsatisfactory proof of sufficient
professional experiences.48 The applicant claimed that the Registration Board’s
decision diminished his income and the goodwill of his business.49 The ECtHR
agreed with the applicant, and held that goodwill is to be considered as a possession
because ‘[t]he applicant had built up a clientèle; this had in many respects the nature
of a private right and constituted an asset, and hence, a possession…’ 50 Later in
1989, the ECtHR applied the same approach in Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v Sweden.51
The case concerned the revocation of a restaurant’s license to sell liquor by a County
Administrative Board. The ECtHR considered that the economic interests connected
with the running of the restaurant were possessions.52 The ECtHR held that the
withdrawal of the business licenses impacted on the goodwill of the business, the
ability to maintain customers, and the value of the restaurant in the future.53
Similarly, the ECtHR also highlighted the role of P1-1 in protecting legitimate
expectations in Pine Valley Developments Ltd v Ireland (1991).54 In this case, Pine
Valley Developments Ltd, an Irish company had bought a plot of land for business
development in reliance on the permission for industrial warehouse and office
development granted by the Minister for Local Government. However, the Supreme
Court decided in 1982 that the granting of permission was ultra vires and unlawful.
The Claimant was unsuccessful in their local court claim for damages, and the Irish
Supreme Court affirmed that the original grant was ultra vires and declared the
47
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permission void.55 When the case was referred to the ECtHR, it held that the
landowner’s reliance on the government’s permission constituted a ‘legitimate
expectation’, to carry out the plan for proposed development, and this legitimate
expectation is regarded as a part of protected property rights.56
On some occasions, the ECtHR has protected legitimate expectations even though
the rights in question have not yet accrued. One of the most striking cases was
Presso Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v Belgium (1995),57 which concerned a
ship collision resulting from the negligent mistake of Belgian piloting services, for
which the State was responsible under the Belgian Shipping Act.58 However, after the
ship owner had initiated its case against the State, the State legislature promulgated a
new Act in 1988 to exclude all claims that were pending. 59 The ECtHR held that the
ship owner had a legitimate expectation that any pending claims would be decided
according to the established law of tort, constituting an asset and amounting to a
possession within the meaning of the first sentence of P1-1.60 This decision indicates
that, even when the case is unresolved and the liability has not accrued, the ECtHR
accepts the applicant’s right to obtain compensation for interferences with legitimate
expectations and such a right cannot be thwarted.
Despite its broad interpretation, the ECtHR emphasized that a legitimate expectation
has to be distinguished from a mere hope, as the latter lacks a basis for legal
protection.61 For example, in Kopecky v Slovokia,62 the ECtHR held in that:
‘Possessions’ can be either existing possessions or assets, including claims, in respect
of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a legitimate expectation of
obtaining effective enjoyment of property right. By way of contrast, the hope of
recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively
cannot be considered as a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 1,
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nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfillment of the
condition.63

In 2010, in Lelas v Croatia,64 the Court of First Session held that a legitimate
expectation should be considered as a possession. The Court considered that:
[A]n individual acting in good faith is… entitled to rely on statements made by state
or public officials who appear to have the requisite authority to do so…. A State
whose authorizes failed to observe their internal rules and procedures should not be
allowed to profit from their wrongdoing and escape their obligations.65

In sum, the scope of possessions has been interpreted broadly. The ECtHR held that
what constitutes a protected possession has an autonomous meaning independent
from classifications under municipal law.66 There is a clear trend towards the
expansion of the scope of protection which covers not only tangible, but also
intangible assets. Moreover, this is evolving to cover public law rights (licenses and
the interests connected with social security rights as a beneficiary) and legitimate
expectations.67 From the ECtHR’s point of view, these rights contribute to the
development of individual livelihood which is the major objective of human rights
law.
2. ECtHR Jurisprudence on Regulatory Interference under P1-1
As mentioned in the previous section, P1-1 comprises three main rules governing
different types of regulatory interference: deprivation of property, control on the use
of property, and interference with property rights. However, the rules do not contain
explicit interpretative guidance to which adjudicators can refer. Since the adoption of
the Protocol in 1954, the ECtHR has developed a body of jurisprudence to
distinguish the scope and application of each rule. The following section divides the
development of this jurisprudence into three phrases: the predominance of the police
power in the 1970s; the rise of regulatory interference in the 1980s; and the
development of jurisprudence after the Sporrong case.
63

Ibid [35].
Lelas v Croatia (European Court of Human Rights, Court (First Section), Application no 55555/08,
20 May 2010) ('Lelas').
65
Ibid [74].
66
van Banning, above n 8, 87.
67
Ibid 87-88.
64

224

(a) Predominance of State Power in the 1970s
In the 1970s, 16 years after the adoption of the Protocol in 1954, challenges against
the governmental expropriation of property emerged. In 1976, the ECtHR examined
the application of P1-1 in Handyside v the United Kingdom.68 This case is one of the
most highly cited cases decided by the ECtHR concerning a state defense of the
governmental rights to regulate. In this case, the British government confiscated
sexual education schoolbooks published by Mr. Richard Handyside. The
confiscation was made in accordance with the UK Obscene Publication Act 1959, on
the ground that the books were said to be against public morality. Mr. Handyside, a
publisher who had purchased the copyright of the Little Red Schoolbook and
published it in many European countries, complained to the ECtHR that confiscation
breached his right to the peaceful enjoyment of possession.69 The ECtHR considered
the seizure to be provisional, so it did not result in full deprivation and, as a result,
the ECtHR found no violation of the second sentence of the first paragraph of P1-1
(not to deprive the owner of possession), as claimed.70 Using a ‘margin of
appreciation’, the ECtHR held that the interference was legitimate and was
implemented for public purposes.71 The ECtHR did not give weight to the
‘proportionality test’ as a criterion in deciding the case.72 It held that the contested
measure was in accordance with the law and aimed to protect ‘morals’, as
understood by British authorities.73 Therefore, the ECtHR accepted the arguments
raised by the Government,74 and unanimously decided that the measure in question
did not breach P1-1.75 .
(b) Rise of Jurisprudence on Regulatory Interference in the 1980s
Following the jurisprudence of the 1970s, the ECtHR began referring to the role of
the three distinct rules under P1-1 for the first time in 1982, in the well-known case
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of Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden.76 In this case, the Swedish government entrusted
the City Council of Stockholm with the power to expropriate the properties owned
by Sporrong and Lönnroth for the government’s town planning development plan. In
addition, some construction and renovation restrictions were imposed on the
properties in question. However, the local officers never undertook the formal land
expropriation action, and this barred the landowners from utilizing their properties
for a lengthy period of time. As no compensation was provided by the government,
the applicants filed the case with the ECtHR to decide whether the measures were
tantamount to an expropriation in breach of the P1-1.
In determining whether the measures violated P1-1, the ECtHR clearly stated, from
the outset, the standard rules contained in P1-1. The Court held in its analysis that:
[t]hat Article comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is of a general nature,
announces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in the first
sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of possessions and
subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the second sentence of the same
paragraph. The third rule recognizes that the States are entitled, amongst other things,
to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing
such laws as they deem necessary for the purposes; it is contained in the second
77

paragraph.

In attempting to identify the specific rule applicable to this case, the ECtHR found
that there was no formal deprivation of property since the applicant retained the right
to enjoy the benefits derived from the property despite experiencing some difficulty
in selling it.78 In addition, the Court also held that there was no control of the use of
property.79 However, the ECtHR returned to the general rule under the first sentence
of the first paragraph of P1-1.80 To answer whether two series of measures breached
P1-1, the ECtHR held that besides serving public interests, the measure must ensure
that:
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[A] fair balance was struck between the demand of the general interests of the
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental
rights…The search for this balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention and is
also reflected in the structure of Article 1.81

Applying the concept to the issues at hand, the ECtHR held that despite the absence
of an deprivation element, the expropriatory measures were unlawful and infringed
P1-1 because ‘a fair balance’ between collective and individual interests was not
achieved, producing an excessive burden on the property owner.82 The Sporrong
case was significant as it was the first violation by Sweden that the ECtHR had
found, and it was the first time that the ECtHR decided in favor of the property right
owner under P1-1.83
(c) After Sporrong’s Case: Further Elaboration of the Scope and Nature of
Article 1 of Protocol 1
The ECtHR has played a more active role since the 1980s in providing legal analysis
regarding the application of P1-1. One of the main reasons for its increasing P1-1
caseload is that individuals were granted rights to refer their cases directly to the
ECtHR.84 Originally, an individual had no direct access to the ECtHR, and the
recognition of the right of individual application was optional and binding only upon
the States that had approved direct access.85 However, after the entry into force of
Protocol 11 to the Convention in 1998,86 the ECtHR’s acceptance of complaints
directly from individuals became mandatory.87 Complaints can be brought against
Contracting States either by other Contracting States or by individual applicants.88

81

Ibid.
Ibid [73].
83
Jonas Grimheden, 'The Self-Reflective Human Rights Promoter' in Jonas Grimheden and Rolf
Ring (eds), Human Rights Law - From Dissemination to Application: Essays in Honour of Goran
Melander (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) 119, 121.
84
Bates, above n 10, 401-5.
85
Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights: Historical Background Council of Europe
<http://www.coe.int/en/web/tirana/european-court-of-human-rights>.
86
Protocol 11 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, opened for signature on 11
May 1994. ETS 155 (entered into force on 1 November 1998) ('Protocol 11').
87
Council of Europe, above n 85.
88
Ibid.
82

227

From 1980 onwards, the ECtHR has heard an increasing number of cases, including
disputes in relation to Protocol 1.89
As a consequence, the ECtHR has intensively developed key principles based on its
case law concerning the enjoyment of property rights, deprivation of possessions and
the control of the use of properties.90 This section of the Chapter examines the key
legal concepts developed by the ECtHR in relation to the three distinct rules
embodied in P1-1. The study investigates which specific rule is applicable to a
particular state measure.
(i) Deprivation of Property
A rule concerning protection from deprivation of property is contained in the second
sentence of paragraph one of P1-1. Jurisprudence developed by the ECtHR generally
affirms that the notion of ‘deprivation’ includes not only ‘direct takings of property,
but also measures that amount to them’.91 As explained in Sporrong case, the ECtHR
stated that:
In order to determine whether there has been a deprivation of possessions within the
meaning of the second rule, the Court must not confine itself to examining whether
there has been dispossessions or formal expropriation, it must look behind the
appearance and investigate the realities of the situation complained of. Since the
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective, it has to be
ascertained whether that situation amounted to a de facto expropriation.92

There have been a number of subsequent cases discussing the nature and
characteristics of notion of deprivation. Basically, deprivation includes all forms of
interference, resulting in the ‘dispossession of the subject of property or the
extinction of the legal rights of the owners’.93 For example, in Papamichalopoulos v
Greece (1993),94 which concerned the taking of the applicant’s land in 1967, during
89
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the period of dictatorship, and passing it to the Navy, the ECtHR held that the Naval
occupation of land resulted in the applicant’s lack of effective use of his property and
this was so severe as to amounts to de facto expropriation pursuant to the meaning of
P1-1.95
(ii) Control the Use of Property
Besides the rule regarding deprivation, P1-1 also recognizes other forms of
interference that limit the use of property. Such interference is contained in the
second paragraph of P1-1, which deals with the state’s right to control the use of
property. Although this type of interference results in restrictions of property rights,
such controls are deemed to impose less excessive burdens than the deprivation of
property.
Basically, the ECtHR accepts that a broad range of regulations may restrict the use
of property, but less severely than deprivation. In 1989, for example, the ECtHR held
in the case of Baner v Sweden96 that the termination of exclusive fishing rights
resulted in a restriction on the applicant’s property rights, and this amounted to a
control on the use of property under P1-1.97 Another example was the case of Pine
Valley Development v Ireland,98 which held that the invalidation of a development
permit, despite not entirely removing the ownership of the property, gravely limited
the utilization of property. In its decision, the ECtHR held that the withdrawal of the
development permission did not prevent the applicant from using the land for other
purposes, and that the applicant retained the right to ownership over the property,
resulting in control over the use of property.99 In this brief review, the ECtHR has
developed only some vague legal guidance as to when and whether a state action
falls within this second paragraph of P1-1.
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(iii) Peaceful Enjoyment of Property
P1-1 also protects the property owner from situations which neither involve
deprivation of property nor control of the use of property. This general rule in the
first sentence of the first paragraph of P1-1 is considered as a ‘catch-all’ provision
that applies to situations where neither of the two previous rules is applicable. 100 A
commentator describes this rule as a ‘purely judicial construction’ as it is heavily
dependent on the ECtHR’s discretion in defining the scope of its application to any
specific type of state measure.101
In the case of Sporrong, the ECtHR held that a prohibition on property development
and long-term cancellation of permits could also constitute the destruction of the
peaceful enjoyment of possessions under the first sentence of the first paragraph of
P1-1.102 The ECtHR explained that such interference did not affect the right to
dispose of the property, nor did it aim at controlling the use of the property, 103 so it
fell under the ambit of peaceful enjoyment.
In the case of Stran Greek Refineries and Straints Andreadis v Greece (1994),104
which concerned the legislation that rendered an arbitral award in favor of the
applicant void, the ECtHR held that such an action was considered as interference
under P1-1.105 The ECtHR also elaborated that such interference was neither a
deprivation nor a measure amounting to control of property but, rather, was
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.106
The ECtHR has also ruled that an unreasonable delay in the payment of
compensation could be regarded as an interference with property. In Solodyuk v
Russia (2005),107 for example, the applicant complained that late payment of a

100

Monica Carss-Frisk, 'A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
European Convention on Human Rights' (Human Rights Handbooks No 4, Council of Europe, August
2003) 24.
101
H Burak Gemalmaz, 'Reconciling the Right of Property and Planning in the Light of the European
Convention on Human Rights' (2010) 59 Annales de l Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul 41, 49.
102
Sporrong Application nos 7151/75; 7152/75 [65].
103
Ibid [69].
104
Stran Greek Refineries Application No 13427/87.
105
Ibid [67].
106
Ibid [68].
107
Solodyuk v Russia, (European Court of Human Rights, Court (Fourth Section), Application No
67099/01, 12 July 2005) ('Solodyuk').

230

pension during a period of high inflation in Russia caused a reduction in monetary
value. The ECtHR held that the considerable reduction in the value of the pension,
due to government delay, caused economic loss to the applicant and that this resulted
in the violation of the first rule of P1-1.108
Despite the growing jurisprudence, the ECtHR has admitted that it is difficult to state
clearly which specific rule should be applied to any particular issue as the
application of rules has to take into account various factual circumstances and legal
environments. In Beyeler v Italy (2000),109 which concerned a dispute over the
ownership of a painting by the famous artist Van Gogh, the applicant claimed that
the painting was his possession. However, the State argued that, due to its historical
and artistic value, the painting was national property. The Italian courts decided that
the sales contract for this painting was void and null. The Strasbourg Court held that
the case was admissible as the applicant had an interest which amounted to
possession.110 Then, after considering the case, the ECtHR admitted that ‘[t]he
complexity of the factual and legal situation prevents its being classified in a precise
category’.111 Although it could have considered that the case concerned the issue of
deprivation, the ECtHR held that the forced transfer of ownership to the government
amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions.112
Despite the absence of a clear distinction between a measure regarded as a control on
use and a measure amounting to an interference with peaceful enjoyment of
property, the ECtHR’s rulings generally recognize that certain forms of
environmental controls and zoning laws are regarded as a control over the use of
property,113 whereas other measures, which fall short of deprivation of property and
outside the meaning of control on the use of property, are to be regarded as an
interference with peaceful enjoyment of property rights.114
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(iv) Complying with P1-1: Striking a Fair Balance through the Proportionality
Test
Once the appropriate rule applicable to the circumstances of the case has been
identified, the Court then assesses whether the interference is justifiable on the
ground of a general balancing test, which aims to strike a fair balance between the
means employed and the aim sought.115 The ECtHR fundamentally accepts the
principle of a ‘margin of appreciation’. The ECtHR first mentioned this hallmark
concept of a ‘margin of appreciation’ in the James case in 1986. Specifically, the
ECtHR stated that:
Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national
authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate
what is ‘in the public interest’. …Furthermore, the notion of public interest is
necessarily extensive. In particular… the decision to enact laws expropriating property
will commonly involve consideration of political economic and social issues…. The
Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in
implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the
legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ unless that judgment be
manifestly without reasonable foundation. (emphasis added)116

Despite upholding state sovereign rights to regulate for internal policies, the ECtHR
also maintains that measures must not impose an ‘excessive burden’ on an
individual.117 To consider whether the measure is proportional, the ECtHR generally
takes into account all pertinent factors, which include (among other things) the
nature of the right, the intensity of the interference, the nature and importance of the
aim of the interference, and the relationship between the means and the aim sought,
and the amount of paid compensation. A failure to maintain a fair balance between
public and private interests would result in disproportionality and, as a consequence,
impose an excessive burden upon an individual victim.
The ECtHR has regularly reviewed the justification of regulatory interference based
on the application of the ‘proportionality test’ in many occasions. For example, in
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AGOSI v the UK (1986),118 a German applicant, who ran a metal smelting business,
complained that the UK Customs authority unlawfully refused to exercise its
discretion to return metal coins that the State seized from a smuggler who obtained
the objects from the applicant by fraud. Based on the facts of the case, the applicant
complained that since a wrongdoer refused to pay the commodity in full, the
ownership of the coins remained with the applicant, and although the wrongdoer
tried to import the coins into the UK illegally, the State could not confiscate the
coins, but had to return them to the applicant who was the rightful owner. To justify
the measure, the Court noted that the prohibition on the import of the smuggled coins
was in compliance with P1-1 and it served a legitimate purpose.119 To determine a
fair balance, the ECtHR examined whether or not there was a reasonable relationship
between the means employed and the aim sought by the State, and then
counterweighed the state’s ‘margin of appreciation’ with the behavior of the
applicant,120 as well as the applicable procedures challenging the responsible
authorities.121
Another frequently cited case is Mellacher v Austria (1989).122 In this case the
applicant claimed that the enactment of a new rent control law by the Austrian
government123 was contrary to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)
as it unlawfully intervened with the applicant’s contractual rights to obtain rent. The
applicant claimed that the measure was not supported by the democratically
majoritarian elected political parties.124 Considering the facts of the case, the ECtHR
held that legislation was reasonable, and was introduced with a legitimate goal to
help poor people obtain adequate access to rental houses.125 After assessing an
element of the fair balance test, the Court found that although the legislation
infringed the binding contractual obligation between the tenant and applicant, the
owner was allowed to pass on various costs to the tenants. Moreover, the Court
found that under the new regime, the landlords were allowed to charge fees 50%
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higher than the rates the applicant would have received under the new contract
during the transitional period.126 The ECtHR then held that the measure struck a fair
balance and did not violate P1-1 of the Convention.127
In 1995, the ECtHR applied the same concept to Pressos Compania Naviera SA v
Belgium.128 The Belgium government passed new legislation to remove the right to
compensation in relation to damage caused by a ship crash, resulting from the
negligence of a Belgium navigating pilot. To analyze the State’s responsibility, the
ECtHR noted that due to the uncertainty of Belgium tort law and its incompatibility
with the laws of its neighboring countries, the State had freedom to amend the
internal law to better cope with these problems.129 Although the ECtHR accepted the
State’s authority to deal with the issue, it also held that the alteration of the rights to
compensation, reasonably expected by prospective victims, could not ‘justify
legislating with retrospective effect with the aim and consequence of depriving the
applicants of their claim for compensation’.130 The ECtHR held that the interference
was ‘inconsistent with the preserving of the fair balance between the interests at
stake’.131
3. Compensation under P1-1
There is no explicit rule in P1-1 that requires the state to pay compensation to redress
parties injured as a result of state expropriation. Generally, the ECtHR accepts the
state’s sovereign power to regulate property for public interest, providing that it
accords with the domestic law. However, a domestic power to regulate is not without
restriction. In spite of a wide ‘margin of appreciation’, the power of the State is
subject to the general principles of international law, which obligate a State to pay
compensation for a taking of property.132 The ECtHR consistently considers that
regulatory interference without compensation is an unlawful intervention that
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infringes upon principles of general international law.133 Thus, in many cases, the
ECtHR asserts that compensation becomes a requirement assessed by the
proportionality and balancing tests. This principle was introduced in the James case
of 1986,134 where the ECtHR held that:
[C]ompensation terms are material to the assessment whether the contested legislation
respects a fair balance between the various interests at stake and, notably, whether it
does not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicant.135 [emphasis added]

Similar to the judgment in James, instead of distinguishing between private and
public interests, the ECtHR has consistently applied the principle of proportionality
in subsequent cases, calling for compensation to achieve a fair balance between
competing interests.136 For example, in Holy Monasteries v Greece in 1994,137 the
ECtHR declared that ‘the taking of property without payment of an amount
reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate
interference and a total lack of compensation can be considered justifiable under
Article 1 only under exceptional circumstances’.138 Likewise in 2000, in the
Carbonara and Venture v Italy,139 a landowner claimed that the local government of
Noicattaro town did not take the possession of the land plot for school construction
within the planned period, and no formal expropriation was taken within the
authorized period.140 The ECtHR held that the inaction of the Town Council of
Noicattaro was equivalent to a development freeze and amounted to a ‘deprivation of
possession’ within the second rule of Article 1 of Protocol 1.141 In this case, the
constructive-expropriation did not only violate P1-1, due to the absence of
compensation,142 but it was also unlawful since it was applied arbitrarily.143 The
obligation to pay compensation with respect to the deprivation rule has been
133
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subsequently declared in a number of recent cases such as Perdigão v Portugal144
and Curmi v Malta.145
Compensation is also required when the measure falls within the context of the rules
regarding ‘control of use’. Basically, this type of regulation is less likely to be
subject to compensation obligations than full deprivation as it imposes less serious
impacts on the property owner.146 The ECtHR, however, still accepts that such
measures might trigger a compensatory duty if the interference fails to strike a fair
balance between competing interests and, instead, imposes a disproportionate burden
on one side.147 As seen in the case of Chassagnou and Others v France (1999),148 the
ECtHR held that a law that enabled public rights to hunt animals on the land of other
people without incurring compensation notoriously upset the fair balance to be
struck between private property rights and general interests, and violated the second
paragraph of P1-1.149 Following the case of Chassagnou, the ECtHR adopted the
same legal doctrine in a number of subsequent cases to protect the right of property
from the controls lacking in any means to offset losses in connection with
government measures.150
Turning to regulation that caused a loss to ‘peaceful enjoyment of property rights’, it
is found that the ECtHR generally awards compensation when the property owner
bears an excessive burden in violation of the first sentence of P1-1. In Sporrong,151
for instance, the ECtHR held that the measure concerned was disproportionate and
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violated the first paragraph of P1-1, even though the measure in question served
public interests.152 The ECtHR asserted that under certain circumstances a right to
compensation is necessary, and held that interference with property was an
‘excessive burden which could have been rendered legitimate only if they had had
the possibility…of claiming compensation’.153 Following the Sporrong case, the
ECtHR adopted the principle of a ‘fair balance’ and a test of ‘proportionality’ when
examining whether a right to compensation is required. Compensation is affirmed as
a critical factor in assessing whether the State’s conduct is legitimate in many recent
cases, including Beyeler v Italy,154 Broniowski v Poland,155 Maria Atanasiu and
Others v Romania.156
It should be noted that when the interference is significant, the ECtHR has held that
‘fair market value’ is the most appropriate standard for compensation valuation.157 In
order to determine the quantum of compensation, the ECtHR tends to use the date of
taking as the starting point for computation of property value. In addition to material
damages, the ECtHR includes ‘moral damages’ to heal a victim’s feeling. 158 Despite
the requirement for compensation for unlawful expropriation, there is still some
inconsistency in approaches to calculating compensation, as some tribunals utilize
the date of award as the appropriate date for property valuation.159
However, the State is not necessarily obligated to pay fair market value
compensation in every case.160 If the essence of social interests outweighs private
benefits, the property owner may not obtain full compensation for the loss.161 This
doctrine was confirmed in the case of James.162 As the ECtHR greatly respects state
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autonomy in regulating private property through domestic legislation, the Court held
in Lithgow v UK163 that:
Article 1 (P1-1) does not … guarantee a right to full compensation in all
circumstances, since legitimate objectives of ‘public interest’, such as pursued in
measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice,
may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.164

Likewise in Jahn and ors v Germany, which concerned land expropriation for
German reunification, the ECtHR held that compensation was not required since the
benefit of reunification of the nation outweighed private interests.165 In such a case,
the measure was proportionate and did not violate the ECHR, thus no compensation
was needed.

C. Trends in Jurisprudence under Article One of Protocol One
This section analyzes the expected future development by the ECtHR of legal
principles, pertaining to the issue of regulatory takings. The assessment of the future
directions of the Court’s jurisprudence is made via three key dimensions: the
tendencies of the nature of disputes, the tendencies of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence,
and the degree of jurisprudential coherence between the Strasbourg Court and
national courts of Member States.
1. The Nature of Disputes: Reconciliation of Conflicting Interests between State
and Private Benefits
Since the Court’s establishment in 1959 till now, it has heard a large number of
disputes concerning alleged violations of the ECHR. According to the statistical data
prepared by the ECtHR, it has examined around 674,000 applications166 and
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delivered about 18,500 judgments from 1959 to 2015.167 Among those cases in
which the ECtHR found a violation of the Convention, breaches of the right to
property under P1-1 was ranked third, after the right to a fair hearing and the right to
liberty and security. While 40 percent of violations concern the right to a fair
hearing, 12.43 percent and 12.14 percent of violations concern the right to liberty
and security and the right to property, respectively.168 The high proportion of
decisions dedicated to the protection of property has undoubtedly demonstrated a
strong tendency towards fierce property protection, which has, in turn, resulted in an
increased caseload before the ECtHR.169
A close examination of its case-law on the right to property reveals that the ECtHR
has addressed a wide range of intractable investor-state conflicts. The Court has
typically resolved four main types of property disputes, which cover: (1) claims on
de facto expropriations; (2) restitution of property confiscated by communist regimes
without compensation; (3) delayed and insufficient indemnities for expropriation;
and (4) excessively high fines or fees.170
2. Reconciling the Conflicting Interests through the Margin of Appreciation and
the Proportionality Doctrine
Despite the diversity of these cases, there are common patterns among those
conflicts which concern the nature of and the justification for a state’s administrative
actions that interfere with private property interests. First, the ECtHR has tried to
interpret the notion of the protection of property rights, by fine-tuning and
reconciling the competing interests between public and private parties. As Lehavi
asserts, the ECtHR has developed the hallmark concepts of both the ‘margin of
appreciation’ and the ‘proportionality test’ as norms for European countries. As a
‘supranational institution’, the ECtHR constructs guidelines for national legal
systems in accordance with European human rights protection. Rather than
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developing a single ‘hard-edged rule’,171 the ECtHR has established legal doctrines
and mechanisms that ‘create a certain common denominator that would hold
countries accountable for standard expropriatory or regulatory actions while
preserving significant leeway in establishing domestic policy ends and means’.172
Throughout the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, it consistently recognizes the state’s
legitimate powers to regulate private property for public interests in a wide range of
policy spheres, such as urban zoning, environmental control, social pensions, and the
restitution of property at the end of the cold war in 1989. Given the unique
circumstances that exist within each member country, the ECtHR has applied the
‘margin of appreciation’ to support and respect decisions of state authorities and
national legislatures that independently express ‘what was in the general interest’.173
Deferring to state autonomy, the ECtHR relies on state authorities who have more indepth knowledge about domestic issues when setting both the means and goals for
their policies.
Despite ensuring each state’s rights to determine its own goals, the ECtHR in
Strasbourg also demonstrates a trend towards more vigilant scrutiny of state
regulatory measures constituting disproportionate burdens on property owners. In
this respect, the Court tends to explore approaches to balance conflicting interests.
By applying principles of proportionality and fair balance, the ECtHR usually
chooses to impose a strict limit on state measures that result in the ‘permanent
dispossession or compulsory transfer of title of property’.174 Since this causes serious
injury to property owners, any absence of compensation for permanent dispossession
on transfer of title would be ‘very difficult to justify’ and would violate the
requirement under P1-1 of the Convention.175 This automatically triggers the duty to
compensate.
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Conversely, in cases of regulation with less intrusive impacts, the ECtHR tends to
apply less rigorous limitations on state measures, and less rigorous fair balance and
proportionality tests. Due to the ambiguity of P1-1, the application of the general
rule and the rule on the control over property use has largely been subjected to the
ECtHR’s judgment based on case-by-case analysis. Even though an interference with
the right to property triggers a compensation duty, the ECtHR can award
compensation amounting to less than full market value for the complainant.
3. European Consensus on Supranational Norms and State Practices in the
Proportionality Test
The ‘proportionality test’ has proliferated throughout the realms of domestic
constitutional and administrative courts and tribunals and is typically used as a
governing legal standard with which to review the justification for state regulations
and public policies in many countries throughout Europe.
In Germany, for example, the principle of proportionality counts as a fundamental
doctrine that domestic courts use to review the legality of regulatory interferences.176
Under the German Constitution (‘Basic Law’),177 the freedom of each citizen’s life,
liberty and property is regarded as a constitutional right. However, the constitution
limits these property rights and permits state intrusions on private property whenever
necessary for public interests.178 Due to conflicting interests, the German
Constitutional Court has deployed the principle of proportionality to ensure that
conflicting interests are reconciled and that any interference with property rights is
proportional.179
France is also a jurisdiction where proportionality has been widely used in a number
of areas of administrative law.180 Starting in the 1970s, the concept of proportionality
was first introduced by the French Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) which is the
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highest French administrative tribunal.181 The Conseil d’Etat has regularly applied
this principle in the context of administrative review, requiring that the measure
reviewed should not be excessive and ensuring that balance is achieved between the
prohibitions to be imposed and the ends to be pursued.182 The use of the
‘proportionality test’ by the Conseil d’Etat is particularly noteworthy as its
references to this principle increased roughly five-fold between the period of 20012005 and 2010-2015, even though the number of decisions declined by more than a
third.183
The UK is another country where domestic courts appear to have adopted the
‘proportionality test’ in their constitutional and administrative review processes. As
demonstrated by Cora Chan, the UK courts have adopted the ‘proportionality test’ in
human right adjudications.184 However, UK courts have applied this test with
varying degrees of rigor in different situations. In cases which are ‘not manifestly
disproportionate’, the courts generally defer to the judgement of the original decision
maker through applying a ‘reasonableness’ test. However, in the event of an
apparently severe violation of human rights, the courts tend to apply a more rigorous
test that does not simply inquire as to the reasonableness of the measure, but rather
adopts the full scale of structured proportionality analysis. Thus, the UK courts
generally intervene only when the measure is ‘manifestly disproportionate’.185
This underlying proportionality principle is also adopted by the local courts in postcommunist countries in Eastern Europe.186 For example, the Constitutional Court of
Poland has regularly adopted the principle of proportionality to review the
constitutionality of statutory provisions that affect human rights and personal
freedoms. To review whether a legal order is proportionate, three key issues are
181
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raised by the Polish Constitutional Court: ‘1) is the regulation capable of achieving
the intended objectives; 2) is this regulation necessary to protect the public interest it
refers to; 3) are its results proportional to the burdens imposed on citizens?’187
Similarly, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has also reviewed the constitutionality
of internal legal orders by noting the requirements of the principle of
proportionality.188 By the adoption of the principle of proportionality, these courts
provide a clear standard to test the legitimacy of the limitation of a private right or
freedom by the state government.
The brief survey above demonstrates that, despite the absence of an express
provision within domestic legislation, the courts in a number of European countries
usually employ the doctrine of proportionality in the context of judicial scrutiny. The
widespread use of the proportionality review within public law regimes affirms the
conceptual flexibility of the ‘proportionality test’ for the legitimacy of challenged
governmental measures. Not only is the principle widely used by the Strasbourg
Court, but the proportionality analysis has also found a place in domestic courts
across legal traditions and systems. Due to its frequent appearance in both
international and domestic public law, the advent of the proportionality test helps to
establish a broad consensus across international and domestic legal bodies regarding
the way in which government acts should be controlled or regulated.

D. Conclusions
As can be seen from the analysis in this chapter, the Court has developed extensive
jurisprudence on the notion of property protection under P1-1 against all sorts of
regulatory interference that amount to expropriation. To give ‘practical and
effective’ protection, the meaning of possessions has been interpreted expansively to
include all types of properties. To ensure property rights protections, since the case
of Sporrong in 1982, the ECtHR has extended the concept of possessions beyond
tangible property to encompass other types of intangible assets that confer economic
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benefits to property owners. However, these possessions usually exclude mere
unreasonable or speculative expectations.
The ECtHR has also identified governmental measures that fall within each type of
interference stipulated within P1-1, and the circumstances under which a
compensation duty is triggered. While the ECtHR respects any European state’s
‘margin of appreciation’ in carrying out measures for public purposes under
domestic laws, the ECtHR may perform judicial review and provide redress to
injured property owners when the measures in question are arbitrary and impose
excessive burdens. Case-law analysis reveals that the ECtHR usually requires
compensation to be paid when the measure is so extreme that it deprives the property
owner of their entitlement to property rights. However, in the case of a measure
falling short of total deprivation, but nevertheless limiting the use of property, the
ECtHR usually holds that compensation is required to guard against disproportionate
burdens and to strike a fair balance between public and private interests. However,
no full compensation may be required.
The precedents set by the ECtHR and the national courts of member nations make it
uncontroversial to predict that the ECtHR will keep reconciling competing interests
by applying the ‘proportionality test’ to balance the means used against the ultimate
goals, and will keep using compensation as a tool to strike a fair balance between
public and private interests.
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CHAPTER VIII
COMPENSABLE REGULATORY TAKINGS UNDER DOMESTIC LAWS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CASE STUDIES FROM THAILAND AND
MEXICO

The protection of property rights against regulatory and administrative interference
has emerged not only in developed countries, but also in developing countries, where
there is a growing concern regarding the controls imposed by public bodies. Similar
to the experience of the United States, elite groups have played a significant
administrative role in developing countries. As these developing countries evolve,
the protection of private property rights is becoming increasingly important. A
corollary of the growing dominance of property right protections is the need for
government intervention, in order to regulate private property in a manner that
ensures the fair protection of public interests. Due to the intensive regulatory
intervention of governments within developing countries, property owners together
with diverse interest groups advocate for the stronger protection of property rights.
The inevitable consequence of these movements is a growing tension between
competing public and private interests. Domestic courts, in both developed and
developing countries, have attempted to overcome the conflict between public and
private interests by articulating legal principles that can determine the extent to
which interference is permissible, without incurring liability.
Indirect expropriation jurisprudence in developing countries is very limited.1
Domestic courts in developing countries, such as Thailand, have little experience in
dealing with the loss arising from lawful regulatory interference, or other similar
incidences not based on wrongful acts.2 Since courts in developing countries are still
in the early stages of development, the legal outcome of regulatory taking claims -
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and in particular, the key factors that courts should consider and apply within these
cases - is unpredictable. Due to this limitation, some state authorities in those
countries might excessively regulate and unnecessarily infringe protected
constitutional rights.3
This Chapter will examine the legal principles pertaining to compensable regulatory
takings developed by domestic courts within the selected jurisdictions of Thailand
and Mexico. In addition to outlining relevant historical events, this Chapter will
highlight the legal mechanisms that are used to resolve regulatory takings disputes in
these two countries. It then studies the basic takings clauses contained in the
respective constitutional and administrative laws of Thailand and Mexico. Armed
with this knowledge, the Chapter will then move to an examination of the takings
jurisprudence developed by domestic courts in both countries. This examination
covers a wide range of issues, such as the notions of protected property rights,
doctrinal concepts of regulatory takings and the standards of compensation. Finally,
it will evaluate the potential efficacy of the legal principles on regulatory takings,
which have emerged from the domestic courts in each country.
Notwithstanding their different historical backgrounds, and the limited nature of
their regulatory takings jurisprudence, this chapter argues that both Thailand and
Mexico have actively developed principles of constitutional and administrative law
to resolve this kind of dispute. It also argues that despite the early development of
jurisprudence, the courts in both countries show a certain degree of legal
convergence of regulatory takings principles.

A. Evolution of State Rights to Regulate and the Emergence of Property
Rights Protection: Thailand and Mexico
Both Thailand and Mexico have encountered similar pressures, in relation to
economic and social struggles, within internal political institutions. Although both
countries have enacted constitutions to safeguard individual rights, they similarly
3
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reserve the state power to regulate private property, subject to certain conditions. The
following section will examine the evolution of state regulatory power and its
interaction with property rights protection in Thailand and Mexico.
1. Thailand
In Thailand, property rights were originally conceptualized as ‘usufruct rights’,
which refers to the right of an individual to use or enjoy property belonging to
others.4 Before the revolution in 1932, the King held supreme royal power to rule the
country; including absolute power to control his own people and to grant individuals
and groups of elites the right to cultivate, and enjoy the benefits of, his land.5
A period of modernization occurred during the reign of King Rama V (King
Chulalongkorn, 1853-1910) and his successor King Rama VI (King Vajiravudh,
1881-1925). During this time, Thailand went through extensive reforms inspired by
‘western techniques of science, warfare, positivist law and colonial government’6 in
order to create a more modern and progressive society. In particular, the civil law
tradition from Continental Europe and a new system of Thai public administration,
courts, codes and professions were all introduced, culminating in constitutional
reform in 1932.7
From the late 19th until the early 20th century, a new formal system of land law and
property registry was introduced.8 As part of a new regime, human rights protection
was also recognized in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (‘Thai
Constitution’) in 1949,9 following the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in
1948.10 To protect individuals against abuses of power by the government, the new
Thai Constitution introduced, for the first time, protection from unfair acquisition of
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private land.11 It was stipulated that the state power to appropriate and confiscate the
land of an individual must only be exercised for public purposes, and is subject to
compensation. This provision has been adopted in all subsequent constitutions since
then.12
Besides the protection against unlawful acquisition of land, a series of Thai
constitutions have also included provisions to safeguard individuals’ property rights
from intrusive state laws and regulations. These guaranteed everyone the right to be
protected from unjust regulations on property rights. However, the protection of
property rights as such is also generally subject to the terms and conditions
determined by laws.13 Therefore, the degree of property protection is conditional, not
absolute.
The Thai Constitutions B.E. 2540 (1997) and 2550 (2007) precluded the State from
exercising its power or enacting laws in a manner detrimental to the constitutionally
protected rights. Both constitutions stated that individual rights and liberties could
only be restricted to the extent that is necessary and without affecting essential
elements of such rights.14 This concept is also contained in the new Thai
Constitution B.E. 2560 (2017), which specifically states that ‘…law shall not be
contrary to the rule of law, shall not unreasonably impose burden on or restrict the
rights or liberties of a person’.15 These fundamental principles found within a series
of Thai constitutions have a strict, legally binding effect on Thai legislatures and
state agencies.
In order to redress harm caused by legislation that conflicts with constitutionally
protected rights, the 1997 Thai Constitution established the Thai Constitutional
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Court,16 and since then, the Constitutional Court has been granted jurisdiction over
all constitutional matters.17 Historically, prior to the establishment of the
Constitutional Court in Thailand, the Court of Justice was the only competent court
with jurisdiction to oversee the constitutional validity of the law.18 Despite the
existence of this institution, constitutional review prior to 1997 was not undertaken
on a regular basis, through any specialized agent.19 After a long political struggle
regarding the demand for constitutionalism in Thailand, amendments were made to
the Thai Constitution in 1997 to provide greater support for, and protection of, the
individual rights of Thai people. For this reason, the 1997 Thai Constitution was
widely regarded as a landmark in Thailand’s democratic constitutional reform.20
Currently, the Constitutional Court is the only court that is able to review the
constitutionality of enacted legislation.21 When legislation is found to be
unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court can declare the law void and ineffective. 22
The decision of the Constitutional Court is final and binds the National Assembly,
Council of Ministers, Courts and all State organs.23
Aside from constitutional review, citizens may also challenge executive powers that
interfere adversely with their private interests through the Administrative Court of
Thailand. This Court is the main public body with the ability to oversee the legality
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of the administrative actions of public authorities.24 The origin of Administrative
Law and the Administrative Court, in Thailand, can be traced back to 1874 when
King Chulalongkorn (King Rama V, 1853-1910) established an advisory organ
called the ‘Council of State’. The Council of State performed both a consultative and
an adjudicative function similar to the Conseil d’Etat in France. However, at that
time, the Council of State had limited adjudicative functions, as separate legislation
was required for it to judge administrative cases.25 Consequently, the Petition Act
was promulgated in 194926 and established the ‘Petition Commission’ to examine
petitions submitted by people who claimed to have suffered from damage caused by
state authorities.27
In 1979, the Council of State Act, B.E. 2522 (1979) was introduced to empower the
Council of State to operate as both a ‘legal councilor’ for statutory drafters, and a
‘petition councilor’ with specialist knowledge of the unique characteristics of
administrative cases.28 This Act permitted the Council of State to perform both
functions, and operate in a manner similar to most Councils of State within Europe.29
Interestingly, the term ‘Administrative Court’ was not used at this point in time as
the existing judges had strongly opposed the formation of a new court with a new
jurisdiction.30 This situation changed in 1997, however, when a new constitution was
adopted. The 1997 Thai Constitution laid the foundation for stable government by
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implementing various ‘watchdog’ organizations to tackle corruption, and including
provisions designed to protect basic human rights from the abusive use of power by
government.31 As a consequence, the Administrative Court was set up pursuant to
the new Constitution, as well as the Act on the Establishment of Administrative
Courts and Administrative Court Procedures B.E 2542 (1999) (the ‘Administrative
Act’). In 2001, the Administrative Courts began operating and replaced the Petition
Council of the Council of State.32
The jurisdiction of Administrative Courts is wide. Fundamentally, under Article 9 of
the Administrative Act, the courts have jurisdiction in relation to public bodies that:
act beyond their scope of power; behave in a manner inconsistent with law;
improperly exercise discretionary power; or engage in other wrongful acts.33 In
addition to a wide range of unjust actions, Administrative Courts of Thailand are
also exclusively vested with judicial power under to adjudicate disputes concerning
‘other liability’ arising from legitimate administrative acts or orders. Under Article
9(3), the Administrative Courts is empowered to consider:
[a] case involving a wrongful act or other liability arising from the exercising
of administrative act under the law or a by-law, administrative order or other
order, or from the neglect of official duties required by law to be performed or
the performance of such duties with unreasonable delay. (emphasis added)
The drafters incorporated this provision in order to prevent injury resulting from
‘lawful administrative acts’ that harm property rights in a manner equivalent to
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property confiscation.34 The right to sue state authorities through the Administrative
Courts, under Article 9(3), is acknowledged by the Thai Constitution.35 To redress
injury caused by an administrative act, Administrative Courts can nullify or revoke
public administrative orders, or award compensation to aggrieved petitioners who
suffer from the administrative actions.36
The scope of ‘other liability’ under Article 9(3) of the Administrative Act is
nevertheless uncertain, as Thai courts most regularly impose remedial actions to
redress loss based on fault, or the wrongful acts of state agencies or public officers.37
This is different from France, which has long recognized that state liability is not
limited to a finding of fault alone, but also extends to forms of harm caused by the
otherwise lawful actions of a state agency in its pursuit of desired social goals. 38
Although the Thai Administrative Courts have heard a number of cases concerning
‘other liability’, Thailand, nevertheless, has less experience in the development of
jurisprudence relating to the ambiguous concept of ‘other liability’ under Article
9(3).39
2. Mexico
The Mexican property rights regime was similar to Thailand. Land and natural
resources were originally owned by a few favored groups of individuals. Mexico was
a colony of Spain for nearly three hundred years. During the colonial period, Spain
brought many changes to the country. Besides new technologies, Spanish conquerors
also introduced Christianity to the newfound lands. However, conquering Spaniards
also took so many natural resources (e.g. valuable silver mines) from Mexico and
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other colonies in Latin America. Spanish conquerors thus played a great role in
ruling and administrating Mexico in the colonial time.40
After the declaration of independence in 1810, Mexico was born as a Republic and
moved to a monarchy system in the 1820s. Despite being independent, the country
faced many internal problems, including the wars between the conservative and the
liberal groups, the role of Catholic Church, foreign influence over domestic affairs,
the status of poor and indigenous people,41 and the problem of unequal distribution
of land ownership in which vast amount of properties owned by a few companies
and wealthy individuals.42 From the study by Signet, in the 19th century, one-fifths of
the natural resources in the country were apparently owned by a minority group of
people and by 1910, 90 percent of rural land was owned by only 800 owners.43
Responding to the problems incurred, President Benito Juarez started the process of
expropriation in 1850s and redistributed the properties of the Catholic Church to
weaken its power and to force these properties to be traded by people in general.44 A
strong socialist movement in the country after the 1910 Revolution then led to the
promulgation of the Constitution in 1917 so as to enhance a fairer system of resource
distributions within the country.45
As a result, Article 27 of the Constitution of the United Mexican States 1917
(‘Mexican Constitution’),46 which is considered to be a ‘post-revolutionary model’,47
was enacted and entitled the State to ownership of all natural resources in its
territory.48 In addition, it vests the State with the right to impose limitations on
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private property for public purposes,49 and prohibits foreign nationals from acquiring
ownership of land, water or concessions for exploitative ends.50 As a consequence,
the Mexican government acquired a great deal of real property and distributed land
to poor farmers for agricultural purposes.51 As Azuela notes, these provisions were
the ‘foundation program of the Revolution’; granting the State ample power to
acquire land and to direct economic activity within the country.52
Notwithstanding its extensive power to regulate, the government is still required to
respect individual property rights. As seen in Article 27, private property can be
expropriated; however, this power can only be exercised for the benefit of the public
and is subject to the payment of indemnity.53 This provision aims to prevent the
implementation of confiscatory legislation that breaches individual property rights.
In addition, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 imposes a limitation on executive
power in order to prevent abusive interference with private property. 54 Although the
government has broad authority to regulate private property rights, a property owner
can challenge the constitutionality of both legislation and administrative acts,
through the Court of Justice, by means of ‘amparo’ lawsuits. An amparo (meaning
to ‘shelter’ or ‘protect’), aims at safeguarding an individual from an arbitrary use of
power by the government, which is contrary to constitutionally protected rights. 55 If
successfully challenged, the law in question can no longer be applied to the
petitioners, but is still enforceable and applicable to the public in general. 56 Although
a successful amparo claim does not grant the petitioner any right to compensation,57
the Supreme Court may declare the legislation or administrative acts null and
ineffective.
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B. Jurisprudence on Regulatory Takings
This Section will focus on the development of related-regulatory takings principles
under Thai and Mexican law. The study encompasses three key areas: the scope of
protected property rights; the concepts of regulatory takings developed by domestic
courts and the standards of compensation.
1. Protected Property Rights in Public Law
(a) Thailand
The Thai Constitution and the Administrative Act do not contain a specific definition
of the protected property rights. However, a survey of jurisprudence shows that both
Constitutional and Administrative Courts of Thailand tend to grant injured property
owners legal redress for harm to either movable or immovable property.
The Constitution Court has long affirmed that State laws, which unreasonably
violate property rights, are unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court has invalidated
those laws that diminish the benefits enjoyed by property owners in relation to either
tangible or intangible properties. In Constitutional Court Ruling No. 13/2556
(2013),58 for example, which concerned the constitutionality of Article 30 of the
Provisional Waterworks Act of B.E. 2522,59 the Court held that although the State
did not acquire private land and the disputed pipeline was laid on the site to serve
public interests, the provision was unconstitutional because it did not fulfill the duty
to compensate. The Court held that a statutory provision which vests the State
Authority with a power to intrude into, and limit the use of, land, is
unconstitutionally unreasonable, and requires the provision of compensation.60
Likewise, the Court has also heard a claim concerning a challenge over the
constitutionality of Articles 74-82 of the Emergency Decree on the Establishment of
Thai Asset Management Corporation, B.E. 2544 (2011), which governs the
establishment and administration of the Thai Asset Management Company (TAMC).

58

Constitutional Court Ruling No 13/2556.
Provisional Waterworks Act, B.E. 2522 (1979) art 30 states that ‘[n]o compensation for the State to
lay the pipeline across an individual property.’ [Kiratipong Naewmalee trans].
60
Constitutional Court Ruling No 13/2556 [Kiratipong Naewmalee trans].
59

255

The TAMC was set up with broad powers to resolve the debt restructuring problems
that occurred during the economic crisis in 1997. The TAMC was required to
manage assets owned by debtors, sell their purchased properties at the negotiated
value, and repay the proceeds to the creditors. The Constitutional Court held that the
powers of the TAMC, as stipulated under Article 74-82, were compliant with the
Thai Constitution and did not impinge upon the essence of property ownership, and
all the rights attached to the same.61 Although no violation of constitutional rights
was ultimately found, this case demonstrates that the Constitutional Court cannot
refuse a case in which there is an alleged violation of property rights, which may
encompass both tangible and intangible assets.
Decisions by Administrative Courts also reveal a broad range of properties and
interests that may be affected by administrative conduct and subject to protection
under the Administrative Act. For example, in the judgment of the Supreme
Administrative Court No. 37/2545,62 the landowner alleged that the Electricity
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) had paid unfair compensation for its
installation of electric power lines on his land. Under the Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand Act B.E. 2511 (‘EGAT Act’), EGAT does not need to seek the
permission of landowners before it installs electrical lines or power generators on
their private land. Although EGAT does not acquire the land, its installation of poles
and electrical lines inhibits the use of property by the property owner. The
landowner, thus, successfully made a claim for compensation. Following this, the
Administrative Courts have heard a number of cases with respect to disputed
regulatory takings of immovable property. Some of these cases include the
installation of electrical lines on private property,63 and the construction of a truckweight checkpoint, which blocked access to private land.64
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In addition to claims involving tangible property, Administrative Courts have also
adjudicated disputes arising from administrative actions violating intangible property
rights, such as contractual rights and legitimate expectations. The Supreme
Administrative Court Judgment No. 215/2552,65 for example, concerned unfair
compensation arising from harm caused by the installation of an electricity power
line that passed across the privately owned land of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff
demanded higher compensation, since the electrical line caused devaluation of the
land price and directly affected the Plaintiff’s plan to build a factory. 66 The
Defendant insisted that the compensation was adequate and was made in accordance
with the law governing acts by EGAT. In addition, the Defendant also argued that
the Plaintiff lacked evidence to support its alleged factory investment plan in that
area.67 The Supreme Administrative Court held that the Plaintiff’s land was located
in an industrial real estate park and that the Plaintiff was the owner of a number of
chemical factories. Based on the potential growth of the business in the future, the
Court held that it was reasonable to believe that the installation of the electrical line
across the Plaintiff’s property could substantially affect the business investment
plans of the Plaintiff.68 The Court upheld the decision by the Court of First Instance,
and agreed that the amount of compensation awarded by the Defendant was
insufficient.69
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Administrative Court Judgment No. 180/2554,70
the State’s refusal to grant a permit for the renewal of plantation forestry was
challenged on the basis that it prevented the Plaintiff from accessing and harvesting
the plantation forest. The Court held that the State’s conduct substantially impacted
the Plaintiff, as it amounted to a revocation of license, and removed a future stream
of benefits reasonably expected by the Plaintiff.71 The State action in question,
therefore, affected contractual rights reasonably expected by the Plaintiff.
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(b) Mexico
Under Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution, the State is vested with an
authority to regulate private property. However, a claimant may challenge the
constitutionality of the government measure through an amparo proceeding. The
Federal Supreme Court of Mexico has asserted that intangible property falls within
the scope of the general constitutional protection from unlawful public action. In the
context of conducting review within an amparo suit, the Supreme Court of Mexico
considered claims raised by the Mexican Petroleum Company of California against
acts of the Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor and its agents for the
violation of among other things Article 27 of the Federal Constitution.72 In this case,
the Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor revoked the operating permit of the
Mexican Petroleum Company on the ground that it had failed to comply with the
new Petroleum Law, by not applying for a confirmatory concession within one year
after the date of the promulgation of the Law.73 Through amparo lawsuit
proceedings, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the Plaintiff, holding that the
discontinuation of the permit was contrary to the constitutional guaranties. In its
decision, the Supreme Court simply found that the revocation was contrary to the
pre-existing rights that the Plaintiff had been guaranteed by the old Petroleum Law,
which covered a concession period of up to fifty years.74 In this case, the Supreme
Court held that intangible property rights are regarded as part of generally protected
constitutional rights. Based on the Court’s decision, the ‘right of exploration’ was
regarded as a protected individual interest under the Constitution. Therefore,
constitutional protection encompasses intangible property and claimant’s legitimate
expectations to operate an oil drilling business, arising from a permit previously
granted by the State.75
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2. Developing a Legal Framework for Regulatory Takings
(a) Thailand
(i) Before the Thai Constitution B.E. 2540 (1997)
Prior to the implementation of the 1997 Thai Constitution, the Court of Justice was
the sole judicial organ with the power to consider cases concerning the
constitutionality of legislation and administrative actions. From 1932-1996, the
Court of Justice heard a significant number of cases that involved the acquisition of
private property by public authorities.76 In addition, the Court of Justice also
considered government actions that amounted to expropriation contrary to
constitutional rights.77 For example, in Supreme Court Judgment No. 2383/2526
(1983), the Plaintiff claimed that his application for business registration was
wrongfully rejected by government officers and this decision violated, among other
things, Article 33 of the Thai Constitution B.E. 2521 (1978).78 The officers argued
that since the Plaintiff’s business involved trading of commodities for future
contracts, the business was risky and could produce unexpected harmful effects to
the economy. The Business Registrar Office deferred approval, causing a lengthy
delay for business operations. The officials argued that, to be eligible for a business
registration, the Plaintiff had to first obtain an approval from the Commerce
Minister, as the business was new and there was no specific law governing this type
of business. The Supreme Court held that a deferral of business approval was lawful
only if decided in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the law. Since the
business was not contrary to public order and security, public officers could not defer
76
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the application once it had been made.79 In this case, the Supreme Court found that
the deferral was unlawful and contrary to the rights protected by the constitution.
Whilst the Court held that a public authority’s inaction could give rise to liability, it
failed to articulate any legal threshold, or criteria, with which to determine when
such inaction could amount to an unconstitutional taking.
(ii) After the Establishment of the Constitutional Court and the Administrative
Courts in 1999
Under the existing regime of property rights protection, created by the Thai
Constitution of 1997, negative impacts on property owners resulting from lawful
legislation and administrative actions are likely to be remediable. As previously
discussed, both types of courts have different jurisdictional power. However, both
have to adhere to fundamental Constitutional principles, which require any
interference with individual property rights and liberties to be made in accordance
with the law,80 and to not destroy the essential elements of property.81
The following sections investigate the jurisprudence on regulatory takings developed
by both the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Courts, pursuant to Thai
Constitution B.E. 2540 (1997) and Thai Constitution B.E. 2550 (2007).82 Despite the
growing attention that has been devoted to this issue, legal reasoning and theories
developed by Thai domestic courts are often brief, vague and, in comparison to the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the ECtHR, devoid of rigor.
Nevertheless, the Thai domestic courts tend to systematically apply the
‘proportionality test’, in order to assess the overall balance of the measure in
question.
The Constitutional Court of Thailand
The Thai Constitutional Court heard a number of cases during the period of 19992016, concerning the constitutional validity of legislation that impacted upon the
protection of property rights under Article 48 of the 1997 Thai Constitution, Article
79
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41 of the 2007 Thai Constitution, and the general rights and freedoms of Thai
people, under Article 29.83
Initially, the Constitutional Court of Thailand did not develop a sophisticated legal
doctrine to identify whether legislation is constitutionally valid or subject to
revocation. For example, in Constitutional Court Ruling No. 26-34/2545 (2002), the
Court determined a challenge to the constitutionality of the Emergency Decree on
the Financial Institution for Asset Management. The Decree entitled the State to
administer the acquiring, purchasing, rehabilitating and reselling of properties that it
purchased from bankrupt banks and other troubled financial institutions. The
Plaintiff argued that the Decree was unconstitutional as the forced transfer of assets
by the Asset Management Company unconstitutionally ‘limited the rights over
property’ enjoyed by the Plaintiff.84 The Constitutional Court held that since the
Decree was to help troubled financial institutions, and to resolve the economic crisis
in the country caused by the economic turmoil in 1997,85 the Decree was applied to
all troubled banks and companies equally and non-discriminatorily.86 In addition, the
Decree did not alter any fundamental rights and duties of the parties involved in the
rehabilitation processes.87 Therefore, without engaging in detailed analysis, the
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Constitutional Court held that the Decree did comply with the requirements of
Articles 48 and 29 of the 1997 Thai Constitution.88
After nearly a decade, the Constitutional Court of Thailand developed a clearer legal
doctrine. In the Constitutional Court Ruling No. 4-21/2554 (2011),89 the Court
reviewed the constitutionality of the Emergency Decree on the Financial Institution
for Asset Management, which governed the forced transfer of troubled businesses
and the arrangement of the auction of bankrupt financial companies by the Thai
Asset Management Corporation. The Court expressly applied the ‘proportionality
test’ in its ruling. Providing a more sophisticated analysis, the Court began by
assessing the necessity of the Decree. It held that the purpose of the Decree was to
help troubled financial institutions and to resolve the instability caused by the
national economic crisis in 1997.90 The Court further asserted that the forced transfer
of private property did not impose an ‘excessive burden’ on property owners and
‘did not materially affect the substance of the rights and liberties warranted by the
Constitution’.91 Thus, the Court took into consideration both the Parliament’s margin
of appreciation and the burden it imposed on individual property owners.92
The Court adopted a similar doctrine in the Constitutional Court Ruling No.13/2556
(2013).93 This case concerned the constitutionality of Article 30 of the Provincial
Waterworks Authority Act B.E. 2522,94 which allows the State to lay down water
pipelines on private property in the absence of any obligation to pay compensation.
The Court held that the laying of water pipes served public interests,95 as this
provision aimed to facilitate the construction of a public water network to promote
the wellbeing of citizens.96 Such an intrusion, however, deprives the landowner of
the right to beneficial enjoyment of the property.97 As no compensation was required
under Article 30, the Court found that the Act breached private property rights,

88

Ibid.
Constitutional Court Ruling No 4-21/2554.
90
Ibid 23.
91
Ibid.
92
This concept was followed by Constitutional Court No 31-32/2554.
93
Constitutional Court Ruling No 13/2556.
94
Waterwork Act 2522.
95
Constitutional Court Ruling No 13/2556, 5.
96
Ibid 6.
97
Ibid 7.
89

262

protected under the Constitution,98 and imposed ‘an excessive and disproportionate
burden and severely impaired the essence of property rights’ since, for example, the
owner of property could no longer build a house or plant trees on the land.99
Ultimately, the Court held that this provision breached Article 29 of the Constitution,
and was void and unenforceable.100
The selected case studies demonstrate that the Constitutional Court tends to apply
the ‘proportionality test’ when declaring a law unconstitutional. Although the Thai
Constitution fundamentally accepts the State’s right to interfere with private property
for the benefit of public interests, the Court has also attempted to counterbalance
state sovereignty with individual rights. The Court examines whether the law in
question properly protects property rights or whether it materially affects the essence
of those rights. To ensure that the legislation strikes an appropriate balance and does
not impose an excessive burden on an individual who suffers from loss due to the
regulatory interference, the Court has established that the enacted legislation must
satisfy a necessity test, and that the means used is proportional to the goals being
pursued. Whilst these case studies have illustrated that the Court adopts a balancing
test in its analysis, this test is arguably still in its early stage of doctrinal
development to be refined.
The Administrative Courts
Thai Administrative Courts have long held that administrative actions interfering
with property rights, pursuant to state regulations or by-laws, can trigger legal
liability, even if the government does not actually acquire title or possession of
property. To ascertain whether a regulatory interference amounts to a regulatory
taking, the Administrative Courts have adopted Article 9 (3) of the Administrative
Act to review disputes in relation to any ‘other liability’ in association with the
administration or public official acts.101
The Administrative Act does not contain a provision defining the nature or scope of
the term, ‘other liability’. However, the Administrative Courts have been inspired by
98
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the legal principle enshrined in French administrative law, asserting that an act of an
administrative officer can trigger liability when it places too heavy a burden on the
property owner and is not equally distributed among citizens.102 Since 1999,
Administrative Courts have heard a number of disputes, and developed doctrinal
principles, regarding regulatory takings under Article 9(3). These disputes can be
classified into two main areas: (i) a government’s failure to pay compensation as
determined by the law, and (ii) liability not based on fault, as developed by the
Administrative Courts.
In relation to the first category, Administrative Courts have long held that the
government is liable for an injury caused by legitimate public works under the law,
and that the failure to pay compensation is unconstitutional.103 For example, in the
Supreme Administrative Court Judgment No. 37/2545 (2002),104 which concerned a
request for fair compensation for harm resulting from the installation of electrical
lines over the land of the Plaintiff, the Court held that EGAT has an obligation to pay
compensation, as required by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand Act,
B.E. 2511 (1968) (EGAT Act), despite the fact that the landowner still retains
ownership over the land.105 This case demonstrates that, even if the government does
not actually acquire title or possession over property, the property owner has the
right to receive compensation, as prescribed by the law in question, for limitations on
property benefits imposed by the State.106
Alternatively, when there is no written law that explicitly imposes an obligation to
pay compensation, government agencies could be subject to a duty to pay
compensation based on the no-fault liability doctrine. This is a legal principle
adopted from French administrative law,107 which holds that the right to
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compensation can be triggered when an administrative action deprives a property
owner of the right to use property, and the regulatory interference results in an
excessive burden. The government has a duty to pay compensation and this liability
is borne by public.108
This principle has become more frequently applied by Thai Administrative Courts in
recent years. To establish whether the administrative action creates an excessive
burden, the Administrative Courts normally focus upon whether the action is
reasonably practicable in the circumstances, and has a proper relationship with the
expected outcome. In addition, the Court looks at whether the interference is grossly
disproportionate to the objective sought. For example, in Supreme Administrative
Court Judgment No. 525/2547 (2004),109 the Plaintiff claimed compensation for
harm caused by the State’s encroachment onto his private property for the purpose of
road widening. The Court dismissed the case as the Plaintiff failed to pursue the
matter before the expiry of the relevant limitation period, which required the claim
be filed within one year after the time the dispute was known, or ought to have been
known, to the Plaintiff.110 However, the Court admitted at the outset that, despite an
absence of a duty to compensate, legitimate regulatory action, which causes
deprivation of the right to use property, triggers the category of ‘other liability’
associated with the administrative actions. Thus, the interference was subject to
Article 9(3) of the Administrative Act, which obligates the State agency to provide
compensation in circumstances where a regulatory encroachment causes an
excessive burden to the landowner.111
The Supreme Administrative Court has used a similar approach in subsequent cases.
In Supreme Administrative Court Judgement No. 180/2554 (2011),112 it concerned a
denial of the renewal of a permit for forest plantation. The Plaintiff was granted a
permit to plant and harvest timber on State forest land, subject to the condition that
the Plaintiff had to plant and rehabilitate forest in State Forest Land in Nakorn Sri
where three released prisoners committed a bank robbery and the Bank successfully sued the
government to pay compensation for the loss due to the government’s policy of licensing prisoners.
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Thammarat Province. When the planted trees reached harvestable age, the Plaintiff
was entitled to the harvesting rights associated with these trees; however, a
Ministerial Resolution was subsequently released declaring that no plantation
licenses will be issued to anyone and that, in order to prevent undesirable logging of
forest resources, access to the plantation forest areas will be strictly prohibited.113
Following this Ministerial Resolution, the Royal Forest Department refused to renew
a license for the Plaintiff and it did not pay compensation for the loss and damage the
Plaintiff had suffered from the announced Ministerial Resolution. The Defendant
asserted that the non-renewal of a license was justified on the ground that such an
action was taken in compliance with the Ministerial Resolution, which was issued in
the public interests, and that it had no duty to pay compensation. According to
Article 20 of the National Reserved Forest Act, B.E. 2515, compensation is paid
only on the grounds of suspension or revocation of licenses. In this case, however,
the State simply did not renew the license.
Based on the evidence, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the Ministerial
Resolution was justifiable and lawful for the purpose of environmental protection.114
However, the Court held that despite an absence of license suspension or revocation,
the non-renewal of the permit, following the Ministerial Resolution, caused
substantial loss to the future economic benefits that could be reasonably expected by
the property owner, and this resulted in an ‘excessive burden’ borne by the
Plaintiff.115 To redress the loss, the Court held that the Plaintiff was entitled to
compensation under Article 9(3) of the Administrative Act.116
More recently, in the Supreme Administrative Court Judgment No. 29/2557
(2014),117 the Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand developed a more
sophisticated way of analyzing the object of Article 9(3). Rather than just focusing
on the effect of the measure, the Court also explicitly took into account the ‘principle
of proportionality’ and the ‘balance of burden’ borne by the affected individual. In
this case, the Plaintiff claimed that state construction of a truck-weighing station in
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front of their land restricted access, which abruptly diminished the price of the land
as well as its’ future business opportunities.118 In addition to seeking an injunction to
prevent the construction of the truck-weighing station, the Plaintiff also claimed
compensation for loss of land value.119
The Supreme Administrative Court held that the truck checkpoint was constructed in
accordance with acceptable standards,120 and that the State did not acquire any part
of the land nor did it take possession of any part of land ownership.121 Applying the
‘proportionality test’, the Court held that the benefits of the planned construction
outweighed the impacts caused by its construction, since the new weigh station was
necessary to control the overloading of vehicles that may cause damage to the
roads.122 However, the Court asserted that by not paying compensation to the
landowner, who suffered from the construction, the State imposed an ‘excessive
burden’ on the Plaintiff, and therefore could not avoid the duty to compensate.123
The above case analysis demonstrates that Thai Administrative Courts do not only
focus on the impact of administrative measures on the property rights in question,
but also factors such as the ‘principle of proportionality’ and the ‘balance of burden’.
Although the Administrative Courts accept the State’s margin of appreciation to
regulate private property for public interests, the State has a duty to compensate
those who suffer from the loss caused by a special sacrifice for the reason of public
policy. Compensation is paid on the ground that the responsibility should be fairly
shared among beneficiaries in society so that the victims who suffer from the
regulatory interference are not the only persons who bear the excessive burden
resulting from state measures.124
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(b) Developing Legal Framework for Regulatory Takings in Mexico
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution serves as the ‘foundation for the
government’s authority to regulate property’.125 It states that:
…Private property shall be not be expropriated except for reasons of public use and
subject to payment of indemnity.
The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property such
limitations as the public interest may demand, as well as the right to regulate the
utilization of natural resources which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to
conserve them and to ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth. With this
end in view, necessary measures shall be taken to divide up large landed estates; to
develop small landed holdings in operation; to create new agricultural centers, with
necessary lands and waters; to encourage agriculture in general and to prevent the
destruction of natural resources, and to protect property from damage to the detriment
of society…126

According to this provision, the Mexican Government is entitled to ‘expropriate’ and
‘regulate’ private property for pursuing public interests.127 The Mexican Constitution
grants a broad power to the congress and the Government to regulate private
property rights for public purposes.128 The Supreme Court of Mexico has long
established that the State is to pay an indemnity only when the property is
expropriated by a formal legal order for public purposes.129
However, in the event of an injury caused by a general public policy that does not
transfer complete property ownership to the State, Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution does not require the State to pay compensation.130 The interpretation of
this provision, by the Supreme Court of Mexico, maintains that indemnification is
not warranted if a regulation is generally applicable and removes only a portion of
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the owner’s right to the property.131 The Court has upheld this legal principle when
deciding disputes arising from a wide range of government policies, such as
regulations to prohibit the construction of chimneys, or other potentially hazardous
structures, that breach town-planning requirements.132
In addition, the Mexican Supreme Court has found that the State transformation of
tangible private properties into national properties that stimulate a sense of national
pride does not trigger the constitutional duty to compensate.133 During the 1930s, the
federal government exercised ‘de facto control’ in declaring many land plots as
archeological sites,134 and thereby forced the owners of those private properties to
allow free public access.135 The strong sense of patriotism in Mexico played a
fundamental part in the State’s justification for imposing these restrictions on private
property without incurring any duty to compensate. Thus, if the Mexican
Government can show that regulatory interference is for public interests, and does
not fully deprive the property rights or economic use, then the state action is unlikely
to constitute a compensable expropriation.136
3. Compensation Obligations In Relation to Regulatory Takings
(a) Thailand
The jurisdiction of the Thai Constitutional Court is limited to reviewing the
constitutionality of state laws; that is, it can only declare state laws invalid if they are
found unconstitutional. This is different to the jurisdiction of the Thai Administrative
Courts, which possess the judicial authority to review the lawfulness and
reasonableness of decisions or acts of public officials. When a Thai Administrative
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Court revokes an administrative order, the subject of such an administrative order is
entitled to claim for compensation for bona fide reliance on the order.137
Besides unlawful acts, a natural legal and juristic person may claim compensation
for loss arising from the State’s exercise of legitimate public power, by virtue of the
‘other liability’ clause in Article 9 (3) of the Administrative Act. In such a case, the
compensation rendered by the Administrative Court can be characterized as falling
into two main categories. These are: the enforcement of compensation as stipulated
by the written law,138 and the claiming compensation based on the judgment of the
courts.139
(i) Enforcement of Compensation as Stipulated by the Law
Within this category, an injured individual is entitled to make a compensation claim
against a public authority, regarding injury arising from public works. One of the
most contentious issues facing the Administrative Courts is the magnitude of fair
compensation that the State needs to pay to a party who has been injured by an
administrative action. Most legislation does not explicitly define the standard of ‘fair
compensation’.140 Generally, the Administrative Courts grant state authorities the
power to determine the amount of fair compensation by the government agency.
However, when the amount of compensation determined appears to be manifestly
unreasonable, the Administrative Courts may review its appropriateness and
ascertain an alternative amount.
In accordance with ordinary judicial norms, the Administrative Courts award fair
compensation by assessing various relevant factors, beyond calculating the simple
market value of property, including: the nature and type of property, the location of
property, and the intent behind the state interference. For example, based on the
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guideline in the EGAT case, the determination of compensation to redress loss
arising from the installation of electrical lines needs to take into account relevant
factors, such as the land price assessed for tax purposes (rather than the prevailing
market price), the location of the land, the value of plants upon the land, and the
construction and removal costs.141 This method helps to ensure that state authorities
can continue to deliver public services, in the best interests of society, without
bearing the burden of unreasonably high compensation.
(ii) Compensation based on the Judgment of the Courts
When there is no specific legal provision, which explicitly imposes liability upon the
government for damage caused by an administrative action, the Administrative Court
is vested with discretionary power to determine whether the challenged
administrative action is subject to a finding of ‘other liability’ under Article 9 (3) of
the Administrative Act. In such a case, the Administrative Courts possess the
discretion to determine the appropriate amount of compensation to be paid to the
person affected by the act of a public authority.142 Due to an absence of specific law,
within this category of disputes, Administrative Courts may apply the principle of
mutatis mutandis, under Article 438 of the Civil and Commercial Code on Tort
Law.143 This principle requires the Court to take into account the ‘situation and the
gravity of the act’. Since there is no clear guidance on the meaning of ‘situation and
the gravity of the act’, the Court has wide discretion to determine the quantum of
compensation. Often, the Administrative Court calculates compensation after a
consideration of all pertinent factors, so as to ensure that the compensation awarded
is sufficient to redress the loss of the victim, without imposing a disproportionate
burden on the state authority carrying out public works.144 For example, in a ruling
by the Central Administrative Court of Thailand in Judgement No. 1631/2553
(2010),145 a case that concerned the government’s flood management response to the
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2003 monsoon - the Applicant, an owner of rice mills, claimed that the government’s
poor management of water resulted in flood damage to farms and factories in the
adjacent provinces. The Central Administrative Court held that due to the heavy
monsoon, it was impossible to keep all land dry or safe from floods. Moreover, since
the government had warned the residents about the approaching monsoon, it was the
responsibility of the people living in risk areas to stay alert and get prepared. Whilst
the government did its best to accommodate the floods, the Court held that the State
still had a duty to compensate those who suffered property damage, in order to
redress injuries pursuant to Article 9(3) of the Administrative Act. Since there was no
express rule governing compensation in this situation, the Court applied Article 438
(1) of the Civil and Commercial Code of Tort Law to determine the amount of
compensation. Ultimately, the Court awarded Baht 929,241.50 as compensation,
plus the interest that had accrued from the date the damage first occurred. Seeing as
the Court found that the government was not at fault, it exercised its discretion to
award compensation, by including only the cost of damaged rice mills as well the
cost to repair damaged equipment.146 This case illustrates that Thai Administrative
Courts are granted wide discretion in balancing opposing interests through the
assessment of compensation. The Administrative Courts, therefore, are not obligated
to order the agency to pay full compensation for damages incurred.
In sum, within the Thai public law system, the Constitutional Court and the
Administrative Courts tend to balance the conflicting interests between private
individuals on the one hand, and public entities, on the other. While the Courts have
long accepted the supremacy of individual rights, they are sensitive to state
sovereign-rights to regulate for the purposes of public welfare. To maintain a balance
between opposing interests, the rate of compensation is dependent upon a
consideration of relevant factors, such as situation and gravity, the nature, type and
location of the property, the purpose of state interference and the public interests in
question.
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(b) Mexico
In Mexico, the owner of expropriated property is entitled to compensation as
determined by Article 27 of 1917 Constitution. According to the Constitution, which
contains a vague compensation standard for expropriated property, the amount of
payment is generally not based on the fair market value price determined by
consumers, but rather the appraised value for tax purposes determined by state
agencies.147 Therefore, the appraised value might not equal to the property’s market
value, and represent only a fraction of real property value.148 However, when a
regulatory interference merely limits the scope of property rights, the owner of
property is not entitled to obtain compensation.149 Nevertheless, a property owner
suffering from regulatory interference can challenge the constitutionality of the
legislation or administrative act through an amparo lawsuit. While a successful
amparo claim does not grant the right to compensation, it can require the courts to
declare an unconstitutional law or administrative act null and void.150

C. Analysis of the Trends of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence:
Thailand and Mexico
1. Thailand
Only a small number of cases in relation to regulatory takings have been heard and
adjudicated by Thai courts. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court and the
Administrative Courts have developed jurisprudence to evaluate the relationship
between public and private interests, when determining whether a regulatory taking
is compensable. The persuasive use of the ‘proportionality test’ is supported by
recent changes within the legal landscape.
Firstly, due to rapid changes in the social, political and economic development of
Thailand, a wide range of laws and regulations have recently been enacted to
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promote public interests, civil liberties and private property rights. For example, the
Fuel Control Act, B.E. 2542 (1999) was promulgated to regulate fuel oil businesses
in Thailand. It determines the criteria, procedure and conditions for the operation of
fuel oil businesses. According to this legislation, the State can control and regulate
entry into business, and can use or possess immovable property, so as to prevent
hazards arising from oil depots or oil pipeline transportation systems. However,
when State actions harm private property, the property owner can request
compensation.151 Likewise, to regulate the production, conservation, purchasing and
facilitation of the mining industry in Thailand, a mandate has been given to the State
administration under the Thai Minerals Act, B.E. 2510 (1967).152 However, in
accordance with the new Thai Minerals Act, B.E. 2560 (2017),153 the State Authority
is obligated to pay compensation in relation to amendments or reductions to the
concession time to extract minerals, and the cancellation of a mining permit granted
to a right holder for the purposes of national security, public infrastructure or other
public interests.154 Within Thailand’s emerging public law infrastructure, neither a
private entity nor a public body can claim any superiority of rights over the other.
Aside from the issue of changing legislation, a paradigm shift has occurred in the
judicial reasoning of Thai courts in recent years. Instead of placing more weight on
the practical, regulatory role of the State, jurists are more frequently utilizing
balancing tests within their analyses, in order to better reconcile conflicting interests
in society. In Constitutional Court Ruling No. 13/2556 (2013),155 for example, which
concerned the constitutionality of Article 30 of the Provisional Waterworks Act, B.E.
2522 (1979),156 the Court held that, although the State did not acquire private land,
and the pipeline was laid in keeping with public interests, the absence of a duty to
compensate those affected by the public works was unconstitutional as it resulted in
an excessive burden on the property owner. Thus, a provision which vested the State
with power to intrude upon, or limit, the private use of land was unconstitutional. In
this respect, the Court did not use the degree of ‘impact’ as the sole or predominate
151
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factor in identifying the existence of regulatory takings, but rather, it evaluated the
relationship between the means and outcomes of a State measure, when scrutinizing
the constitutionality of laws and administrative acts.
The ‘principle of proportionality’ is well accepted in contemporary Thai
Constitutions. As previously discussed, the hallmark of the proportionality and
reasonableness tests appears in the Thai Constitution B.E. 2550 (2007) article 29157
and the Thai Constitution B.E. 2560 (2017) article 26.158 These legal provisions
imply that the legislature and state authorities should engage in a weighing and
balancing of conflicting constitutional values when enacting law, and the State is not
allowed to intrude upon constitutionally protected rights more than is necessary.159
Since the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the Thai parliament is
compelled to enact laws that meet the requirements within the Constitution.
Administrative agencies are similarly required to commit to the standards of
protection outlined within constitutional

provisions,

by not

imposing a

disproportionate burden on property owners.
2. Mexico
The Supreme Court of Mexico has long held that a regulation that is generally
applicable and does not entirely deprive a property owner of his or her right to use
property does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation.160
However, to challenge the constitutionality of legislation or administrative actions,
an aggrieved party may sue a public authority through an amparo claim, and request
the federal courts to declare the law in question null and ineffective.
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Applications for amparo proceedings have come before the Mexican federal courts
in the context of administrative acts revoking oil-drilling permits. This was first
raised in 1928, when the Mexican Petroleum Company contested the decision of the
Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor to not renew a permit for oil drilling.
The Secretary argued that the revocation was valid and lawful on the ground that the
Mexican Petroleum Company had failed to comply with the new Petroleum Law, by
not applying for a confirmatory concession within one year after the date on which
the Law was promulgated.161 The Supreme Court decided in favor of the Plaintiff,
who argued that the discontinuation of the permit was contrary to the Mexican
Constitution. It found that the revocation was contrary to the pre-existing rights that
the Plaintiff had been guaranteed by the old Petroleum Law, which gave the
concession for a period of up to 50 years.162
Nevertheless, the Court did not set out any general criteria with which to determine
when a government measure, falling short of the full deprivation of property rights,
could be regarded as an unconstitutional regulatory interference subject to
compensation. Mexican courts have never answered this question clearly; instead,
they have developed an abstract but comprehensive set of reviewing standards with
which to scrutinize a regulatory interference. In answering whether the government
can legally apply laws retroactively to the extent that affect the private property
rights, the Mexican Supreme Court has long held that the Court can apply the law in
a retroactive manner given that it is the intent of the legislature. 163 In addition, the
Court developed a broad principle to affirm state sovereign right to regulate private
property for public benefits. It stated that:
When the legislator finds himself faced with simple interests invoked by individuals,
he may suppress such individual rights and sacrifice them for the benefit of the Public
Community ... In the sense, we set as a general rule that law controls actions in the
past when its purpose involves a Public Concern and has before it only private
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interest….The individuals by the very fact of membership in society should sacrifice
164

their private interest in favor of the general welfare.…

According to the underlying concept proposed, the Supreme Court of Mexico
undoubtedly placed a high priority over public utility that permits the control actions
by the government. However, to assess whether the contested regulation contravenes
constitutional requirements, the Mexican Supreme Court has recently adopted the
‘proportionality test’ to determine the validity of law, in the context of rights to
equality in 2004.165 The Court has also applied the ‘three-tier reasonableness test’ in
its criminal and tax cases.166 Its approach to proportionality traverses three
subordinate inquiries; i.e. objectivity of the goals pursued, rationality of the measure,
and the reasonableness of the relationship between the means and the outcomes of
the measure.167 Nevertheless, in addition the proportionality test, the Court has held
that a statute or government action must also pass a ‘strict scrutiny’ test relating to
‘suspect classifications’, which are those touching on race, ethnicity, national origin
and other fundamental rights that strictly cannot be violated.168 In contrast, in the
field of economic law, courts may adopt a ‘weaker scrutiny’ test, which permits the
decision maker to implement a law or measure that affects personal interests that are
not regarded as fundamentally essential.169
In a pertinent case, Judicio de Amparo en Revision 1659/2006,170 the Supreme Court
of Mexico deployed the ‘proportionality test’ to resolve a conflict between individual
and public interests. This case involved a young soldier who was dismissed from the
military after a diagnosis of HIV. The case was presented to the Supreme Court as a
constitutional collision between societal interests, represented by the collective
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capacity of the military forces to carry out their duties, and individual rights based on
the guarantee of equality and non-discrimination in relation to health.171 In February
2007, the Supreme Court of Mexico used the ‘proportionality test’ to adjudicate the
case. It held that the dismissal of the soldier diagnosed as HIV positive imposed an
onerous burden on him. Despite his diagnosis, the soldier would have been able to
remain in the military if he was transferred to an administrative position. Although it
is legitimate for the military to dismiss unhealthy soldiers, so as to maintain the
efficiency of the Mexican armed forces and the security of the country, the Supreme
Court held that the military action collided with the individual right to equality and
non-discrimination.172 As a consequence, the Supreme Court invalidated the military
order, reinstated the soldier to his previous position and granted him all the legal
benefits he had been denied during the dismissal period. Following an examination
of this complex case, Martin concluded that there were four steps taken by the
Supreme Court: (i) an examination of whether the law governing the social security
system of the Mexican armed forces had a constitutionally legitimate aim in enabling
the dismissal of the soldier as a consequence of being HIV positive; (ii) an
examination of whether there was a rational connection between the means and the
ends of the statute; (iii) an examination of whether the measure employed satisfied a
‘least drastic means element’; and (iv) an examination of whether the solution was
proportional to the goal of the statute.173
Although there is no fixed legal formula for the classification of regulatory takings,
the above Mexican case studies illustrate how the courts permit public organs to
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when adopting regulations that infringe
private property rights. Nevertheless, public interests pursued by the State may be
insufficient to justify a non-compensable regulatory interference when they entirely
deprive the owner of property rights. In such an extreme case, some compensation
has to be paid in order to attain an appropriate balance between conflicting interests.
However, in other circumstances, wherein a less-than-full deprivation is found, the
Mexican courts might apply a lower threshold to determine whether a compromise
must be awarded to remedy the impact of a regulatory taking. In such a case, the
171
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interference might be characterized as a compensable regulatory taking, when it fails
the ‘proportionality test’ by imposing an excessive burden on the property owner.

D. Conclusions
The political history of both Thailand and Mexico is characterized by the
concentration of power in the hands of a few elite groups within each country. These
influential groups held great social influence and gained control over large amounts
of property. Due to the momentum of national revolutions, new constitutions were
implemented to protect individual rights and freedoms in each country, reflecting the
growing significance of private property rights. Both Thailand and Mexico have
since then developed legal mechanisms to ensure that property is fairly distributed
and safeguarded against arbitrary interference by public bodies. However, due to
rapid change in the political, economic and social spheres, the need to develop a
judicial test that allows judges to evaluate the relative importance of multiple
conflicting factors has become essential. Given that only a limited number of cases
regarding compensable regulatory interference have been adjudicated, the courts in
both countries are in the early stages of developing the relevant legal principles.
Nevertheless, the manner in which both Thai and Mexican courts have addressed the
issue of regulatory interference illustrates some similar approaches to assessing the
scope of property protection and balancing conflicting interests.
In relation to the scope of property protection, this Chapter has found that the courts
in each country have protected both tangible and intangible property rights. In
Thailand, the courts tend to provide a strong safeguard against regulatory
interference by providing property owners with protection against interference by
public authorities across a broad range of property rights. Thai jurisprudence not
only acknowledges and protects tangible assets, but also all associated rights
attached to the property. The Mexican federal courts have similarly interpreted
constitutional protections of property rights as encompassing a broad range of
private interests, including legitimate expectations.
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To identify the occurrence of a regulatory taking that requires legal redress, each
country has applied a different approach. In Mexico, the courts have set a high
threshold, which the plaintiff must overcome in order to successfully claim
compensation. Thus far, compensation has only been warranted when either the
property’s value or ownership is entirely taken by the State regulatory action and the
action has been adopted in breach of the constitution. Mexican courts can only
declare the measure unconstitutional and void through amparo proceedings. Whilst
jurisprudence regarding the parameters of regulatory takings is limited, the federal
courts in Mexico have adopted a sophisticated ‘proportionality test’ with which to
identify when a government policy that limits individual rights is contrary to the
constitution.
In Thailand, on the other hand, the courts are more generous in providing protection
to private property owners. In addition to providing compensation for the revocation
of an unlawful measure, compensation may be awarded for harm suffered as a result
of legitimate regulatory interference, provided that the interference fails to satisfy the
‘proportionality test’ and imposes an excessive burden on a private party. Thai
administrative courts usually assess situational factors to ensure that public interests
are fairly protected too. Public interests can be regarded by ordering less-than-full
market compensation even when an administrative act violates constitutionally
protected rights.
This Chapter’s analysis of compensable regulatory takings laws in Thailand and
Mexico indicates that jurisprudence in both countries recognizes a margin of
appreciation that public institutions enjoy when formulating or implementing public
policies. Nevertheless, to ensure that individual constitutional rights are also fairly
protected, the courts in both countries deploy a ‘proportionality test’ in order to
strike a balance between competing interests.
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CHAPTER IX
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

The foregoing chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that domestic courts as well
as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have applied different
interpretative approaches in addressing legal ambiguities in regulatory expropriation
clauses. Although no fixed formula has been established, each court has utilized a
type of balancing approach to identify the occurrence of compensable regulatory
takings.
This Chapter will commence by comparing various conceptualizations of
compensable regulatory takings developed by each of the domestic courts, within the
selected jurisdictions, and by the ECtHR. To provide a comprehensive overview, this
comparative examination will address the historical background of takings-related
provisions, the scope of property, and emerging compensation standards. In the
second section, this Chapter will distill the common approach, and principles,
generally applied by domestic courts in the US, Thailand, Mexico and the ECtHR,
when deciding upon the existence of a compensable regulatory taking. This section
will summarize key legal elements and elaborate upon the role of the ‘proportionality
test’ as a legal tool with which an adjudicator can differentiate between an
expropriation and a non-compensable regulation. It highlights strengths and
weaknesses of the ‘proportionality test’, and how this test can solve the issue of legal
indeterminacy in international investment law.

A. Thematic Concepts of Indirect Expropriation Compared
1. Legal background
Originally, the United Stated Constitution (the ‘US Constitution’)1 provided no
explicit protection of property rights. However, to prevent property rights from
1

United States Constitution.
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abuses of government power, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was later
included as part of the Constitutional Bill of Rights.2 This clause contains a negative
right that aims to protect individuals from abusive government power, by declaring
that ‘[n]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation’.3 The codification of the Fifth Amendment was modeled on general
state constitutions, as well as the common law, to provide economic stability to
property owners and to avoid conflicts with domestic laws.4 In order to ensure the
adequate protection of legal and property interests, domestic US courts play a vital
role in interpreting and applying the Takings Clause when assessing the legality of
government interferences.
Similarly, the original Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (commonly known as the ‘European Convention on Human
Rights’ or ‘ECHR’)5 did not contain a provision for the protection of property rights,
even though it was drafted in the aftermath of the abuses of the Second World War.6
However, on 20 March 1952, the Council of Europe agreed to include Article 1
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)7, and member States adopted it as part of the binding ECHR.
The aim of the ECHR is to foster human rights protection and humanitarian
objectives without prescribing the standards adopted in each country.8 Currently, P11 contains three main rules. These include: ‘1 every natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions; 2. no one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by
law and by the general principles of international law; and 3. the preceding
provisions shall not, however, in any way, impair the right of a state to enforce such
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
2

Matthew P Harrington, 'Regulatory Takings and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause'
(2004) 45 William & Mary Law Review 2053, 2064.
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M Caitlin Sochacki, 'Takings Law: The Similarities and Differences between the European Court of
Human Rights and the United States Supreme Court' (2008) 24(2) Connecticut Journal of
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general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’
The protection of property under P1-1 does not confine the adopted standards to the
national laws of member states, it focuses on legal conceptions that are compliant
with human rights laws.9 In this respect, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) reviews not only the legality of the measure in question, but also enforces
P1-1 to ensure that the standards of protection determined by the ECHR are fully
complied with, and implemented by, the member states.10
Reflecting upon the context of Thailand, the protection of individual freedom and
property rights was not realized until the promulgation of the Constitution of the
Kingdom of Thailand (the ‘Thai Constitution’) in 1932. Prior to 1932, private
property rights were obscure and the King retained the supreme royal power to
assign land to elite groups.11 Due to the influence of Western colonization in the
region, Thailand ‘overhaul[ed] its system of public administration’, including tax
reform, slavery abolition and more precise property rights protection in land in the
early 19th century.12 Since 1932, a series of Thai constitutions have included a
provision concerning expropriation, according to which the forced transfer of land
ownership must be for public purposes and accompanied by compensation.13 In
addition, a series of Thai constitutions have also contained a provision that prohibits
general government regulations that violate individual rights and freedoms. This
implies that, in the absence of a written requirement for compensation, any
restriction of property rights must be made according to the law and must not impose
an excessive burden on property holders.14
Currently, property owners in Thailand can challenge the validity of legislative and
administrative actions that affect constitutionally protected rights through either the
Constitutional Court or Administrative Courts.15 While the Constitutional Court is

9
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vested with power to review the validity of legislation, the Administrative Courts
may review the lawfulness and reasonableness of administrative actions.
Similarly, in Mexico, the protection of property rights was not emphasized prior to
the promulgation of the Constitution of the United Mexican States (the ‘Mexican
Constitution’) in 1917.16 Prior to this, land and natural resources were originally
governed by influential groups and the Catholic Church.17 A specific protection for
property rights is now provided in Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution,
which guarantees the development of communal land-use for the benefit of poor
people and society,18 and also protects private property by outlining that
expropriation can only occur in circumstances serving a public purpose and when
accompanied by compensation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Mexico has long
held that compensation is only necessary when the State acquires the ownership of
private property.19 The imposition of restrictions on the use of property, for public
interest purposes, does not trigger to the right to compensation.20 Importantly,
though, a regulation may be opposed through an ‘amparo’ lawsuit, whereby
legislative or administrative actions can be challenged on the ground that they violate
constitutionally protected rights.21
The evolution of the domestic legal framework within each of the selected countries,
as well as the framework created by the ECtHR, reflects the changing perception of
the role of property rights in the respective jurisdictions. In addition, the changing
structural framework in the selected jurisdictions is demonstrative of the growing
demand for the judicial review of legislation and administrative actions by the host
state government. Although the protection of private property, and associated rights,
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is the primary objective of each of the examined legal instruments, some restrictions
on property protection may be imposed if these restrictions comply with the
conditions determined by the country’s Constitution or the ECtHR.
2. Scope of Property Protected
The US Constitutional Bill of Rights contains no clearly defined limit to the scope of
property protection granted within the Takings Clause. Therefore, the US Supreme
Court has explicitly formulated a wide list of property rights that are protected under
the ambit of the Takings Clause. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the
Takings Clause generally protects tangible property.22 In addition, the Supreme
Court has also held that rights in rem and rights attaching to land are considered as
protected property rights.23 Moreover, the US Supreme Court has also regarded
‘economically beneficial or productive use of property’ as the rights protected under
the Constitution. In Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court affirmed this
concept in its ruling, stating that compensation is needed when the confiscation of
property has occurred and ‘where regulation denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of property’.24 However, the Supreme Court did not recognize a
‘future right’ or a ‘right not yet accrued’ as a property right to be protected as a
‘reasonable-investment backed expectation’.25 To be regarded as a ‘reasonable
investment expectation’, the Court relies on the government’s own representation at
the time the investment was made. If the Plaintiff can show that he or she made an
investment on the basis of a government representation, then the Court will regard
this expectation as a right protected under the Constitution.26
Similarly, the ECtHR adopts an expansive interpretation of the definition of a
‘possession’ protected under P1-1, and may regard the object in question as a
protected property, even in circumstances where it not recognized as such under the
domestic law of a member country.27 In addition to tangible property, a broad range
of intangible property rights are also regarded as a ‘possession’ under P1-1. They
22
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include, for example, contract rights,28 business restitutionary claims and debts,29 and
a shareholder’s rights to claim compensation resulting from the nationalization of an
industry by the State.30
The ECtHR has also honored the ‘legitimate expectation of realization’ and counted
it as a ‘possession’.31 The Court held that to be protected under P1-1, the owner must
have a legitimate expectation of being able to carry out the proposed development of
property. To uphold a legitimate expectation, the Court in one case went further to
affirm that although the right to claim compensation was terminated by a new
statute, the Court had to respect the property owner’s prior right to obtain
compensation.32
A broad conceptualization of property protection is also adopted by Thai courts.
Neither the Thai Constitution nor the Act of the Establishment of the Thai Supreme
Administrative Court33 (the ‘Administrative Act’) contains a provision outlining the
meaning and scope of protected property rights. However, a survey of relevant Thai
jurisprudence suggests that both of these legal instruments tend to provide legal
redress to property owners who have lost interests associated with either movable or
immovable property due to state legislative or administrative actions.
The Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of legislation that affects a
broad range of property interests. For example, in the Constitutional Court Ruling
No. 13/2556 (2013), the Court held that Section 30 of the Provisional Waterworks
Act B.E. 2522 (1979), which deprived the land owner of use of their property
without compensation, was unconstitutional. In this Ruling No. 13/2556, the Court
asserted that all purchased properties and inherent contractual obligations were
counted as property for the purposes of constitutional protection.34
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Likewise, the Thai Administrative Courts have affirmed that administrative actions
that affect a broad range of property interests may trigger legal liability. For
example, the Supreme Administrative Court has held that although forced
installation of electrical lines on land without compensation was lawful under the
EGAT Act, to ensure equity and fairness, the State had a duty to pay compensation
to the affected property’s owner who suffered as a result of state operations.35 In
addition, the Court has also asserted that administrative actions can trigger liability
when they violate contractual obligations and reasonable expectations of future land
use.36
The Supreme Court of Mexico has similarly expanded the scope of property rights
protection, provided under the Mexican Constitution, beyond tangible property in
order to encompass reasonable expectation rights. In the course of amparo
proceedings, the Supreme Court of Mexico has asserted that the discontinuation of a
drilling permit, requested by a foreign oil company, affected its reasonable
expectation, and enabled the Court to hear the case.37
Based on case reviews, both the selected domestic courts and the ECtHR tend to
acknowledge that a wide range of property rights and possessions fall within the
ambit of protections provided within takings law. As a result of adopting an
expansive interpretation of property, the domestic courts and the ECtHR have
included both tangible and intangible property rights within the protections afforded
under takings laws. However, despite the fact that all of the examined jurisdictions
protect a wide range of property rights, the basis of consideration is different across
these jurisdictions. On one hand, the US Supreme Court bases its analysis on the
definition of ‘taking’ rather than on the definition of ‘property’.38 Therefore, the US
Supreme Court decides in favor of property owners when government measures
interfere with either a ‘reasonable investment-backed expectation’39 or ‘all
35
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economically viable use’ of property.40 This is similar in Thailand and Mexico,
where courts in both countries do not analyze the definition of property as a separate
issue, but they consider this question as part of the courts’ judicial review of the
constitutionality of legislation and administrative actions. In contrast to those
countries, the ECtHR considers this issue separately, and employs a broad
interpretative approach when analyzing the term ‘possessions’.41 In this way, a
variety of properties are also counted as possessions.
3. The Development of Takings Jurisprudence
A review of the jurisprudence within the selected jurisdictions reveals that the
relevant domestic courts as well as the ECtHR have developed the legal doctrines
regarding indirect expropriation, with a significant focus on delineating a ‘bright
line’ with which to distinguish normal state regulations from compensable regulatory
interference. However, due to the lack of an explicit constitutional and legislative
provision protecting an individual against a state’s regulatory interference, courts
play a critical role in developing the interpretation of regulatory takings
jurisprudence and such interpretations have evolved over time.
In the United States, the US Supreme Court has developed a takings doctrine under
the Fifth Amendment. In the early 20th century, the takings analysis was applied only
to the occupation of physical property, and a state regulation that simply restricted
the use of property was regarded as a public policy not subject to compensation.
However, an increase in State regulation of migrants, immigration and industries,
resulted in a huge burden to individuals.42 The US Supreme Court started examining
the power of government to affect property rights in the 1922 case of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v Mahon, in which the Court proposed a vague threshold by stating that a
measure becomes a taking if it ‘goes too far’.43
As discussed in Chapter Six, from 1978-1992, the US Supreme Court reviewed a
number of cases and significantly developed regulatory takings doctrines. Examining
40
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those cases, the Supreme Court variably employed the per se test and the ad hoc test
to identify the existence of compensable takings under the Fifth Amendment.
According to the per se test, compensation is required, regardless of the public
interests served by the regulation, so long as the regulation causes a substantial
deprivation of property rights.44 Therefore, the Supreme Court focuses on the impact
of the regulation as the sole determining factor, regardless of the objectives served
by the measure.
In the alternative, the Supreme Court adopts the ad hoc test when the regulation falls
short of full expropriation of physical property or the denial of all economically
viable uses.45 To apply the ad hoc test, the Supreme Court examines all relevant
factors on a case-by-case basis, including the government actions involved, the
diminution of property value caused by the regulation, the extent to which the
regulation interferes with a reasonable investment expectation of the property owner,
and the nature of the government measure.46
However, the US Supreme Court has more recently developed a more sophisticated
method to identify regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment by introducing the
principle of proportionality.47 This doctrine implies, that rather than focusing on the
impact of a measure as the sole determining factor, the Court may find that a
regulatory taking, justifying compensation, has occurred when the regulation
‘crosses a line’ by imposing an excessive burden on the property owner.48
This principle has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the US in many subsequent
cases such as Nollan v California Coastal Commission49 and Dolan v City of
Tigard.50 Both cases are exceptional in not considering impact as the sole
determining factor but, rather, emphasizing the need for proportionality between the
character of the regulatory measure, on the one hand, and its impact on the property
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owner, on the other. Thus, if the measure in question imposes an excessive burden, it
may constitute a compensable taking.
At present, the US Supreme Court frequently adopts the ‘proportionality test’ when
assessing regulatory takings inquiries.51 Due to the perceived benefits of the
‘proportionality test’, Oregon has adopted this principle in its land use law known as
‘Measure 49’, which permits the landowner to seek compensation from the State
government in circumstances where the land use regulation restricts the use of a
private residential property or a farm.52
In contrast to the US, the ECtHR does not commence its assessment with an analysis
of the elements that form a taking. Instead, the ECtHR starts by identifying which
specific rule under P1-1 is best suited to the case. However, in order to determine
whether the regulation in question is a regulatory interference violating the ECHR,
the ECtHR has employed the ‘proportionality test’ to examine the nature of the
relationship between the purpose and impact of the measure in question. 53 Under
P1-1, there are three main specific rules, spelling out different types of governmental
interference. The first rule is for the ‘deprivation’ of property, which is limited to a
complete destruction of legal title.54 The second rule concerns the ‘control of
property use’, which involves a specific restriction of an owner’s right to use
property either at present or in the future.55 The third rule is a ‘catch-all’ provision
that refers to protection from interference with the ‘peaceful enjoyment of
property’.56
After identifying the specific rule applicable to the case, the Court then assesses
whether the regulatory interference is justifiable. To assess this, the ECtHR usually
adopts the ‘overall balancing test’,57 which involves a consideration of the
appropriateness of any compensation paid by the government,58 the suitability of the
measure and its relationship to the goal pursued, and the burden borne by an
51
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individual who is adversely affected by the regulation.59 In conducting the test, the
ECtHR accords deference to the state’s margin of appreciation.60 The Court will
interfere only if the regulation is ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’.61
The adoption of the ‘proportionality test’ by the ECtHR is indicative of its
recognition of state sovereign rights to control and regulate private property in order
to promote social interests. In light of the diversity within the legal traditions,
cultures and economic development of member States, this principle ensures that the
ECtHR respects state autonomy when implementing public policies that serve the
general interests of participating countries. However, as the analysis within Chapter
Seven reveals, whenever a measure results in total deprivation of property or
property rights, it is generally found to be a regulatory taking that triggers a
compensatory obligation.
Unlike the US and European Union, the Thai legal system does not incorporate a
specific legal provision concerning protection against regulatory takings. Prior to the
enactment of the Thai Constitution B.E. 2540 (1997), Thailand did not have a
specific mechanism for the settlement of disputes arising from public law matters;
only the Court of Justice of Thailand was vested with the jurisdiction to conduct
judicial review and oversee any improper functioning of state authorities.62 Due to
limitations in legal competency to overlook public law matters, attempts were made
to fill existing gaps by introducing a system of public law courts with the capacity to
award remedies against grievances caused by public authorities. The Thai
Constitution of 1997 was widely regarded as ‘the People’s Charter’, 63 containing
many important and innovative provisions, covering an improved system of checks
and balances via the establishment of the Constitutional Court and the
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Administrative Courts, and the enhanced protection of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms of Thai people.64 Pursuant to the broad power conferred to the
Constitutional Court and the Administrative Courts, as well as the wide scope of
protection granted by the amended provisions, property owners in Thailand can now
challenge the constitutionality of both legislation (through the Constitutional Court)
and administrative actions (through the Administrative Courts).
To review the constitutionality of legislation, the Thai Constitutional Court has from
time to time adopted a ‘proportionality test’ in assessing the magnitude of the impact
imposed by legislation.65 Likewise, the Administrative Courts of Thailand are vested
with power to review the validity and lawfulness of administrative actions. Under
Article 9 of the Administrative Act, not only can legal liability be imposed on a state
authority for unlawful actions, it can also be imposed for economic injury resulting
from lawful actions. As stipulated by Article 9(3) of the Administrative Act, the
Administrative Courts are empowered to decide a case in relation to ‘other liability’
associated with administrative actions. Although there is no explicit interpretation of
what constitutes ‘other liability’, the Court assesses each case on the ground of a
‘fair balance test’ that determines whether the measure substantially deprives an
individual of property rights or the economic value of the property in question. If
compensation for lawful state action is not paid, or is incommensurate to the lost
value of the property interests, the regulation in question might fail to strike a fair
balance and the Administrative Court may order the public authority to pay a proper
amount of compensation.66
In the context of Mexico, a consideration of the impact of a measure is utilized most
frequently as the primary determining factor for an award of compensation.
According to Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution, the Supreme Court of
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Mexico formally awards compensation for regulatory interference that destroys all
property rights or ownership rights through formal expropriation laws.67 However,
for a general regulation that does not entirely deprive the owner of all property
rights, state interference is not generally subject to compensatory liability.68
Nevertheless, such regulatory interference may be subject to judicial review. Even
though its legal doctrine on regulatory takings is underdeveloped, the Supreme Court
of Mexico has recently applied the principle of proportionality to settle disputes
arising between private and public interests, in areas outside of the law of
expropriation.
Following the comparative analysis outlined above, it can be concluded that the
selected domestic courts and the ECtHR have different mechanisms and approaches
with which to analyze the issue of regulatory takings. Despite adopting a variety of
approaches, all jurisdictions are alike in applying the ‘proportionality test’ in order to
determine the existence of compensable takings. Consonant with changing social,
political and economic structures within each country, this principle permits the
domestic courts as well as the ECtHR to balance the competing interests in society.
Essentially, whenever the regulatory interference results in a deprivation of property
or viable economic use of property, it is considered egregious and is subject to
compensation. However, if a regulation falls short of full deprivation of property, the
adjudicators defer to the state’s margin of appreciation. In circumstances where
relevant social benefits outweigh the incursion upon private property rights, no
compensation, or an amount less than full compensation, might be required.
4. Determining the Standards of Compensation
Under the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution, a state authority is to
compensate an owner for any action that amounts to a regulatory taking. According
to the approach of the US Supreme Court, the determination of compensation is a
separate step that is undertaken after the existence of a taking has been ascertained.69
When compensation is awarded under the Fifth Amendment, the US Supreme Court
usually holds that ‘Fair Market Value’ (FMV) is required, regardless of the scale of
67
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the loss suffered by the property owner.70 FMV generally refers to the amount a
willing purchaser would need to pay to a willing vendor.71 Therefore, in order to
strike a fair balance, the FMV is the most appropriate standard to redress the loss
sustained by the affected party. Nevertheless, a payment of FMV can render the
implementation of regulations that qualify as takings very costly for governments
and, thus, exacerbate the financial stress faced by local governments. For this reason,
the US Supreme Court recognizes other means, such as Transfer Development
Rights (TDRs), as an alternative means to compensate an individual whose property
is affected by a regulation.72 As discussed in Chapter Eight, the US Supreme Court is
moving towards the formulation of a remedial approach that assists the government
to reach a solution that strikes a more appropriate balance between public and private
interests.
In contrast to the US Supreme Court, the ECtHR has held that reasonable
compensation does not always mean full FMV compensation.73 The ECtHR has held
that less-than-full compensation can be justifiable, depending upon the prevailing
economic and social justice circumstances prevailing in the relevant country.74
Generally, the ECtHR will honor the state’s margin of appreciation when
ascertaining the amount of compensation that the state government needs to pay. The
ECtHR will only intervene if the compensation is not reasonable, and does not fairly
cover the lost value of property.75 The ECtHR usually views the payment of
sufficient compensation as a factor relevant to the identification of whether the
measure is proportionate.76
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Similarly, the Thai Administrative Courts generally let the competent state agency
determine the amount of compensation that is to be paid to the property owner in
relation to harm caused by regulatory interference. When compensation is required,
it is paid by the state agency in accordance with its compensation guidelines as
determined by the law concerned. In this situation, the state agency takes into
account a range of relevant factors, which include the land price as appraised by a
state authority for tax purposes, the location of the property, and the purpose of the
public work in question.77 The Court interferes only when the compensation is
manifestly unreasonable.
However, when there is no specific requirement for compensation, the Supreme
Administrative Court may apply the principle of mutatis mutandis under Article 438
paragraph one of the Civil and Commercial Code of Tort law78, whereby the
appropriate amount of compensation is critically dependent upon a consideration of
the ‘situation and the gravity of the act’.79 An illustrative example of this is the
Central Administrative Court of Thailand Case No. 1631/2553.80 This case
concerned the impact on private property caused by the government’s flood
management in response to a severe monsoon in 2003. The applicant, who owned
rice mills, claimed that the poor management of water by the government caused
flood damage to farms and factories in adjacent provinces. The Central
Administrative Court held that due to the heavy monsoon, it was impossible to keep
all of the properties dry. Also, since the government had warned the residents about
the approaching monsoon, it was the responsibility of the people living in those areas
to stay alert and get prepared. The Court held that although there was no specific
requirement for compensation, the State had a duty to compensate those who
suffered from the floods in order to redress their injuries according to Article 9(3) of
the Administrative Act. Since there was no express rule governing compensation in
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this situation, the Court applied Article 438 (1) of the Civil and Commercial Code of
Tort Law to determine the amount of compensation. After a consideration of all
relevant circumstances, the Court awarded a total of Baht 929,241.50, plus the
interest that had accrued from the date of the initial flood damage. Since the Court
asserted that the government was not at fault, the Court exercised its discretion to
award compensation for damaged rice mills only as well as the repair costs for all
associated equipment.
In the context of Mexico, the courts only award compensation for direct acquisitions
of lands by formal expropriation decrees.81 For types of regulatory interference that
do not deprive full ownership, the affected owner can only seek a court injunction
through amparo proceedings, whereby the court can rule against the government
action or declare the statute unconstitutional. Mexico’s jurisprudence interprets the
Constitution narrowly, limiting the duty to compensate to cases of direct
expropriation. In this respect, like the ECtHR and the Thai Administrative Courts,
the Mexican Supreme Court confers great flexibility to the State to exercise its
sovereignty in regulating private property free from the imposition of a
compensatory duty towards individuals who may be affected by regulatory
interference.
In sum, with the exception of Mexico, all of the examined domestic courts as well as
the ECtHR have awarded compensation to redress property owners suffering from
regulatory interference. Although compensation is an important means of redress, the
adjudicators within each system have applied different standards and methods to
determine the magnitude of the compensation award. While the ECtHR and Thai
courts can exercise wide discretion in determining the amount of compensation thereby ensuring that all relevant circumstances and conditions are taken into
account in order to reach a fair award - the US Supreme Court cannot exercise the
same degree of discretion under the fair market value standard (or FMV). Despite
significant differences, the US Supreme Court has recently implemented the
Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) programs, which aim to mitigate and
reduce the financial hardship experienced by state governments in response to laws
81
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that impose restrictions on property owners. In this regard, the courts in selected
countries (excluding Mexico) and the ECtHR, have attempted to balance individual
property rights with public interests by taking into account all prevailing conditions
in order to ensure that property rights are respected and the exercises of state
authority are preserved.

B. The Concept of Proportionality Compared
The survey above reveals a tendency across each of the examined jurisdictions
towards the deployment of a ‘proportionality test’ when determining the existence of
a compensable regulatory taking. As discussed in previous Chapters, this principle is
predominant at both domestic and international levels. The case analyses exposed
that the adjudicators in our selected jurisdictions follow a very similar approach
when adopting the ‘proportionality test’ to assess expropriation disputes. A close
examination reveals that the adjudicators in various jurisdictions base their reasoning
and decisions on three sub-elements of the proportionality principle: the principle of
necessity, the principle of suitability and the weighing of the public and private
interests at stake.
1. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
The ECtHR asserts that regulatory interferences must strike a fair balance between
the means employed and the aim sought.82 To test the validity of the regulatory
interference, the ECtHR generally does not only rely on a mere ‘rational basis’ or
‘reasonableness’ of the measure, but rather focuses on three key issues: whether the
measure is necessary to achieve a social need, whether it is the most suitable option
(or whether alternative options are available) and whether the measure is
proportional to the goal the state government sought to accomplish.83
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For example, in Mellacher v Austria (1989),84 which concerned the enactment of a
new rent control law by the Austrian government,85 the applicant claimed that the
law was contrary to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) as it
unlawfully interfered with the applicant’s contractual rights to obtain rent.
Considering the facts of the case, the ECtHR relied on the state’s margin of
appreciation to take the measure, and held that even though the new rent control law
affected the previously concluded contracts, the legislation was reasonable, and was
introduced with a legitimate goal to help poor people to obtain access to rental
housing.86 In addition, the ECtHR asserted the existence of other alternative
solutions does not render the measure in question unjustified.87 The Court explained
that as long as the measure is within the boundary of state power, the State is vested
with the full authority to make a final decision that best fits the situation.88
To assess the justification of the interference, the Court engaged in further analysis
via the proportionality test, and took into account all relevant factors including the
amount of compensation. After assessing the factors pursuant to a fair balance test,
the Court found that, although the legislation infringed on the contractual obligations
between tenant and landlord, the owner was allowed to pass on various costs to the
tenants. In addition, the Court found that under the new regime, landlords were
allowed to obtain the rental fees from the tenants at a rate that was 50% higher than
would be allowed under an old lease.89 The ECtHR ultimately held that the measure
struck a fair balance and did not violate P1-1 of the ECHR.90 By taking into account
all prevailing facts, and the legitimate aims pursued by the legislation, the Court did
not merely focus upon the impact of the measure; rather, it substantiated the analysis
by scrutinizing the state’s margin of appreciation and asking whether the measure
imposed an impact commensurate to its articulated goal.
In addition to resolving tensions that arise between public and private interests in the
context of social problems, the ECtHR has also applied the proportionality principle
84
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to other areas of conflict, such the disputes resulting from the State’s omission to
comply with a law that the Applicant has relied upon. In 1995, the ECtHR applied
the same line of analysis in Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium.91 The Belgian
government passed legislation to remove the right to compensation for damage
caused by a ship crash resulting from the negligence of a Belgian navigation pilot.
Based on its analysis, the ECtHR accepted the State’s freedom to amend its internal
law to resolve the problem of legal unpredictability, attributed to the uncertainty of
Belgian tort law and its incompatibility with the laws of its neighboring countries.92
The Court deduced that the national authority could enjoy a certain margin of
appreciation in determining what is in the public interest.93 However, it also held that
the alteration of the right to compensation, reasonably expected by prospective
victims, could not ‘justify legislating with retrospective effect with the aim and
consequence of depriving the applicants of their claim for compensation’.94 The
ECtHR held that the interference was ‘inconsistent with the preserving of the fair
balance between the interests at stake’.95
In the recent case of Sargsyan v Azerbaijan,96 the ECtHR recently applied the threestep approach in analyzing a dispute that related to refugee protection. In 2015, the
Court heard the complaint from an applicant who was forced to leave his home by
the Government of Azerbaijan, following the conflict between Azerbaijan and
Armenian forces. After the Azerbaijan army disarmed the local Armenian army in
the Shahumyan region of Azerbaijan, ethnic Armenian people were forced to leave
their village and residence. To justify its actions, the Government of Azerbaijan
claimed that the area was too dangerous to live in. Based on the submitted factual
evidence, the Court held that Azerbaijan had violated the applicant’s rights under P11 of the ECHR. Although the Court was fully aware of the Azerbaijan government’s
justification to displace its population from the disputed area,97 it pointed out that the
Government did not provide adequate assistance to the people suffering as
91
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consequence of this displacement.98 In addition, it did not provide any alternative
measure to adequately restore and secure the applicant’s property rights or to provide
compensation to redress his loss.99 Thus, the Court decided that the conduct of the
Azerbaijan government created an excessive burden in violation of P1-1.100
These illustrative cases demonstrate that the ECtHR has granted state governments
and legislatures broad leeway in determining their country’s best interests. To be
admissible, the measure must meet the tests of necessity and suitability. Although
the ECHR guarantees the protection of private property rights under P1-1, these
rights are not absolute. To this end, member states can interfere with the property
rights of their citizen as long as the regulatory interference satisfies the requirements
of the ‘proportionality test’; according to which, a fair balance amongst public and
private interests must be maintained.
2. United States
The US Supreme Court introduced the concept of proportionality, to review the issue
of regulatory takings, in the cases of Nollan (1987)101 and Dolan (1994).102 Prior to
these cases, the Supreme Court had adopted the Penn Central (1978) three-prong
test, to ascertain whether a compensable taking had occurred. The factors examined
within the three-prong test include: the impact of the measure, any interferences with
investment-backed expectations and the character of the measure. Despite the
adoption of a balancing method, the conceptualization of compensable takings
developed by the US Supreme Court in Penn Central was arguably too generalized
and did not provide a clear guideline with which to determine when an alleged
regulatory taking would trigger a duty to compensate.103
In order to refine the three-prong test into a structured doctrine with the ability to
more accurately pinpoint the circumstances that will trigger a compensatory duty, the
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US Supreme Court introduced the ‘essential nexus requirement’ in the case of
Nollan. According to this new conceptual framework, the existence of an ‘essential
nexus’ between the condition imposed by the government and the goal being pursued
must be demonstrated. Moreover, the Court considered whether the imposition of a
public easement by the California Coastal Commission, in the absence of
compensation, constituted a taking under the US Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.
The Court examined the nature and character of the state’s imposition by
investigating whether it would ‘further the end advanced as the justification for the
prohibition’.104 After examining the case, the Court found that the easement imposed
on the construction permit lacked an essential nexus with a legitimate state
interest.105 From the Court’s point of view, the condition must bear the same policy
goal as the public interest issue that the state is attempting to protect.106
The Court’s judgment in Nollan on the nexus requirement has had legal implications
for subsequent cases. In 1994, the Court developed a more concrete principle to
identify the emergence of a regulatory taking in the case of Dolan v City of Tigard.
In addition to requiring a connection between the proposed development and the
imposed conditions for the development, the Court also required ‘rough
proportionality’ between the permit condition imposed and the adverse impact of the
proposed development.107 The Court did not, however, establish a precise formula
with which to calculate proportionality.108 The Court merely required the city to
explain the manner in which the imposed condition would offset the adverse impact
of the increased number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by the claimant’s
proposed development plan.109
The test adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of Nollan and Dolan (the
‘Nollan-Dolan test’) is arguably more structured and transparent than the Penn
Central three-prong test.110 Although both the Penn Central and Nollan-Dolan tests
104
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require courts to be more contextual in their legal reasoning, the Penn Central
balancing approach does not strictly engage the courts in a discussion of all the
facets of public interest, and the respective weight attributable to each of these
factors.111 Under the Nollan-Dolan test, the Supreme Court appears to adopt a set of
rules, analogous to the proportionality principle, which provides a clear analytical
tool with which to assess and reconcile conflicting interests. In order to evaluate the
Nollan-Dolan factors holistically, the Supreme Court must defer to the reasoning of
the defendant, and examine the rationale and real legislative purpose behind the
regulation,112 as well as the burden of the regulatory impact borne by the property
owner.113
3. Thailand
In Thailand, the principle of proportionality is one of the most important legal
doctrines utilized by judicial organs with the ability to control state power and
prevent abusive or unreasonable state conduct. As discussed in Chapter Eight, both
the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Courts of Thailand have frequently
applied the ‘proportionality test’ as a means to control legislative and administrative
discretion, and uphold individual rights and freedoms.114
To decide whether legislation or administrative acts satisfy the central tenets of the
‘proportionality test’, Thai courts focus on the state’s margin of appreciation as the
first step in determining the appropriate scope of state authority. For example, in the
Constitutional
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Ruling

No.

27/2546

(2003),

which

examined

the

constitutionality of legislation that confiscated assets obtained by criminals via drugrelated activities, the Constitutional Court held that the legislation was constitutional
as it was enacted for the primary purpose of tackling problematic, criminal behavior.
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When determining whether the measure was justifiable, the Constitutional Court
emphasized that confiscation was restricted to assets acquired from criminal activity
only. As a consequence, it then held that the legislation in question did not impose an
excessive burden as it did not affect the fundamental elements of the right to
property.115
Similarly, in the Constitutional Court Ruling No. 13/2556 (2013), which concerned
the constitutionality of Section 30 of the Local Water Act B.E. 2522, the Court held
that the installation of water pipes across private property was legitimate and
essential in facilitating the provision of domestic water services. The provision was
legitimate. However, the Court held that since Section 30 of the Act did not
incorporate any requirement for compensation, it imposed an excessive burden on
the property owners and was, therefore, unconstitutional as it enabled the state
authority to interfere with private property without incurring any liability.116
The Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand has also adopted the same line of
analysis when examining whether individual rights are protected from a wide range
of arbitrary state administrative actions. It has performed judicial review to
invalidate regulations that have imposed excessive burdens on property owners. In
the Red Case Judgment No. 180/2554 dated 8 June 2554 (2011), for example, the
Court reviewed the validity of state discontinuation of a forest plantation license, and
commenced its assessment with an examination of the legitimacy of the state order.
It held that the discontinuation of the license was a lawful act as it was supported by
a Ministerial Declaration that aimed to restrict logging, and other timber harvesting
operations, so as to protect the environment.117 Although the state’s discontinuation
of the license was justified and legally valid, on the ground of environmental
protection, the Supreme Administrative Court asserted that the diminution of the
legitimate investment expectation of the license holder, as well as the economic
impact caused by the cancellation of the permit without compensation, resulted in a
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disproportional and excessive burden to the license holder. Thus, compensation was
ordered.118
Recently, the Supreme Administrative Court determined a case which concerned the
appropriateness of the construction of a truck weighing station, in which judgment
was made against the claimant on 11 February 2557 (2014).119 As discussed in
Chapter Eight, the Court clearly adopted the proportionality principle to examine the
issue, ultimately deciding that the measure did not result in an excessive burden to
the landowner. This was because the land owner was not completely prevented from
accessing the land, and no essential elements of his property rights were deprived.120
Nevertheless, the Court asserted that the land owner was entitled to compensation to
mitigate the extra burden borne by the applicant as compared to the adjacent
landowners.121
The above analysis demonstrates that Thai courts have extensively applied the
proportionality principle to examine the justification of legislation and administrative
acts, despite the fact that Thai domestic law does not explicitly mandate the use of
this principle.122 To assess the justification of legislation and State measures, the
courts generally examine three distinct components: necessity, suitability and the
balance between competing interests. Nevertheless, the examination of case law also
revealed that Thai courts do not always apply a strict three-part test in a coherent and
consistent manner; some courts have interchangeably and inconsistently analyzed the
components of necessity and suitability. Moreover, Thai courts are yet to develop a
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clear threshold with the ability to indicate when interference is severe enough to be
regarded as a compensable taking.123
4. Mexico
The concept of a regulatory taking under Mexican law is somewhat obscure. In the
Mexican legal system, compensation is normally limited to those property owners
who have been adversely affected by an expropriation of land through a formal law.
However, property owners who have been affected by a state regulatory interference,
in breach of constitutionally protected rights, must file for an amparo legal
proceeding in order to request an injunction against state legislation or administrative
actions.
The Supreme Court of Mexico has long been struggling to develop legal principles
that can resolve conflicts between public and private interests. As discussed in
Chapter Eight, the principle of proportionality for judicial review of the
constitutionality of state measures was illustrated in a case involving a young soldier
who was dismissed from the military after being diagnosed as HIV positive.124 The
Supreme Court adopted the proportionality test to determine the validity of the
military order to dismiss the unhealthy soldier. As discussed in Chapter Eight, the
Supreme Court carried out a four-step test to scrutinize whether the order was
rational and proportionate to the goal pursued.125 Although this case is not directly
related to the issue of regulatory takings, it provides a good example of the way in
which Mexican courts have utilized the principle of proportionality when resolving
disputes arising from conflicting public and private interests.
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5. Summary of the Comparative Analysis of the Proportionality Test across
Jurisdictions
Based on the jurisprudence developed by the courts in the United States, the ECtHR,
Thailand and Mexico, in response to disputes involving competing interests, it is
apparent that the ‘proportionality test’ frequently consists of three key components:
(i) the necessity of the measure; (ii) the suitability of the measure; and (iii) the
proportional relationship between the means and the goals pursued. However, each
jurisdiction adopts a different approach to comprehend the proportionality analysis.
While the ECtHR analyzes each of the three factors separately, Thai courts
sometimes use the ‘necessity test’ and the ‘suitability test’ interchangeably. In the
same vein, the US Supreme Court - instead of directly exploring the necessity and
the suitability of the measure under the Nollan-Dolan framework - requires the state
government to prove how the imposed conditions upon development approval could
promote legitimate state interests. Moreover, when the courts engage in a process of
weighing and balancing opposing rights and interests, they adopt different threshold
standards to justify an order of compensation. For instance, while Mexican courts
award compensation for regulations that entirely deprive the owner of his/her
property rights, US and Thai courts, as well as the ECtHR, similarly resort to a
compensation remedy when the challenged measure imposes an excessive burden on
an individual. This diversity of approach is indicative of the fact that adjudicators in
different jurisdictions are likely to have divergent opinions of, and attribute varying
importance to, particular protected rights. Despite such differences, the comparative
study ultimately reveals that each of the selected jurisdictions adopt a version of the
‘proportionality test’ and do not, therefore, reject the suitability of the three-step
proportionality analysis.
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C. The Proportionality Test: Rationale, Problems and Solutions to
Improve Legal Coherence and Determinacy in the Context of
International Investment Arbitration
The principle of proportionality is widely recognized in many jurisdictions. For this
reason it is regarded as one the general principles of law that adjudicators in both
domestic and international courts frequently use to investigate the validity of laws
and administrative actions under public law.
As described by Alexander, the ‘proportionality test’ is widely recognized as a tool
to promote ‘contextuality, transparency of the relevant factors and reasons, breath in
the competing considerations and overt normality’.126 The function of this test is
hence not merely to review government policy but, rather, to provide a structured
process of inquiry,127 which encourages adjudicators to define the competing
objectives that must be balanced with each other.128 Although the ‘proportionality
test’ may render a less solid answer to every hard case, the doctrine of
proportionality, widely embedded in domestic constitutional law as well as
international law, allows adjudicators to adopt effective interpretative strategies that
assist in resolving the problem of legal indeterminacy, by taking into account the
context, facts and norms of the situations faced by the adjudicators. When applied
consistently across a series of rulings, the ‘proportionality test’ provides an
adjudicator the framework within which to articulate a ‘class of criteria’ that can
then be utilized by subsequent adjudicators encountering similar conflicts pertaining
to the validity of state laws and administrative actions.129
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Despite its advantages, however, the framework afforded by the concept of
proportionality grants significant leeway to adjudicators when determining the
relevant factors taken into their analysis. It is thus within the adjudicators’ discretion
to construe the relative value of each of the interests at stake. Since the
proportionality principle is a ‘form of contextualized practical judgment’,130 the
adjudicators employing this method might overstep or second-guess the authority of
the relevant decision-making bodies, raising concerns regarding adjudicative
legitimacy or the creditability of rulings.131
Issues surrounding the arbitrary exercise of discretion by adjudicators, when framing
legal reasoning and conducting proportionality analysis, have long been discussed in
the context of international investment arbitration, and this problem has implications
for the choice that must be made among possible outcomes.132 Historically, arbitral
tribunals have struggled to find solutions to international investment disputes that are
considered fair to all parties. Although the ‘proportionality test’ is regarded as a
preferable approach to manage conflicts between states and individuals,133 without a
clear mandate restricting the power of arbitral tribunals, they might exercise their
discretion erratically, and this poses the risk of conducting an overly stringent review
or intruding into the traditional areas of state sovereignty. As Calamita claims,
‘proportionality is not a simple technical exercise, but rather involves, at a minimum,
the making of judgments and choices informed by socio-political values’.134 If the
‘proportionality test’ is not conducted properly, appointed arbitral tribunals might
interfere with the province of the political branches by independently judging and
weighing competing societal interests and values, potentially undercutting the
130
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democratically appointed decision-making bodies in that country.135 As claimed by
Bücheler, this problem could affect arbitral tribunal’s ‘legal legitimacy’, which could
ultimately undermine the trust and reliability of the arbitration system in general. 136
To mitigate the problem mentioned above, the arbitral tribunals should defer to ‘state
authorities’ factual and legal assessment by attaching weight to authorities’
assessments as to appropriate balance between public and private interests.137 As
claimed by some commentators, the arbitral tribunals should ascribe weight to the
view of those decision-makers since most courts and tribunals adjudicating public
law matters of this nature are more familiar with the relevant social circumstances,
and the context in which the conflict has emerged, compared to ad hoc arbitral
tribunals.138 Rather than engaging in speculation, the ad hoc arbitral tribunals should
adopt a ‘margin of appreciation’ when examining the boundaries of state regulatory
interferences and the justifications associated with such measures. 139 In addition, it is
more appropriate for legitimate decision-makers or domestic courts to carry out the
assessment of competing interests, required under the ‘proportionality test’;
therefore, arbitrators should defer to national authorities’ assessment of the weighing
and balancing of a measure’s effect vis-à-vis the goals it endeavors to pursue.140 If a
state’s regulatory interference exceeds the appropriate margin of appreciation, or
creates an excessive burden for property owners, only these can the tribunal
intervene so as to afford protection to foreign investors.

D. Conclusion
The comparative study above shows that the American, Thai, and Mexican domestic
courts and the ECtHR provide protection for a wide range of property rights,
135
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associated with both tangible and intangible properties. This protection also extends
to the legitimate expectation of an investor, although the expectation must not be
speculative, and must be actually realized by the property owner.
In relation to the types of regulatory interference that require compensation, the
comparative study has found that there is no comprehensive rule with which to
distinguish an unfettered regulatory interference from an indirect expropriation that
will attract an award of compensation. All courts have considered the issue on a
case-by-case basis. Instead of formulating a clear definition of the types of policy
measures that are likely to constitute an act of indirect expropriation, the judiciary
tends to focus on the substantial deprivation standard, while also recognizing the
state’s wide margin of appreciation in expropriation claims. Based on the
jurisprudence developed by adjudicators in all selected jurisdictions, it is found that
when a measure has entirely deprived a property owner of their property rights or
substantive economic use of property, the intervention is deemed to impose an
excessive burden on the property owner, therefore justifying compensation. On the
other hand, where an intervention has fallen short of full deprivation or expropriation
of ownership, the adjudicators take into account various factors in their analysis
before declaring the measure a ‘taking’ and determining the appropriate amount of
compensation.
With the exception of Mexico, the courts in the selected jurisdictions tend to award
compensation as a means to mitigate the injury caused by regulatory interference.
While the US Supreme Court emphasizes fair market value (FMV) in an award of
compensation, the Thai administrative courts and the ECtHR place a greater
emphasis on other factors that may reduce the value of compensation. Nevertheless,
the US Supreme Court is currently considering other options of compensation
payment, such as the assigned Transfer Development Rights (TDRs), so as to
mitigate the problem of financial distress in the country.
The comparative analysis undertaken within this thesis demonstrates that, due to a
global convergence in the economic and political values of legally diverse countries,
the ‘proportionality doctrine’ is increasingly recognized as a standard applicable in
both domestic and international law for the resolution of conflicting interests. To use
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the ‘proportionality test’, an examination of competing interests must be made on a
case-by-case basis. Generally, the courts assess various factors, including the
necessity of the measure, the suitability of the measure, and the proportionality of the
burden borne by the property owner in relation to the anticipated impact of the
regulation.
Although the proportionality doctrine is widely recognized as a ‘center-piece of the
jurisprudence’ in domestic courts and international organizations to resolve the
disputes related to regulatory interference,141 it is revealed that doctrine has been
used in different jurisdictions in different pace and degree. The study reveals that the
doctrine forms a strong foundation in the jurisprudence developed by the European
Court of Human Rights. The doctrine has also consistently been used by the Court as
a central mechanism to resolve the conflicts arising out of state’s regulatory
interference. Likewise, borrowing from the ECtHR, Thai courts have adopted the
same doctrine to review the justification of legislation and administrative actions
taken in the country. The courts in the United States and Mexico, however, have not
explicitly referred to the proportionality doctrine when examining the regulatory
takings enquiries. Although the doctrine is just existed in both countries, there is a
tendency towards the using of this doctrine more in the future, especially in the
United States, where some key aspects of the doctrine resemble to the balancing test
which weights and balances a series of domestic interests and values pursued.
In spite of the differences, the proportionality doctrine is not alien to the courts in
those jurisdictions and those courts generally do not deny the existence of the
‘proportionality test’ as an instrument to reconcile the differences between
competing values and interests. However, due to the lack of clear guidance in
relation to the relative value of each of the interests at stake, the adjudicating tribunal
should make an assessment, subject to supervision by local decision-makers, of the
relevant factors and acknowledge the state’s margin of appreciation.
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CHAPTER X
SUMMARY AND SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADVANCE THE
DETERMINACY OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION PROVISIONS

A. Summary of Main Findings
Essentially, the concept of indirect expropriation is not a new phenomenon within
international law and jurisprudence. It largely concerns situations in which State
regulations impact upon the use of private property in a manner tantamount to direct
expropriation. Nevertheless, the exact conduct that constitutes an indirect
expropriation, subject to international responsibility, is still unclear.
This investigation of the evolving concept of indirect expropriation in international
law reveals that there have been many attempts at demarcating the distinction
between a normal regulation, on the one hand, and a compensable regulatory taking,
on the other. A close examination of international disputes, as well as the
jurisprudence developed by a series of international adjudicative bodies, shows that
there has been no consensus to create a uniform standard across countries and across
international legal orders. Indeed, the ill-defined concept of indirect expropriation
contained in old-versioned of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Chapter 11 of
the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have contributed immensely to
inconsistent and unpredictable interpretation by international adjudicative bodies.
The failure to develop a clear conceptual framework or uniform standards of
interpretation regarding the issue of compensable indirect expropriation, has led to
the problem of legal indeterminacy within the existing system of international law.
To date, a variety of international legal instruments, such as the a series of new
Model Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and the emerging Trans Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP), have been developed in accordance with customary
international law standards with the aim of improving the clarity of treaty texts and
the consistency of legal interpretation in many key areas, including indirect
expropriation provisions. Nevertheless, this thesis has argued that the newly
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formulated international agreements retain problematic ambiguities, which might
result in arbitral interpretations that appear to conflict with the intent of the parties.
In order to develop a more coherent approach with the potential to combat the
indeterminacy - and inconsistent interpretation - of indirect expropriation provisions,
this thesis has argued that, considering the public law nature of international
investment treaties, vague terms contained within those treaties should be interpreted
in light of legal doctrines drawn from public law principles under both domestic and
international law. To achieve a certain level of coherence and consistency, the
interpretation of treaty texts could utilize ‘general principles of law’, as is required in
the context of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).
The comparative study of state practices, and jurisprudence developed by the US
Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Constitutional
and Administrative Court of Thailand, and the Mexican Supreme Court, has shown
that the powers of governments to limit rights over property have long been
recognized within these selected jurisdictions. In essence, the governmental power to
control property has, historically, been conceptualized as an exercise of ‘police
power’ to promote legitimate public purposes in society. However, as societies
evolve politically and economically, the protection of property rights becomes an
increasingly predominant mode of curbing abusive uses of state power. Nevertheless,
since property rights are not absolute, and must serve a determinate social function,
they are subject to limitations. In this respect, state authorities can legitimately
exercise their powers to control private property within the bounds of permissible
legislative or bureaucratic discretion; however, conduct exceeding such bounds
requires the state to redress harm suffered by property owners as a result of sued
regulatory interferences.1
To ensure that public and private interests are appropriately balanced, domestic
courts in all selected jurisdictions, as well as the ECtHR, have commonly adopted
the ‘principle of proportionality’ as the main tool with which to resolve disputes in
1
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relation to regulatory takings. Within this conceptual framework, courts in the
selected jurisdictions generally recognise that regulatory interference is subject to
compensation under two main circumstances: The first circumstance is when a
regulation deprives the property owner of all property rights or all economicallyviable use. This situation is considered to be an extreme case, justifying the payment
of full market value as compensation for the loss incurred. The second circumstance
is when the regulatory interference falls short of total deprivation of property rights,
or of economically-viable use of property. In both cases, if the private interest
nevertheless outweighs the benefits arising from the regulatory interference in
question, compensation is generally required to redress the harm arising from an
excessive burden borne by the property owner. However, the quantum of
compensation may be dependent upon the conditions, and the nature of the measure,
in question. The respective courts may grant less-than-full compensation when this
amount is capable of striking a fair balance.
The appeal of this principle is that it permits the adjudicator to avoid an ‘all or
nothing’ interpretation, whereby it must favour either the private or public interest as
the main determining factor in deciding an indirect expropriation claim.2 While the
former focuses upon the impact of a state measure on the affected property, the latter
largely refers to the state’s margin of appreciation as a key component of legal
analysis. As claimed by Kriebaum, this ‘all or nothing’ approach would result in a
situation where a tribunal fails to achieve a compromise between public and private
interests, and simply places the interest of one over the other.3 Thus, the
characteristics of the ‘principle of proportionality’ provide a coherent framework for
legal analysis of expropriation, and enable the adjudicator to scrutinize all kinds of
regulatory interference that expropriate private property, without impeding the
processes of democratic politics within a country.
However, it should be noted that the proportionality principle is not a panacea for
addressing inconsistencies and indeterminacies inherent in indirect expropriation
analysis. The principle is a context-specific form of analysis and the application
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varies on a case-by-case basis. Despite the unpredictability of its outcome, the
application of the principle must take into account not only all relevant facts, but also
a stable set of criteria for evaluating the issues at hand. Such application of the
proportionality principle can reduce the existing anomalies in the investor-state
dispute settlement system, and contribute to the progressive development of
international investment law in the future.

B. Conceptual Framework for the Coherent and Consistent
Interpretation of Indirect Expropriation Provisions
1. Scope of Protected Property Rights Protection in Investment Treaties
The scope of protected investment and property rights is not defined in the
expropriation clause of a typical investment treaty. However, a drafter of an
investment treaty could limit the application the expropriation clause by restricting
the scope of protected property rights and investments. As discussed in previous
Chapters, the scope of property rights protection under indirect expropriation laws in
our surveyed jurisdictions is broad in each case and generally encompasses any form
of both tangible and intangible property. However, it does not generally encompass
property rights that are either speculative in nature or a mere expectation of vested
rights.
2. Adopted Proportionality Doctrine as Substantive Law
Largely as a result of its appeal, the ‘principle of proportionality’ is implicitly
embedded in modern international investment treaties. Under the 2004 US Model
BITs, and the revised 2012, the drafters have listed a class of criteria in the Annexes
that reflect the opportunity to apply the ‘principle of proportionality’.4 Following the
legal standard developed in US jurisprudence in Penn Central,5 the drafters have
included, in consecutive US BIT Models, three key legal factors to determine
whether an action by a party constitutes an indirect expropriation. These factors are:
4
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(i) the economic impact of the government action; (ii) the extent to which the
government

action

interferes

with

distinct,

reasonable

expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action.

investment-backed

6

Despite the introduction of the new framework, which permits the adjudicators to
better balance public and private interests, the applicability of the provisions is
arguably unpredictable as it is subject to the unguided discretion of arbitral tribunals.
As discussed in Chapter Nine, the three-prong test arguably involves an ‘amorphous
process’, whereby the courts take all of the relevant factors into consideration at
once, rather than engaging in a systematic evaluation of these factors. 7 This is
different from the ‘proportionality doctrine’, which is more structured and explicitly
requires that all pertinent rights and interests at stake be thoroughly weighed and
compared in a systematic and logical manner.8 The explicit introduction of the
‘proportionality test’ to the field of international investment law will allow
adjudicators to ground their analysis within a more formal and consistent framework,
thereby encouraging a holistic assessment of the impact of regulatory interference.
Although the proportionality doctrine is recognized in the surveyed jurisdiction, the
degree in which the doctrine is actually applied varies. While the doctrine has long
been established by the ECtHR, it has been borrowed and applied to case law by
Thai courts from time to time. The doctrine is, however, an emerging concept in the
United States and Mexico. In both countries, the doctrine has become a standard
feature of constitutional analysis in the recent years. In the United States, where
courts adhere to the balancing of interests and values when determining the existence
of regulatory takings, the proportionality doctrine has recently been adopted in
courts’ legal reasoning when analyzing the regulatory interference issues.
Despite the variants of the application, the doctrine is not alien in the surveyed
jurisdictions. Since the concept of proportionality is fairly recognized in the surveyed
6
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jurisdictions, even in the United States,9 it emerges as a ‘general principle of law’
within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT when the arbitral tribunals
articulate the vague standards of protections under international investment treaties.
To establish a common platform of legal analysis in international investment treaties,
at least three basic questions commonly featured in courts’ jurisprudence should be
referred by international arbitral tribunals when analyzing the compensable
regulatory takings: first, the means must be necessary to serve the stated goal;
second, the means must be suitable; and third, the regulatory interference must be
proportionate to the goals that the state government wants to pursue.
3. Procedural Law for Adjudicating on Proportionality
If the proportionality doctrine is adopted as substantive law, then it will need
procedures to hear and consider opinions of the contracting parties during the
balancing process.10 As discussed in Chapter Nine, arbitral tribunals that have less
political expertise, and are not embodied within local politics, should listen to
domestic government and take into their account the means and goals pursued by the
host state government in their balancing process of proportionality analysis.
Although the legal outcome may still be unpredictable, the proportionality test is
considered to be an ideal instrument with which to encourage the defendant to
articulate the justification for the interference.
Deference to decision-making bodies during the arbitration processes is not a new
idea. Article 31 of the US Model BIT, for example, states that:
1. Where a respondent asserts as a defense that the measure alleged to be a breach is
within the scope of an entry set out in Annex I, II, or III, the tribunal shall, on request
of the respondent, request the interpretation of the Parties on the issue. The Parties
shall submit in writing any joint decision declaring their interpretation to the tribunal
within 60 days of delivery of the request;
2. A joint decision issued under paragraph I by the Parties, each acting through its
representatives designated for purposes of this Article, shall be binding on the
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tribunal, and any decision or award issued by the tribunal must be consistent with that
joint decision.11

This sample provision provides a good illustration of how the local political
decision-making bodies of host state governments could participate in the process of
proportionality analysis to ensure that the context and relative importance of public
interests – a product of the socio-political settings within each specific country - will
be properly taken into account. The involvement of decision-makers in the process
would help to mitigate the risk of valid policies being undermined by ad hoc arbitral
tribunals, which are often unfamiliar with the circumstances present within a specific
country or are affected by personal bias.12

C. A Proposed Legal Framework for Future International Investment
Law on Indirect Expropriation
Given the problems associated with the indeterminacy of indirect expropriation
clauses, a new approach to review and identify compensable regulatory interference
is greatly needed. A viable approach to developing a new model law is to adopt
‘general principles of law’ employed by the domestic courts of the US, Thailand and
Mexico, as well as the ECtHR.
In relation to the notion of protected property rights and investments, the drafters
might include a broad range of properties and interests in the possible model.
However, the scope of protection should exclude certain property interests that are
either a mere expectation or a speculation.
To clarify the distinction between direct and indirect expropriation, the model law
could use the standard proposed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). However, to promote predictability, the UNCTAD
definitions of both direct and indirect expropriations could be improved upon. Based
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on the model proposed by UNCTAD, which is in line with the concept developed by
courts within the jurisdictions surveyed here, there are two different types of state
regulatory interference that are subject to state liability. First, a direct expropriation
is the consequence of a measure that results in nationalization, or other modes of
expropriation, through the formal transfer of title, or forfeiture. Second, an indirect
expropriation is the consequence of a regulatory interference that has an effect
tantamount to direct expropriation, but without a formal transfer of title, or the
equivalent effect. A model text adopted by UNCTAD is suited well and should read
as followed:
Direct expropriation occurs when an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly
expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure;
Indirect expropriation occurs when a measure or series of measures by a Party has an
effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright
seizure.13

In addition, the model law should set up some criteria to distinguish between a
normal regulation and a compensable regulatory taking. The current regime of US
Model BITs provides a wide exemption clause to exclude certain types of policy
measures from expropriation liability. The 2012 US Model BIT, it sets out that:
Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public
health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.14

However, the proposed model exemption clause is not free from ambiguities and
there is no clear threshold that identifies the circumstances in which regulatory
interference is exempted from an indirect expropriation liability. Nevertheless, by
applying the common principles found in our surveyed jurisdictions, key elements
by which could be combined to form a proportionality test, to provide a coherent
basis for legal interpretation by arbitral tribunals, can be formulated. Starting with
the proposal prepared by UNCTAD and the US Model BIT, but adding criteria
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pertinent to the ‘proportionality doctrine, a model exemption clause to distinguish
compensable from non-compensable regulatory takings might be formulated as
follows:
Except in rare circumstances, a measure which is adopted and applied for public
purposes, adopted in good faith, on a non-discriminatory basis, and meets the
proportionality requirements, is not an indirect expropriation subject to the duty to
compensate. To determine the proportionality of a measure, the arbitral tribunal must
examine: (i) the necessity of the measure, (ii) the suitability of the interference in
relation to the policy goal; and (iii) any excessive burden resulting from the measure.
To decide whether the measure imposes a disproportionate burden on the property
owner, the arbitral tribunal has an obligation to consult with governmental decisionmaking bodies in the contracting parties prior to making a final decision. Subject to
the state’s margin of appreciation, the arbitral tribunal may award fair market value, or
less than the fair market value, as compensation.15

Articulated in this way, arbitral tribunals would be discouraged from acting
unreasonably when either limiting a state’s sovereignty to regulate or protecting the
property rights of foreign investors. To justifiably interfere with private property
rights, a regulatory measure must be necessary, suitable to the goals pursued and not
impose excessive burden on the property owner in a given case. Thus, arbitral
tribunals should recognize the state’s margin of appreciation; but be able to intercept
those measures that have an impact disproportionate to the alleged goals being
pursued.
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